THE FACTS

 [7-46] The applicants’ brother, Bayram Dülek, was found dead by being hanged in the ward toilet in the course of his military service during which the doctors issued a report indicating that he had been in tendency to commit suicide due to his psychological disorder namely dysthymia. The applicants’ request for initiation of an administrative investigation to redress the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage sustained by them due to the death of Bayram Dülek was dismissed. The action for compensation brought before the Supreme Military Administrative Court (“SMAC”) was dismissed on the ground that there was no faulty liability or absolute liability attributable to the administration. In the application lodged with the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), it was held that there had been a breach of the right to life. The applicant’s request for a re-trial in line with the ECHR’s violation judgment was also dismissed by the SMAC.

 IV. EXAMINATION AND GROUND

47. The Constitutional Court, at its session of 17 February 2016, examined the application and decided as follows:

A. The Applicants’ Allegations

48. The applicants maintained that their next-of-kin, Bayram Dülek, had been recruited to the military service although he had suffered mental illness to the extent he would end his own life, which had been known to the authorities; that he had committed suicide as the necessary precautions had not been taken during the military service; that the action for compensation brought by them before the SMAC had been dismissed as the administration did not have any fault or no-fault responsibility in the impugned incident; that thereafter they had lodged an application with the ECHR which found a violation of the right to life; and that their request for a retrial in line with the ECHR’s judgment had been once again dismissed by the SMAC upon examination. They further alleged that in the decision whereby their request for a retiral was dismissed, their allegation that Bayram Dülek should have never been recruited to the military service was considered to form an action for compensation resulting from an administrative act and this complaint was found to be filed out of time; whereas as for the alleged non-fulfilment of the duty of care, it was indicated that as the ECHR had found a violation due to the deficiency in the military recruitment system, its judgment was not applicable to this complaint; and that making a reference to merely a certain part of the ECHR’s judgment and making an arbitrary interpretation of this part, the SMAC issued a dismissal decision. It was further indicated that the ECHR held the State responsible not only for the deficiency in the recruitment system but also for the consequences thereof; that even if recruitment to the military service was considered as an administrative act, the continued undertaking of the risk as to the right to life during the performance of military service and its possible consequences were also an unjust act; and that the authorities failed to display due diligence in respect of the applicants’ next-of-kin during the performance of the military service. They accordingly alleged that their rights safeguarded by Articles 12, 17, 40 and 125 of the Constitution had been violated and claimed pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation as well as requested reimbursement of the court expenses incurred.

B. The Court’s Assessment

49. The Constitutional Court is not bound by the legal qualification of the facts by the applicant and it makes such assessment itself (see Tahir Canan, no. 2012/969, 18 September 2013, § 16). In consideration of the application form and its annexes as a whole, it appears that the applicants mainly complained of the failure to redress the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage sustained by them on account of the incident, which was found established by the ECHR’s judgments finding a violation of the right to life, as the SMAC failed to conduct a sufficient and effective inquiry. In this respect, the Court considered that all allegations raised by the applicants -in so far as they related to the question whether the steps indicated by the ECHR in its violation judgment had been duly taken- be examined within the scope of the right to life safeguarded by Article 17 of the Constitution.

1. Admissibility

50. Individual applications must be lodged, either directly or through other courts or representations in foreign countries, with the Constitutional Court within 30 days upon the exhaustion of the available legal remedies or, in cases where no available legal remedy exists, by the date when the violation is become known, pursuant to Article 148 § 13 of the Constitution, Article 47 § 5 of the Code on the Establishment and Rules of Procedures of the Constitutional Court no. 6216 and dated 30 March 2011, as well as Article 64 § 1 of the Internal Regulations of the Court (see Yasin Yaman, no. 2012/1075, 12 February 2013, §§ 18-19).

51. The requirement to comply with the relevant time-limit rule, which is one of the admissibility conditions of the individual application mechanism, is a condition to be ex officio taken into consideration at every stage of the examination of individual application (see Taner Kurban, no. 2013/1582, 7 December 2013, § 19).

52. As per the abovementioned provisions, an individual application must be lodged within 30 days following the date when the legal remedies have been exhausted or, if no legal remedy is available, the date when the violation is become known. In this sense, there is a close correlation between the exhaustion of legal remedies and the time-limit condition set for individual application. Accordingly, the ordinary legal remedy specified in these provisions must be accessible and effective one which is capable of offering a reasonable prospect of success and providing redress (see Taner Kurban, § 20). In other words, this limited time cannot be extended by means of making inappropriate applications with organs and bodies which do not have any power and duty to offer redress for a given complaint. It is therefore necessary to separately review whether each legal remedy is effective in respect of the relevant applications, without seeking the condition for exhaustion of an ineffective and inadequate legal remedy, given the particular circumstances of each case (see Hasip Kaplan, no. 2013/4681, 30 June 2014, § 23).

53. In the present case, the applicants whose request for rectification of the decision was dismissed on 7 November 2012 by the 2^nd Chamber of the SMAC made another request for rectification of the decision of 7 November 2012. It was also dismissed without any examination by the same Chamber on 20 February 2013 on the grounds that such a request may be filed only for once and that rectification of the decision dismissing the request for a retrial cannot be requested. The applicants lodged an individual application within 30 days after taking delivery of the decision dismissing their request for rectification of the decision. Regard being had to the fact that the applicants’ request for rectification of the decision was dismissed without any examination, it must be primarily ascertained from the date of which decision the thirty-day time-limit set for lodging an individual application would start to run.

 54. Relevant part of Article 66 § 1 of Law no. 1602, titled “Rectification of decision”, provides for “A request for rectification of the decisions rendered by the Chambers and the Board of Chambers may be made for only once (…)”. In the decision of joinder, which was rendered on 7 February 1977 by the General Assembly of the SMAC concerning the rectification of the decision, it was indicated that in cases where a decision which was rectified upon the request for rectification was deemed to be a fresh decision, it would lead to a vicious circle in terms of the appellate remedy; that broad interpretation of “decisions rendered by the Chambers and Board of Chambers” would go beyond the objective pursued by the law-maker; that as it was the same body rendering the decision and dealing with the request for rectification of the decision and the subject-matter of this request was comprised of the decisions of the same nature, which were rendered by the Chamber of the Board of Chambers, the decision rendered following the acceptance of the request for rectification of the decision must be considered not as a fresh decision but as the one replacing the rectified decision; and that accordingly, an individual might file a request for rectification for once.

 55. Following the above-mentioned decision of joinder, the SMAC has consistently noted that the remedy of rectification of decision may be resorted to for only once and accordingly dismissed, without any examination, the requests for rectification which were raised for the second time. The sole exception to that rule, which is accepted by the SMAC, is the cases where the request for rectification of decisions rendered upon the first examination pursuant to Article 45 of Law no. 1602 is accepted and where a different conclusion is reached on the merits. Save for this exception, the SMAC dismisses, without any examination, the request for rectification of decision which is raised twice.

 56. Given Article 66 of Law no. 1602 which provides for that rectification of the decisions rendered by the SMAC Chamber and Board of Chambers may be requested for only once, the decision of joinder of 7 February 1977 that was rendered by the SMAC General Assembly as well as the steady practice in this respect, the Court considers that the available remedies have been exhausted upon the decision rendered by the SMAC on the first request for rectification of the decision; and that the thirty-day time-limit for lodging an individual application must start to run as from the notification date of this decision. That is why the SMAC does not make any examination as to the merits of the request for rectification of decision if it has been made for twice and dismisses the request as not being eligible for examination.

 57. In spite of the relevant provisions of Law no. 1602 and the relevant practice implemented by the SMAC as mentioned above, particular circumstances of each case must be also taken into consideration in terms of the requirement of exhaustion of legal remedies and thirty-day time-limit rule.

 58. In the present case, the action for compensation brought by the applicants was dismissed on the merits by the 2^nd Chamber of the SMAC on 12 December 2007. Thereafter, the applicants requested rectification of the decision, which was accepted by the 2^nd Chamber of the SMAC on 12 March 2008 but was ultimately dismissed on the merits by the same Chamber on 8 October 2008. The applicants requested rectification of the decision for the second time. Although it was the second time the applicants requested rectification of the decision in the same case, the SMAC dismissed their request by its decision -dated 28 January 2009 and no. E.2009/112 K.2009/88- where it was indicated “… as the grounds relied on by the complainant’s lawyer in the petition whereby the rectification of the decision has been requested were found justified, and the decision requested to be rectified was found in accordance with the law and procedure, as well”. In other words, the SMAC did not dismiss without any examination the applicants’ second request for rectification of the decision in the same case but instead examined their request and accordingly dismissed it for being compatible with the law and procedure.

 59. In the light of the ECHR’s judgment finding a violation, the applicants filed a request for a retrial. However, their request was rejected. Thereupon, they filed a request for rectification of that decision. However, the SMAC dismissed without any examination the request for rectification on the grounds that a request for rectification of the decision cannot be filed for twice and that upon the dismissal of the request for a retrial, no request for rectification of the dismissal decision can be made either.

 60. As is inferred from the explanations above, whereas before the ECHR’s violation judgment, the SMAC examined the applicants’ request for rectification of the decision, which was also filed for the second time; following the ECHR’s violation judgment, it dismissed without any examination the request for rectification of the decision -whereby the request for a retrial had been rejected- on the ground that no request for rectification of the decision could be filed for twice and that rectification of the decision dismissing the request for a retrial could not be requested. Regard being had to the facts that the applicants’ second request for rectification of the decision was not dismissed without any examination before the ECHR’s violation judgment and that even dismissed, the request was nevertheless examined on its merits, the applicants’ request for rectification in the hope that the decision on dismissal of their request for a retrial would be re-examined was found reasonable in the context of the particular circumstances of the case. An interpretation to the contrary may lead to the violation of the applicants’ right of access to a court for acting in an extremely formalistic manner. For these reasons, the present application -which was lodged within thirty days as from the notification date of the decision concerning the request for rectification of the decision dismissing the request for a retrial- must be considered to have been lodged in due time.

 61. In Article 46 § 1 of Code no. 6216 on the Establishment and Rules of Procedures of the Constitutional Court, it is envisaged that an individual application may be lodged only by those, whose current and personal right is directly affected due to an act, action or negligence allegedly giving rise to a violation. By very nature of the right to life, an application with respect to this right for the persons who have lost their lives may be lodged only by the relatives of the deceased persons (see Sadık Koçak and Others, no. 2013/841, 23 January 2014, § 65). In the present case, the deceased person, Bayram Dülek, was the son of the applicants Kazım Dülek and Sıddıka Dülek and brother of the other applicants. It is therefore no deficiency also in respect of the applicants’ capacity to lodge an individual application.

 62. For these reasons, the Court declared the individual application admissible for not being manifestly ill-founded and there being no other ground to declare it inadmissible.

 2. Merits

 63. The applicants maintained that their next-of-kin Bayram Dülek, suffering from a psychological disorder, had committed suicide during his military service due to the authorities’ negligence; that after their action for compensation had been dismissed by the SMAC, they lodged an application with the ECHR which found a violation of the right to life in their case; that their request for a retrial in the light of the ECHR’s judgment had not been examined effectively and sufficiently by the SMAC; and that their losses could not be redressed. They accordingly alleged that their right to life had been violated.

 64. In its observations, the Ministry has noted that as the applicants did not raise a complaint as regards the violation of the right to life, no observations would be submitted within the scope of this right; that it would merely submit observations with respect to the right of access to a court; that the right of access to a court, which refers the right to bring an action before tribunals in civil matters, also covers the right to be present before the court; that however, the right of access to a court is not an absolute right but may be subject to certain implicit restrictions; and that in this sense, States have a certain margin of appreciation. It has been further indicated that any restriction with the right of access to a court may comply with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention only when a legitimate aim is pursued and there is reasonable balance between the aim pursued and the means applied; that in applying the procedural rules, the courts must abstain from acting with excessive formalism which may infringe the right to a fair trial as well as from extreme flexibility which would lead to elimination of the procedural rules; and that setting certain time-limits to have recourse to certain remedies such as to lodge an appeal and to bring an action serves for the principle of legal security.

 65. In the Ministry’s observations, it has been also indicated that in the present case, on 18 May 2012 when the applicants applied to the SMAC for a retrial upon the ECHR’s violation judgment, the finding by the ECHR’s final judgment that the impugned decision was in breach of the Convention or its additional protocols was not among the grounds that would require a retrial under Law no. 1602; that the applicants’ request was nevertheless dealt with by the SMAC but was considered as an action for compensation resulting from an administrative act; and that as no action was brought in due time against the recruitment of the applicants’ next-of-kin to the military, the ECHR’s judgment could not be executed; and that these considerations must be taken into account in the assessment to be made.

 66. In their petition of 13 April 2015, the applicants noted that although it was indicated in the Ministry’s observations that they had not complained of a violation of the right to life, they mentioned, in the application form, the manifest violation of Article 17 § 1 of the Constitution; that as Bayram Dülek was no longer alive, consequences of the violation could be removed only by offering redress for the losses and damages suffered by his relatives due to his death; and that qualification of their action by the SMAC as an action for compensation resulting from an administrative act was in breach of their constitutional rights.

 67. Article 17 § 1 of the Constitution, titled “Personal inviolability, corporeal and spiritual existence of the individual”, reads as follows:

 “Everyone has the right to life and the right to protect and improve his/her corporeal and spiritual existence.”

68. The Convention signed on 4 November 1950 for the protection and improvement of fundamental rights and freedoms was ratified by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey by Law no. 6366 and dated 10 March 1954 and took effect in terms of Turkey after the certificate of ratification was deposited to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on 18 May 1954. By virtue of the resolution of the Council of Ministers dated 22 January 1987 and no. 87/11439, the right to lodge an individual application with the European Commission on Human Rights was adopted, and by virtue of the resolution dated 25 September 1989 and no. 89/14563, Turkey recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the ECHR. Thereby, Turkey has undertaken the liability to secure the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention and afforded all individuals within its jurisdiction the right to lodge an application with an international tribunal which may render legally binding judgments finding a violation.

69. The fundamental rights and freedoms that are safeguarded under the Convention may be effectively protected only when the violation judgments rendered by the ECHR are duly executed in the domestic law. The failure to duly execute the ECHR’s violation judgments in the domestic law means that the fundamental rights and freedoms safeguarded by the Convention could not be effectively protected in practice.

70. It is for the Constitutional Court, which is empowered to examine an alleged violation of any fundamental rights and freedoms under the joint protection realm of both the Constitution and the Convention, to deal with the complaints that the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention have not been afforded effective protection in practice. Any consideration to the contrary would be incompatible with the constitutional objective which provides for the effective protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms under the joint protection realm of the Constitution and the Convention. Therefore, the question whether a violation judgment rendered by the ECHR has been duly executed must be examined by the Court. However, such an examination by the Court will not be the re-examination of the facts from the outset but will be confined to the question whether the violation judgment rendered by the ECHR has been duly executed.

71. With a view to affording protection for the fundamental rights and freedoms not only in theory but also in practice, the ECHR’s judgment finding a violation is deemed as a ground for a retrial by Law no. 5271, Law no. 6100 and Law no. 2577. In this scope, a new paragraph was added by Law no. 6459to Article 64 of Law no. 1602, and thereby a violation judgment by the ECHR is considered as a ground for a retrial also in Law no. 1602.

72. The inferior courts must satisfy the requirements of reasonable speediness and due diligence in dealing with cases involving the alleged violation of the right to life. The Court must assess whether the inferior courts dealt with the proceedings conducted into such kinds of incidents in depth and with due diligence as required by Article 17 of the Constitution or to what extent the inferior courts made the examinations. That is because the sensitivity to be shown by inferior courts in this respect would preclude any damage to the important role of the judicial system in preventing similar violations of the right to life that may emerge subsequently (see Cemil Danışman, no. 2013/6319, 16 July 2014, § 110; and Filiz Aka, no. 2013/8365, 10 June 2015, § 33). The requirements of reasonable speediness and due diligence that the inferior courts must fulfil in cases with respect to the right to life are undoubtedly applicable to the examination of the request for a retrial made on the basis of a violation judgment rendered by the ECHR.

73. In the present case, upon the dismissal of the action for compensation brought against the administration for having fault in the death of Bayram Dülek and finalization of the dismissal decision, the applicants lodged an application with the ECHR, alleging that there had been a violation of the right to life. The ECHR, dealing with the case, unanimously found a violation of the said right. In the light of the ECHR’s violation judgment, the applicants filed a request with the SMAC for a retrial and compensation. However, their request was dismissed.

74. The main issue to be discussed in the present case is whether the issues raised by the applicants, who filed a request with the SMAC for a retrial following the ECHR’s violation judgment, within the scope of the right to life was examined effectively and sufficiently and whether the violation judgment rendered by the ECHR was duly executed. In cases involving the complaints of alleged violation of the right to life, the inferior courts must examine the incidents in depth and with due diligence as required by Article 17 of the Constitution, and when the inferior courts find a violation and offer an appropriate and sufficient redress, the victim status might be removed. Therefore, the allegation that no just satisfaction could be afforded within the meaning of the right to life due to the SMAC’s failure to make an effective and sufficient examination as to the case, which was found to be in breach of the right to life by the ECHR, would be examined under the procedural aspect of the right to life.

75. Whereas it is in principle the inferior courts’ duty to assess the available evidence in a given case and to interpret the provisions of law, it is for the Constitutional Court to assess whether the inferior courts made examinations with due diligence as required by Article 17 of the Constitution or to what extent an examination was made in cases involving the alleged violation of the right to life. Regard being had to this consideration, the Court must examine whether the SMAC’s decision on dismissal of the request for a retrial contained a meticulous examination as required by Article 17 of the Constitution and whether the ECHR’s violation judgment was duly executed. Such an examination is necessary as required by the duty to examine whether any of the fundamental rights has been violated, which is entrusted to the Constitutional Court by the Constitution.

76. The following phrase was added to Article 64 of Law no. 1602, where the opportunity of retrial is laid down, by Article 2 of Law no. 6459: “in cases when it is found established by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights that the impugned decision has been in breach of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or its additional protocols”. A violation judgment rendered by the ECHR is accepted as a ground for a retrial pursuant to Law no. 1602. However, on 18 May 2012 when the applicants requested a retrial, Law no. 1602 did not explicitly accept a violation judgment rendered by the ECHR as a ground for a retrial. However, the applicants’ request for a retrial was dismissed not on the ground that Law no. 1602 did not consider the ECHR’s violation judgment as a ground for a retrial, but rather on the ground that the grounds indicated in the ECHR’s judgment were not applicable to the present case. In other words, the SMAC acknowledged even implicitly that a violation judgment rendered by the ECHR may require re-opening of the proceedings but dismissed the applicants’ request for a retrial as the grounds specified in the ECHR’s judgment were not applicable to their case.

77. In the decision of 7 November 2012 whereby the 2^nd Chamber of the SMAC dismissed the request for a retrial, it was noted that the applicants complained in their first petition of both Bayram Dülek’s recruitment to the military and of the authorities’ failure to show due diligence during the military service; that the first complaint as to Bayram Dülek’s recruitment to the military was in the form of an action for compensation resulting from an act but could not be examined as the action was not brought within the legal time-limit of 120 days prescribed in Article 35 of Law no. 1602; and that therefore, the SMAC would examine only the question whether due diligence had been displayed in the course of the military service. It was further indicated that as in its judgment, the ECHR found a violation due to the deficiency in the recruitment process, its operative part could not be applied to the present case. Given the SMAC’s decision, it appears that there is an assessment that the ECHR found a violation only due to the deficiency in the recruitment process but not in terms of the requirement of due diligence during the military service. Making such an assessment, the SMAC reached the conclusion that the ECHR’s violation judgment could not be applied to the applicants’ complaint as to the non-fulfilment of the requirement of due diligence during the military service. It also appears that the applicants’ complaint that Bayram Dülek should have never been recruited to the military was in the form of an action for compensation resulting from an act but could not be handled for not being brought within the prescribed period pursuant to Article 35 of Law no. 1602.

78. It should be primarily noted that any assessment to be made by considering that the ECHR found a violation only due to the deficiencies in the recruitment process but not in terms of the requirement of due diligence to be displayed during the military service may lead to conclusions which are not compatible with the ECHR’s judgment.

79. At this point, in assessing whether the ECHR’s violation judgment was duly executed and whether an examination was made in depth as required by Article 17 of the Constitution, the Court must elaborate on the SMAC’s consideration that a violation was found not in terms of the requirement of due diligence but only on account of the deficiency in the recruitment process, as well as on the dismissal of the applicants’ complaint that Bayram Dülek should have not been recruited to the military for being time-barred.

80. In its judgment, the ECHR has made a reference to the Regulation which was in force at the material time as well as to the List of Diseases and Disorders enclosed therewith and has accordingly noted that in cases where a person suffers from the diseases specified in Parts B-D of the Mental Health and Disorders included in Articles 15 to 18 of this List, a decision on “non-eligible for the military service” may be issued, and in cases where a person suffers from the diseases specified in Part C, a decision on “postponement to the next year”, “delayed referral to the medical examination” and “sick leave” may be issued. It has been also indicated that even the competent authorities’ finding that a person suffering from a mental disorder namely dysthymia and ultimately committing suicide was eligible for military service (even as a commando) is sufficient to reach the conclusion that the Regulation in force had certain deficiencies. It has been also noted that given the particular circumstances of the present case, the Government’s argument that the military officers disclosing their mental problems are subject to a suitable medical examination could not be notably relied on; that the military authorities should have been aware of the fact that Bayram Dülek’s recruitment to the military and his continued performance had posed a real risk to his mental and physical integrity; and that it was the Contracting State that must be held responsible for the deficiencies in the military recruitment process as well as for the unfavourable circumstances resulting from these deficiencies (see Dülek and Others v. Turkey, §§ 52-55).

81. Regard being had to the violation judgment rendered by the ECHR, it has been observed that there is no finding that the violation resulted merely from the deficiencies in the military recruitment process; that the reasoning “even the recruitment of the person suffering from dysthymia is sufficient to reach the conclusion that the statutory arrangements in force had certain deficiencies” cannot be interpreted to the effect that the violation was found only on the basis of the deficiencies in the recruitment system; that this reasoning was used so as to stress that it would be meaningless to examine the question whether the requirement of due diligence had been fulfilled during the military service in respect of the person who was recruited to the military contrary to the safeguards in the legislation and who subsequently committed suicide; that as a matter of fact, the recruitment of a person suffering from dysthymia, which was also known to the authorities, and his continued performance of military service were found to constitute a violation in the judgment; and that not only his recruitment but also his continued performance were highlighted in the judgment. Given all these considerations as a whole, it would not be compatible with the ECHR’s judgment to consider that only the recruitment of a person who should not have been recruited to the military due to his disorder was found to constitute a violation and that the ECHR did not find a violation due to this person’s continued performance of military service as well as due to his being deprived of the opportunities to have medically examined during the military service, to have checked by the İzmir Military Hospital and to avail himself of the measures specified in the relevant Regulation, such as sick leave, according to the nature and degree of his disorder. It has been accordingly concluded that the SMAC’s decision -whereby the applicants’ request for a retrial was dismissed on the basis of the consideration that the ECHR found a violation only due to the deficiencies in the military recruitment system- did not contain an examination made in depth and with due diligence as required by Article 17 of the Constitution; and that the ECHR’s judgment finding a violation was not duly executed in the present case.

82. The SMAC also dismissed, without any examination, the applicants’ complaint that Bayram Dülek should not have been recruited to the military for being time-barred. Prior to the its decision whereby the applicants’ request for a retrial was dismissed, the SMAC had examined for twice this complaint on its merits and, at the end of each examination, dismissed the action on the grounds that the administration did not have any fault or no-fault responsibility. However, following the ECHR’s violation judgment, the SMAC qualified the complaint as an action for compensation resulting from an act and dismissed the action without any examination as it had not been brought within the prescribed period. This interpretation by the SMAC was unforeseeable and extremely severe, which makes it extremely difficult to appropriately and sufficiently redress the violation and renders dysfunctional the consequences of the ECHR’s violation judgment.

83. For these reasons, the Court has found a violation of the procedural aspect of the right to life safeguarded by Article 17 of the Constitution.

 3. Application of Article 50 of Code no. 6216

 84. Article 50 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code no. 6216 on Establishment and Rules of Procedures of the Constitutional Court, dated 30 March 2011, reads as follows:

 “(1) At the end of the examination of the merits it is decided either the right of the applicant has been violated or not. In cases where a decision of violation has been made what is required for the resolution of the violation and the consequences thereof shall be ruled...

 (2) If the determined violation arises out of a court decision, the file shall be sent to the relevant court for holding the retrial in order for the violation and the consequences thereof to be removed. In cases where there is no legal interest in holding the retrial, the compensation may be adjudged in favour of the applicant or the remedy of filing a case before the general courts may be shown. The court which is responsible for holding the retrial shall deliver a decision over the file, if possible, in a way that will remove the violation and the consequences thereof that the Constitutional Court has explained in its decision of violation.”

 85. The applicants claimed 10,000 Turkish Liras (“TRY”) and TRY 40,000 as pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage for Sıddıka Dülek; TRY 15,000 and TRY 40,000 as pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage for Kazım Dülek; and TRY 30,000 as non-pecuniary compensation for each of the other applicants. They also claimed TRY 25,000 and TRY 7,000 for reimbursement of the counsel fee and court fee respectively.

 86. It has been concluded that the procedural aspect of the right to life was violated as no effective and adequate examination had been conducted as to the applicants’ request for a retrial.

 87. As there is legal interest in conducting a retrial for redressing the consequences of the violation of the right to life, a copy of the judgment must be sent to the 2^nd Chamber of the SMAC to conduct a retrial.

 88. The applicants claimed both pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation. However, as it appears that ordering a retrial has constituted sufficient satisfaction for the applicants’ allegation, their claim for compensation must be dismissed.

 89. The total court expense of TRY 1,998.35 including the court fee of TRY 198.35 and the counsel fee of TRY 1,800, which is calculated over the documents in the case file, must be reimbursed to the applicant.

 V. JUDGMENT

 For these reasons, the Constitutional Court UNANIMOUSLY held on 17 February 2016 that

A.           The alleged violation of the right to life be DECLARED ADMISSIBLE;

B. The procedural aspect of the right to life safeguarded by Article 17 of the Constitution was VIOLATED;

C. A copy of the judgment be SENT to the 2^nd Chamber of the SMAC in order to conduct a retrial with a view to eliminating the consequences of the violation of the right to life;

D. Although the applicants claimed pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation, their request for compensation be DISMISSED as ordering a retrial would constitute sufficient satisfaction for the applicants’ allegation;

E. The total expense of TRY 1.998.35 including the court fee of TRY 198.35 and the counsel fee of TRY 1,800 be REIMBURSED JOINTLY TO THE APPLICANTS;

F. The payments be made within four months as from the date when the applicant applies to the Ministry of Finance following the notification of the judgment; In case of any default in payment, legal INTEREST ACCRUE for the period elapsing from the expiry of four-month time-limit to the payment date;

G. A copy of the judgment be SENT to the Ministry of Justice.