REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

 SECOND SECTION

JUDGMENT

ÖMÜR KARA AND ONURSAL ÖZBEK

Application no. 2013/4825

24 March 2016

            III. THE FACTS

[8-30]. The first applicant Ömür Kara and the second applicant Onursal Özbek were employed by the employer, T. Ticaret A.Ş. (“the Company”), having signed an employment contract on 1 March 2010 and 11 April 2011 respectively.

The applicants also signed a Commitment Letter on Information Security, as a part of their employment contracts, in which Article 2 briefly provides that “any computer, e-mail, internet, telephone, USB memory and such kind of resources and communication means provided by the Company for business purposes cannot be used by employees for personal purposes other than those that are strictly necessary, for any unacceptable purpose and in a way which is contrary to public moral and customs” and Article 6 provides that “without giving prior notice and warning to the employees, the Company’s officials are entitled, at any time, to monitor IT and communication resources used by the employees, to back-up and report employees’ correspondences and communication records, -if necessary- to inspect and seize these correspondences and records in detail as well as to impose any restriction on the employees’ utilization of such resources”. 

After a while, the second applicant’s wife informed one of the Company officials of the emotional relationship between the applicants and, in support of this claim, submitted a copy of the applicants’ e-mail correspondences. Therefore, the applicants were denied access to their computers at the workplace in order for a monitoring process whereby the employer could check the accuracy of the claim in question.

Upon the inquiries carried out by the Company, the applicants’ employment contracts were terminated, on 21 May 2012, by the former pursuant to the relevant paragraph of Article 25 of the Labour Law, which is titled “acts and behaviours in breach of moral and good faith principles”.

The applicants then filed an action before the 12^th Chamber of the Bakırköy Labour Court for reinstatement on 20 June 2012; however the labour court dismissed the actions. Thereupon, the applicants appealed the first instance decisions before the Court of Cassation which also dismissed the appellate request. Accordingly, after being upheld by the Court of Cassation, the first instance decisions became final.

On 27 June 2013, the applicants lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court.

IV.  EXAMINATION AND GROUNDS

30. The Constitutional Court, at its session of 24 March 2016, examined the application and decided as follows.

A.   The Applicants’ Allegations                                

31. The applicants maintained that the contents of their correspondence via their personal e-mail accounts had been accessed by their employer without their consent; that their employment contracts had been terminated on the basis of these contents; that the contents of their correspondence had been considered as evidence within the scope of the declaratory action filed by them in request for reinstatement; that the court which had examined the contents of their correspondence, by disregarding the manner in which they had been obtained, had decided that their contracts had lawfully been terminated; that due to the second applicant’s ex-wife’s being heard as witness before the court, the action in question had proceeded over the details of their private lives; that thereby, the court had caused the contents of their correspondence related to their private lives to become public; that the court had failed to provide them with protection against the unlawful interference with their private lives by third persons; and that their opinions which they had submitted during the proceedings had been questioned. In this respect, the applicants alleged that their rights safeguarded by Articles 20, 22 and 25 of the Constitution had been violated. 

B.    The Court’s Assessment

32. The Constitutional Court is not bound by the legal qualification of the facts by the applicants and it makes such assessment itself (see Tahir Canan, no. 2012/969, 18 September 2013, § 16).

33. The Ministry stated, in its observations, that the complaints regarding the use of the applicants’ private correspondence as evidence were related to the examination as to whether a fair trial had been conducted; that therefore they must be examined within the scope of the right to a fair trial; and that it had submitted its observations to that effect in applications where similar complaints had been put forward. Furthermore, in the assessment of the conducts of the respondent employer, taking into consideration the facts that an action for compensation may be filed against the respondent Company and that a criminal complaint may also be filed against the relevant persons, it must be examined whether legal remedies have been exhausted. In the assessment of the use of the private correspondence as evidence, the relationship between the scope of the private life and the termination of employment contract must be examined, as well as it must be examined whether the right to respect for private life requires the public authorities to take measures. In this context, relevant judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (“the ECHR”) containing similar allegations of violation were pointed out. 

34.  In their counter-statements which they submitted against the Ministry’s observations, the applicants stated that their allegations of violation were not related to the fairness of the proceedings, but to the right to respect for private life and the privacy of communication, and they reiterated their observations and requests which they had submitted in their application letters.

35. As it was understood that the allegations in question had stemmed from the courts’ failure to provide the applicants with protection against the unlawful interference with their private lives by third persons and the courts’ having accepted their private correspondence as evidence and caused them to become public, the examination would not deal with the fairness of the assessment of the evidence, but it would be carried out in conformity with the essence of the allegations, namely within the scope of the right to respect for private life and the privacy of communication.

1.    Admissibility

36. The applicants filed an action for reinstatement on the ground that their employment contracts had been terminated on the basis of the contents of their correspondence via their e-mail accounts, which had been in breach of the respect for their private lives and of their freedom of communication, thereby nullifying the termination of their employment contracts. It was therefore concluded that the applicants had submitted before the instance courts their complaints regarding the interference by their employers by means of checking their correspondence.

37.  Accordingly, the alleged violation of the right to respect for private life and the privacy of communication was declared admissible for not being manifestly ill-founded and there being no other grounds for its inadmissibility. 

2.    Merits

38. The applicants mainly alleged that the courts had failed to protect their private lives against the interferences by third persons; that their private correspondence had been accepted as evidence and made public by the courts; and that therefore their rights guaranteed under Articles 20 and 22 of the Constitution had been violated.

39. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 148 § 3 of the Constitution and Article 45 § 1 of Law no. 6216, in order for the merits of an individual application lodged with the Constitutional Court to be examined, the right claimed to have been interfered with by the public power must, in addition to being guaranteed in the Constitution, fall within the scope of the Convention and the additional protocols to which Turkey is a party. In other words, it is not possible to declare admissible an application which contains a claim as to the violation of a right falling outside the common protection area of the Constitution and the Convention (see Onurhan Solmaz, no. 2012/1049, 26 March 2013, § 18).

40. Article 20 § 1 of the Constitution, titled “Privacy of private life”, provides as follows:

“Everyone has the right to demand respect for his/her private and family life. Privacy of private or family life shall not be violated.”

41. Article 22 of the Constitution, titled “Freedom of communication”, provides as follows:

“Everyone has the freedom of communication. Privacy of communication is fundamental.

Unless there exists a decision duly given by a judge on one or several of the grounds of national security, public order, prevention of crime, protection of public health and public morals, or protection of the rights and freedoms of others, or unless there exists a written order of an agency authorized by law in cases where delay is prejudicial, again on the above-mentioned grounds, communication shall not be impeded nor its privacy be violated. The decision of the competent authority shall be submitted for the approval of the judge having jurisdiction within twenty-four hours. The judge shall announce his 11 decision within forty-eight hours from the time of seizure; otherwise, seizure shall be automatically lifted.

Public institutions and agencies where exceptions may be applied are prescribed in law.”

42. Article 8 of the Convention, titled “Right to respect for private and family life”, provides as follows:

“(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

43. The right to respect for private life is protected under Article 20 of the Constitution. The State must abstain from any arbitrary interference with the individuals’ private and family lives and prevent them against unjust attacks of the third parties. Private life is a broad concept which does not lend itself to an exhaustive definition. However, this concept covers such elements as the corporeal and spiritual integrity, physical and social identity, name, sexual orientation and sex life, as well as personal information and data, personal development, family life, and etc. (see Bülent Polat [Plenary], no. 2013/7666, 10 December 2015, § 61). Furthermore, given the purpose of the guarantees provided by Articles 20 and 22 of the Constitution, the data obtained by monitoring the personal phone calls and the use of internet in workplaces, as in the present case, shall be examined within the scope of this right (For similar judgments of the ECHR, see Barbulescu v. Romania, no. 61496/08, 12 January 2016, § 36).

44. The notion of private life guarantees that individuals lead a private social life, namely a “private life” within the meaning of their right to develop their social identities. In this sense, respect for private life must also comprise, to a certain degree, the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings. According to the case-law of the ECHR, there is no reason to consider that the notion of "private life" excludes professional activities. Restrictions on working life may fall under Article 8 when they affect the way in which the individual forges his social identity through the development of relationships with her/his peers. At this point, it should be noted that in the course of their working lives, the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world (see Bülent Polat, § 62; Özpınar v. Turkey, no. 20999/04, 19 October 2010, § 45; and Niemietz v. Germany, no. 13710/88, 16 December 1992, § 29).

a. General Principles

45. Fundamental rights which fall within the scope of the common protection area of the Constitution and the Convention may be impaired not only by the direct implementation of the public force, but also through the interference of third parties in a way leading to disputes between private persons. While in the first situation, there is no hesitation as to the direct fulfilment by the public authorities of the negative and positive obligations incumbent on them for ensuring the relevant safeguards, the second situation requires an assessment in the particular circumstances of each case as to what kind of protection the State is expected to afford the individuals against the interference by third parties and what the scope of its obligations is.

46. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Constitution, the provisions of the Constitution are fundamental legal rules binding upon legislative, executive and judicial organs, and administrative authorities and other institutions and individuals. Accordingly, the Constitution protects all individuals’ rights and freedoms enshrined therein. The scope of the fundamental aims and duties of the State stipulated in Article 5 of the Constitution and the emphasis in Article 12 of the Constitution on the nature of fundamental rights and freedoms reinforce this area of protection. In some cases, public authorities may undertake positive obligations to ensure the effective protection of the relevant rights and freedoms, even if they stem from the disputes between private persons. In cases where disputes arise between private persons, in the examination of whether the guarantees provided by the fundamental rights and freedoms have been fulfilled, such applications -regard being had to their particular circumstances- may be examined within the scope of the State’s positive obligations, as the private persons shall not be held responsible for the obligations imposed on the public authorities by the Constitution (see Barbulescu v. Romania, § 53).

47.  Such obligations require that a legal infrastructure be set up for the resolution of disputes between private persons; that the disputes in question be examined through fair proceedings including procedural safeguards; and that it be examined whether the constitutional safeguards concerning fundamental rights have been respected during these proceedings. These requirements stem from the obligation of the public authorities not to tolerate the unjust interferences by third parties with the rights and freedoms of individuals. As a matter of fact, the inferior courts play a role in the protection of safeguards by delivering binding decisions for the resolution of disputes between private persons. At this point, bringing the disputes before the judicial authorities and the resolution of them through fair proceedings constitute a part of the positive obligations incumbent on the public authorities.

48. The ECHR points out that such disputes, even if they do not arise out of the direct interference by the State, may entail the obligation of the State; and that although the essential object is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities, the State may in certain circumstances be obliged to intervene in the relationship between private individuals by taking reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the effective enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the Convention (see Sorensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark [GC], nos. 52562/99, 52620/99, 11 January 2006, § 57; and Palomo Sanchez and Others v. Spain [GC], no. 28955/06, ..., 12 September 2011, § 59).

49. The obligations of public authorities in terms of private law relations between persons other than the actors using public force, as in the present case, are to take the necessary measures to prevent the interference by third persons with the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, in the present application the right to respect for private life and the privacy of communication, and to ensure protection through the courts. Although the necessary structural measures are taken by public authorities, in cases where individuals are not provided with protection against the interference by third parties in the decisions of the courts conducting the proceedings in dispute, their obligations mentioned above shall not be deemed to have been fulfilled. This means that the rights and freedoms of individuals are left unprotected through the courts, which are public authorities.

50. Accordingly, in cases where the disputes concerning alleged interferences with the rights, safeguarded by the Constitution, of individuals working within the scope of private law employment relationship, the inferior courts must not ignore these safeguards, a fair balance must be struck between the competing interests of employer and employees, it must be examined whether the interference by the employer by means of monitoring the applicants’ institutional email accounts was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued by the employer and relevant and sufficient grounds must be submitted while delivering the judgment.

51.   Inferior courts, while striking a balance between the parties and examining the proportionality of the interference, must consider -in the circumstances of the case- how the restricting and compelling regulations are defined in employment contracts, whether the parties are informed of these regulations, whether the legitimate aim which resulted in an interference with the fundamental rights of employers was proportionate to the interference, and whether the termination of employment contracts, as in the present application, was a reasonable and proportionate action in view of the acts or inactivity of the employees. In addition, the inferior courts must act in due diligence to ensure that the procedures carried out during the proceedings and the reasoning of the decision delivered at the end of the proceedings do not constitute per se an interference with the private life.

52.  The ECHR examines, in cases brought before it for the alleged violations of Article 8-11 of the Convention in terms of private law employment relationships, whether the Contracting Parties have fulfilled their positive obligations stemming from these articles and ascertain whether the relevant rights of the applicants who were dismissed have adequately been secured by national courts in the context of private law employment relationships (see Palomo Sanchez and Others v. Spain, § 61).

53.  The ECHR considers that national courts must strike a fair balance between the competing interests of the individuals and of the community in private law disputes concerning the rights enshrined in Articles 8-11 of the Convention (see Köpke v. Germany, no. 420/07, 5 October 2010; Palomo Sanchez and Others v. Spain, § 62; and Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 48420/10, ..., 15 January 2013, § 84). In addition, it must be determined whether the interferences made with the relevant rights under protection within the scope of the private law employment relationship were proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the justifications submitted in the decisions of national courts were both relevant and sufficient (see Palomo Sanchez and Others v. Spain, § 63).

54. Pursuant to the employment contracts signed by private persons by paying regard to mutual interests, the parties naturally undertake certain responsibilities, they undertake that they will abide by certain restrictive rules during working hours and they are informed of the sanctions they will face if they fail to comply with the contract. At this point, in order for the employer, by considering the interests in the continuation of peace and confidence at the workplace, to limit certain rights of the employees during working hours and thereby ensuring the targeted working order, the employees may be obliged to abide by certain rules. However, the issues that compel employees to abide by such restrictive and established special rules must not impinge on the essence of their fundamental rights, they must clearly be stipulated in the employment contracts signed by the parties, and the employees must be provided with information on these issues. In cases where employees are not duly informed or warned, they will have reasonable expectations that there will not be any arbitrary interference with their fundamental rights and freedoms, and therefore such interference by the employers, who are generally in a position of determining the conditions of the contracts, to be directed at their employees will not become acceptable.

55.  It is primarily under the inferior courts’ power and responsibility to determine the competing interests, to strike a reasonable balance and to establish whether the interferences were proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued by the employer. There is no doubt that the inferior courts, which are in direct contact with all parties of the case, are in more advantageous position to assess the circumstances of the case. The role of the Constitutional Court is restricted to the determination as to whether these rules have been interpreted in conformity with the Constitution. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court is authorized to supervise the procedure followed by the inferior courts and to determine especially whether the courts have paid regard to the safeguards enshrined in Articles 20 and 22 of the Constitution while interpreting the lawfulness of the interferences with the rights and freedoms of the parties which are already limited. In this scope, the Constitutional Court’s task is not to determine whether there was an actual ground for the termination of the contracts, nor to take the place of the inferior courts, but rather to review the decisions taken by the public authorities within their margin of appreciation from the standpoint of the guarantees concerning the right to respect for private life and the freedom of communication.    

56. In this connection, the ECHR reiterates that it has an authority to supervise the procedure followed by the national courts and in particular, to establish whether or not the national courts paid regard to the safeguards set forth in the Convention, especially in Article 8 thereof, while interpreting and applying the legislation provisions. In addition, the ECHR, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity on which it relies while reviewing the applications, does not supervise the margin of appreciation of the national courts in the interpretation of their legislation provisions; however, it reviews whether the conclusions of the national courts were in line with the standards enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention, and thus whether the conclusions of the national courts amounted to a violation of the right to respect for private life (see Petrenco v. Moldova, no. 20928/05, 30 June 2010, § 54; and Palomo Sanchez and Others v. Spain, § 55).

57. In the present case, the alleged failure to ensure the safeguards provided by the fundamental rights and freedoms must be examined within the scope of the State’s positive obligations, as the dispute in question had taken place between private persons.

58. As stated above, the limits of the negative and positive obligations that may be considered within the scope of the right to respect for private life and in which cases the positive obligations necessitate favourable acts cannot be determined by setting precise boundaries, and these obligations may vary in each cases.

59. The applicants maintained that although the monitoring of their email accounts constituted an unjust interference with their private lives and their freedom of communication, in the actions for reinstatement which they brought requesting that the termination of their employment contracts be found unjust and they be reinstated, such a determination was not made. On the contrary, due to the decisions of the courts, these interferences were legitimized and their correspondence were caused to become public. The applicants’ allegations in this respect must be examined by considering the circumstances of the period during which the facts taken as grounds for the interferences had occurred and by also considering whether the inferior courts acted in conformity with the aforementioned principles in the course of the proceedings before them.

60. In the present case, seven witnesses including the ex-wife of the second applicant were heard at the first hearing held on 31 January 2013 before the 12^th Chamber of the Bakırköy Labour Court that was conducting the reinstatement proceedings in respect of the applicants. Witness statements generally included the observations of the witnesses on the relationship between the applicants and on their intimacy. In addition, the reflections of the applicants’ intimacy, working in different departments, on their productivity and performance and in general on the workplace environment were also mentioned in the witness statements. In this connection, in the statements of the applicants, as well as of the other witnesses working in the same Company with the applicants, no unfavourable assessment was made on the productivity and performance of the applicants; and some of the witnesses stated that they had received some information on the applicants’ being close to each other but that they were not aware of the existence of a relationship beyond friendship between them.

61. When the parties’ statements which they made during the proceedings and the witness statements are examined, it could not be established whether the correspondence between the applicants, which had been disclosed by the ex-wife of the second applicant to their employer, had been made through their personal or institutional e-mail accounts; however, regard being had to the statement of a witness, who had been working as a human resources director in the relevant Company on the date when the applicants’ employment contracts were terminated, before the court as “… We have done research, through the data processing system, on whether the plaintiff used his e-mail account for special purposes. Indeed, the mentioned e-mails are available in the computer records.” and to the acknowledgement in the petitions submitted by the employer to the inferior courts, it has been understood that the employer, who had been informed of the situation through the contents of the applicants’ correspondence in question and the statements of the second applicant’s ex-wife, monitored the applicants’ institutional e-mail accounts through the data processing system in order to verify the accuracy of the applicants’ correspondence in question.

62. As it appears from the case files, assessments were made to the effect that the correspondence between the applicants had been disclosed to the authorized person or organs of the respondent Company by third persons who were not party to the case; that afterwards, the employer had monitored the applicants’ institutional e-mail accounts; and that the applicants’ employment contracts had been terminated on various grounds, especially on the grounds that the contents of the relevant correspondence had been contrary to the employment contracts. It was also considered that the respondent Company had submitted the relevant correspondence to the inferior courts as evidence; that the justifications of the decisions rendered by the courts that had examined the evidence and heard the witnesses had not contained any details about the contents of the correspondence in question; and that according to the employer, it had not been possible to maintain the business relationships with the applicants; and as a result, the applicants’ cases were dismissed.

63. In the present case, there was a conflict between the interests of the employer in the continuation of peace and discipline in the workplace within the scope of the rules set by him and the applicants’ right to respect for their private lives and the privacy of communication. However, the Constitutional Court’s duty is not to make a direct assessment on the disputes between the private persons. The role of the Constitutional Court is to supervise the procedure followed by the inferior courts, which delivers binding decisions for the parties, in the resolution of the dispute and to determine whether the inferior courts paid regard to the safeguards enshrined in Articles 20 and 22 of the Constitution while interpreting the lawfulness of the interferences with the rights and freedoms of the parties which are already limited.

64. Pursuant to the provisions set forth in the employment contracts signed between the applicants and their employer, the applicants had undertaken to abide by the Internal Regulation on the rules to be followed in the workplace, the Basic Regulations, orientation booklet, the Travel Regulations, instructions and procedures, as integral parts of their employment contracts.

65. The regulations allowing for arbitrary and unlimited interferences by the employers with their employees’ private lives and their freedom of communication are unacceptable within the scope of Articles 11 and 12 of the Constitution. However, in cases where there are regulations that explicitly include the rules set in accordance with the commercial requirements and disciplinary understanding of the company, which are not contrary to the safeguards provided by the constitutional rights and freedoms, the laws and international treaties, and where the employees are informed of and warned about these regulations beforehand, it may be reasonable to take measures with a view to limiting certain rights of the employees, especially during working hours, to a certain extent and compelling them not to fall foul of the rules. Accordingly, in cases where no information is provided in this respect and no warning is made to the employees, it must be accepted that the employees will have reasonable expectations that there will not be any interference with their rights and freedoms, and they must be provided with the safeguards ensured by these rights and freedoms.

66. Within the scope of the examination made in this respect, it has been understood that each page of the Workplace Basic Regulations, the Information Security Contract, the regulations including the basic management principles and basic rules of conduct, the regulations including ethical rules for the commercial relations of the company, the Travel Regulations, the Workplace Disciplinary Regulations, the Workplace Personnel Regulations and the Workplace Dress Code, which are accepted as part of the employment contracts, had been signed by the applicants, along with their employment contracts. Thus, it may be concluded that the applicants were adequately informed of all general regulations including rules and restrictions set by the employer for the purpose of ensuring peace and discipline in the workplace.

67. It appears that, by signing in particular the Information Security Contract, the applicants had undertaken not to use the computers, e-mail accounts, internet, telephone, communication programs and other sources of information technologies and communication instruments for personal purposes beyond essential needs, for fun and for the acts against manners and customs. Furthermore, the applicants had also acknowledged and undertaken that the directors of the company might always monitor the information technologies and communication sources used by the applicants without informing or warning them; that their correspondence and communication records might be backed up, reported, examined in detail where necessary, seized or limited for use.

68. The use of the Company sources, computers and institutional e-mail accounts for private purposes had strictly been banned through the regulations which had been part of the employment contracts, and the applicants had been warned and informed of the fact that where necessary, their correspondence and communication records might be monitored and examined. However, it has been understood that although the personal e-mail accounts and communication instruments was allowed to be used during working hours, the applicants carried out their private correspondence through their institutional e-mail accounts during working hours, which was in breach of their employment contracts. Therefore, the applicants cannot be considered to have had reasonable expectations with regard to the protection of their private correspondence that they carried out through their institutional e-mail accounts.

69. Furthermore, the employer examined the applicants’ institutional e-mail accounts in order to verify the allegation that the applicants had acted contrary to the Company regulations, after he had been informed of the applicants’ correspondence submitted by the ex-wife of the second applicant to the directors of the Company. In addition to the determination made in this respect, regard also being had to the provisions of Law no. 4857 and the regulations stipulated in the employment contracts, it has been concluded that the employer had pursued a legitimate aim by monitoring the correspondence between the applicants in order to verify whether they had used their institutional e-mail accounts for private purposes and in accordance with the Basic Regulations; that the interference by the employer had been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued; and that these issues had been taken into account in the decisions of the inferior courts.

70. When the proceedings before the courts are examined, it appears, in the first place, that the applicants had submitted their evidence before the inferior courts and that they had been able to enjoy their right to submit their allegations and their right to defence without facing any obstacle. It has also been understood that the correspondence in question was made during working hours for private purposes; that the applicants was informed of and warned about the regulations concerning the workplace order and they signed the relevant documents in this respect; that on suspicion that applicant acted contrary to their employment contracts, their employer monitored their institutional e-mail accounts in a way falling within the predetermined limits of interference; and that there is no other information as to the fact that the employer accessed and monitored other data about the applicants. During the proceedings, it was concluded that the rotas and personal files of the applicants had been requested and examined by the instance courts; that the contents of the correspondence in question had not been stated in the reasoning of the decisions; that a limited assessment had been on the subject-matter of the case; that in the decisions it had been underlined that due to the applicants’ improper acts, unfavourable situations had occurred in the workplace, which had led the employer to terminate the applicants’ employment contracts; that besides Law no. 4857, the applicants’ acts had also been contrary to the employment contracts and internal regulations of the workplace; and that therefore there was nothing unlawful in the termination of the applicants’ contracts. Furthermore, the statement of the ex-wife of the second applicant in the capacity of witness only contained the questions which were asked by the courts in order to verify the employer’s allegations and which did not have any intimate aspect, and in the course of the proceedings or in the reasoning of the decisions, there was no element that caused the applicants’ private lives to become public and violated the privacy of communication.

71. It was concluded, in the decisions of the inferior courts, that given the fact that the applicants had no reasonable expectations, a balance was struck between the competing interests of the applicants and the employer; that assessments were made as to whether the interference made by the employer through the monitoring of the institutional e-mail accounts of the applicants had been proportionate to the legitimate purpose pursued by the employer in accordance with the internal regulations of the Company; that it was examined whether the termination of the applicants’ employment contracts had been reasonable and proportionate to their acts; that for all these reasons, relevant and sufficient grounds were available for dismissal of the applicants’ case; and that the contents of the applicants’ correspondence were not announced to the public either during the proceedings or in the reasoning of the decisions.

72. Consequently, as the inferior courts that resolved the disputes arising out of the private law employment relationships fulfilled their positive obligations for the protection of constitutional safeguards by finding relevant and sufficient grounds and the contents of the correspondence between the applicants were not announced to the public, it must be concluded that the applicants’ right to respect for their private lives and the privacy of communication, which are respectively safeguarded by Articles 20 and 22 of the Constitution, were not violated.

V. JUDGMENT

The Constitutional Court UNANIMOUSLY held on 24 March 2016 that

A. The alleged violations of the right to respect for private life and of the privacy of communication be DECLARED ADMISSIBLE;

B. The right to respect for private life and the privacy of communication, which are respectively safeguarded by Articles 20 and 22 of the Constitution, were NOT VIOLATED; and

C. The court expenses of the applicants be COVERED by themselves.