THE FACTS

 [6-30] The land where the applicant had a share was expropriated for establishing a sports field and accordingly registered in the name of the Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality in 1998. The Municipal Council subsequently amended the zoning plan covering the area where the expropriated land is located. Accordingly, the zoning plan of the land was changed into a commercial area on 20 July 1998. It was then sold by auction to third parties on 2 November 1998. A workplace was built on the land which was then registered as a “market” in the land registry.

 The applicant brought an action for compensation against the metropolitan municipality and claimed the amount between the price of the land, which was sold to third parties, at the date of the action and the expropriation price paid to him. The incumbent court dismissed the action on 31 May 2012. The applicant appealed the dismissal decision; however, it was upheld by the Court of Cassation on 27 December 2012. The applicant’s request for rectification of the judgment was also dismissed by the Court of Cassation.

 Some of the other co-owners of the land, where the applicant had a share, also brought an action against the metropolitan municipality on 25 June 2010 and requested the return of the expropriated land or the reimbursement of its actual price as the expropriated land was not used in line with the original aim of expropriation. The action was accepted by the relevant court. By its judgment dated 20 March 2012, the Court of Cassation quashed the first instance decision, stating that no action could be brought against the expropriations, which were performed by reaching a compromise with the owner of the land.

 The applicant lodged an individual application with the Court on 2 August 2013.

IV. EXAMINATION AND GROUNDS

31. The Constitutional Court, at its session of 21 April 2016, examined the application and decided as follows.

A. The Applicant’s Allegations

32. The applicant maintained that his right to property had been violated on the ground that the action for compensation brought by him, on the basis of Articles 22 and 23 of Law no. 2942, upon the sale to the third parties of his immovable, which had been previously expropriated by the metropolitan municipality for establishing a sports field but which was -contrary to the public interest pursued- then turned into a commercial area by an amendment to the zoning plan, was dismissed pursuant to Article 8 of Law no. 2942. The applicant further alleged that there were violations of his right to a fair trial due to the conclusion of the proceedings although he had requested the trial court to await the outcome of another case of similar nature as well as of the principle of equality on the ground that another action on the same matter had been accepted whereas the action in the present case had been dismissed by the court. The applicant accordingly requested the Court to order a retrial and award him 45,000.000 Turkish Liras (TRY) in respect of his damages.

B. The Court’s Assessment

1. Admissibility

33. The Constitutional Court is not bound by the legal qualification of the facts by the applicant and it makes such assessment itself (see Tahir Canan, no. 2012/969, 18 September 2013, § 16). Although the applicant alleged that there had been violations of the right to a fair trial and the principle of equality along with the alleged violation of the right to property, he failed to submit any concrete information or document to demonstrate on which ground he had been subject to discrimination. Therefore, all complaints raised by him would be examined within the scope of the alleged violation of the right to property.

34. The Court declared the alleged violation of the right to property admissible for not being manifestly ill-founded and not being inadmissible for any other ground.

2. Merits

35. The applicant maintained that his right to property had been violated on the ground that the action for compensation brought by him, on the basis of Articles 22 and 23 of Law no. 2942 concerning reinstitution, upon the sale to the third parties of his immovable, which had been previously expropriated by the metropolitan municipality for establishing a sports field but which was -contrary to the public interest pursued- then turned into a commercial area by an amendment to the zoning plan, was dismissed as this action could not be brought pursuant to Article 8 of Law no. 2942.

36. Article 35 of the Constitution, titled “Right to property”, reads as follows:

 “Everyone has the right to own and inherit property.

 These rights may be limited by law only in view of public interest.

 The exercise of the right to property shall not contravene public interest.”

37. In Article 35 of the Constitution, it is set forth that everyone has the right to property which may be restricted by law only on grounds of public interest; and that the exercise of the right to property shall not be in breach of public interest (see Habibe Kalender and Others, no. 2013/3845, 1 December 2015, § 38).

38. Article 13 of the Constitution embodies the general principles concerning the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms while Article 35 thereof embodies the special principles concerning the restriction of the right to property. In line with the arrangement in Article 13 of the Constitution, Article 35 also indicates that the restrictions to be imposed on the right to property are to be prescribed by law. In addition, Article 35 provides for that the restriction shall be imposed in the public interest and that the exercise of the right to property shall not be contrary to the public interest, thereby pointing out the requirement to strike a balance between the public interest and the personal interest (see Türkiye İş Bankası A.Ş., no. 2014/6192, 12 November 2014, §§ 40 and 41).

39. In the present case, the primary matter to be resolved is to determine whether there was an interference with the “right to property”. If there is an interference, it must be then ascertained whether the interference had a legal basis and pursued a legitimate aim, whether there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued as well as whether the burden imposed on the applicant was proportionate.

a. Existence of Property

40. The applicant complained of the subsequent transfer of his immovable, which was expropriated in the public interest but was never used to that end, to third parties after a short while.

41. The right to property enshrined in Article 35 of the Constitution is a safeguard that protects existing possessions, properties and assets. A person’s right to obtain a property which is not already owned by that person does not fall within the notion of the property protected by the Constitution, no matter how strong his or her interest is in this matter. As an exception to this, an “economic value”, or a “legitimate expectation” to obtain an enforceable “claim”, may in certain circumstances benefit from the guarantee inherent in the right to property which is under joint protection of the Constitution and the Convention. Legitimate expectation is a sufficiently concrete expectation that arises from an enforceable claim reasonably demonstrated, that is based on a certain provision provided for in the national law or an established case-law which indicates that the prospects of success are high. In order for a legitimate expectation to arise, the existence of a dispute or serious claim does not suffice but there must exist an expectation with sufficient basis, which is based on a law or established case-law in the domestic law. (see Kemal Yeler and Ali Arslan Çelebi, no. 2012/636, 15 April 2014, §§ 36 and 37).

42. The determination as to the existence of the right to property based on a legitimate expectation falling into the scope of the joint protection realm of the Constitution and the Convention is contingent on the recognition of the ownership claim raised in the relevant legal system, and such recognition is ensured by virtue of the provisions of law and judicial decisions (see Üçgen Nakliyat Ticaret Ltd. Şti., no. 2013/845, 20 November 2014, § 37). Any person complaining of an alleged violation of the right to property is initially required to prove the existence of such right (see Hüseyin Remzi Polge, no. 2013/2166, 25 June 2015, § 35).

43. The European Court of Human Rights (“the ECHR”) indicates that in cases where the expropriated immovable property which is not used for the purpose of public utility, then the owner would at least have a “legitimate expectation” for its restitution, which therefore constitutes a property within the meaning of Article 1 of the Additional Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see Karaman v. Turkey, no. 6489/03, 15 January 2008, § 29; and Motais de Narbonne v. France, no. 48161/99, § 18). Besides, in its judgment in the case of Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. Malta (no. 40786/98, 13 July 2004, §§ 34, 34). Besides, the ECHR notes that even in the absence of a statutory arrangement allowing for restitution of the portion of the property expropriated in the public interest, which has not been used for the purpose of public utility, the portion in question raises an issue within the meaning of the right to property.

44. In Articles 22 and 23 of Law no. 2942, the right to restitution of the owner of the expropriated property is enshrined. In this respect, the judgment rendered by the 18^th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, no. E.2013/19896 K.2014/88 and dated 13 January 2014, reads as follows:

“Regard being had to the wording and content of Articles 22 and 23 of the Expropriation Law, it has been observed that Article 22 imposes an obligation on the administration, whereas Article 23 accords a right to the property owner. Accordingly, it is set forth in Article 22 that in cases where the administration considers that the expropriated property no longer pursues the original intent of expropriation or any public interest (waiver upon the finalization of the expropriation), the administration is obliged to notify primarily the property owner of this conclusion; and that if the administration sells the property to any third person by failing to comply with its obligation to notify, then the owner shall be entitled to be reimbursed for the total value of the expropriated property, less the expropriated price, within the scope of the statutory arrangements prescribed in the law. In Article 23, the property owner is afforded the right to restitution of his property within the periods specified in the law if the administration, still seeking to use the expropriated property for the original intent of expropriation or for any aim in the public interest, has nevertheless taken any step to attain the aim pursued. However, as stated in Article 22, even in cases where the administration no longer needs the expropriated property, the property owner or the heirs do not have any right of litigation if the expropriated property was used for the purpose pursued, or turned into a facility, for the period of 5 years. Besides, to exercise the right to restitution, the expropriated property is not necessarily used in line with the designated purpose of expropriation as a whole; but even a portion used for the designated purpose would suffice to remove the liability to restitute the expropriated property.

As also specified in Article 22, if the administration decides to sell the expropriated property, which has not been used for 5 years even though it has been used in line with the designated purpose of expropriation or a facility, structure or building has been founded on it, the administration must primarily resort to the property owner or the heirs. If they do not want to re-purchase the property, the administration may then dispose of the property. In cases where no facility, structure or building has been founded on the property in spite of having being expropriated, or the expropriated property is not used for the original purpose, or it is sold by the administration in breach of the procedure prescribed in the law, the property owners or the heirs may claim the total price of the property, less the expropriation price, without being subject to any time-limit.

 45. Accordingly, as indicated in the established case-law of the Court of Cassation in similar cases, if no facility, structure or building is not founded on an immovable in spite of having being expropriated, or the immovable has not been used in line with the aim pursued in expropriation and it is sold by the administration in breach of the procedure prescribed by law, the property owners or their heirs may demand the relevant amount, less the expropriation price, without being subject to any specific time-limits.

 46. In addition, the decision rendered with respect to the action brought for compensation concerning the impugned immovable became final on 30 May 2013 when the relevant Chamber of the Court of Cassation dismissed the request for rectification of its initial judgment. It has been accordingly understood that Articles 22 §§ 2 and 3, 23 § 3 and Provisional Article 9, which were added to Law no. 2942 by Article 100 of Law no. 6552 and dated 10 September 2014 and which restrict the time-limits for bringing an action on the basis of the provisions on restitution, are not applicable to the present case.

 47. In the present case, the applicant’s immovable was expropriated by the relevant metropolitan municipality for establishing a sports field zoning status of which was changed into a commercial area on 20 July 1998. It was then sold to third parties on 2 November 1998. It thus appears that the immovable in dispute was never utilized in the public interest. Therefore, the present case differs from the Court’s judgment in the case of Habibe Kalender and Others where the immovable used for a long time in the public interest was transferred to third parties as a result of the changing conditions. In the latter case, the immovable was used for approximately 20 years in accordance with the original intent of the expropriation, and it was accordingly indicated that as it was not the case that there was no longer a need for the property, or no action was taken within five years, following its expropriation, it did not constitute a legitimate expectation within the meaning of the right to property (see Habibe Kalender and Others, §§ 45 and 48).

 48. However, in the present case, the applicant’s immovable was not used in the public interest after being expropriated but transferred to third parties shortly after its expropriation. Accordingly, the applicant has a legitimate expectation for return of the immovable as it was not used in the public interest.

 49. In this sense, it is undoubted that the applicant’s immovable property, which was expropriated in the public interest, falls under the safeguard afforded by Article 35 of the Constitution (see Cemile Ünlü, no. 2013/382, 16 April 2013, § 25). Besides, the failure to use the expropriated property in line with the public interest pursued at least constitutes a legitimate expectation for its return to the applicant. Accordingly, in the present case, there is no doubt as to the existence of the right to property under Article 35 of the Constitution.

 b. Existence and Type of Interference

 50. Article 35 of the Constitution and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol no. 1 to the Convention have parallel wordings, and the latter provision embodies three sub-principles. The first principle is the peaceful enjoyment of the property or the right to respect for property, which is enshrined in the first sentence of the first paragraph. The second principle is related to the deprivation of property and makes it subject to certain conditions. This principle is set forth in the second sentence of the same paragraph. The third principle entitles the State to control the use of property by law in the public interest and to the extent required by this aim, which is enshrined in the second paragraph (see Kenan Yıldırım and Turan Yıldırım, no. 2013/711, 3 April 2014, §§ 58 and 59).

 51. As the transfer of the applicant’s immovable, which had been expropriated in the public interest, to third parties without being used in the public interest pursed amounted to deprivation of property (see Karaman v. Turkey, § 29; and Motais De Narbonne v. France, § 18), it has apparently constituted an interference with the right to property enshrined in Article 35 of the Constitution. It is therefore necessary to make an assessment as to the applicant’s deprivation of his property within the framework of the second principle.

 c. Whether the Interference Constituted a Violation

52. In the present case, the immovable in dispute was expropriated, pursuant to Article 8 of Law no. 2942, within the framework of the procurement procedure prescribed therein. However, the applicant alleged that the impugned expropriation did not actually pursue an aim in the public interest.

d. General Principles

53. As set out in Article 35 of the Constitution, the right to property may be restricted only in the public interest. Public interest, which is also called as social interest, common benefit and general interest and which is a common benefit beyond the personal interest, is a special ground for restriction prescribed by Article 35 of the Constitution with respect to the right to property and is interpreted in a broad manner to the extent that would also cover the terms, general interest and social interest (see the Court’s judgment no. E.1999/46 K.2000/25, 20 September 2000). The term “public interest” is an aim of restriction as allowing for imposing a restriction on the right to property in cases when required by the public interest. It also affords an effective protection for the said right by way of setting forth that the right to property cannot be restricted for any reason other than public interest, thereby setting a limit for restriction (see Yunis Ağlar, no. 2013/1239, 20 March 2014, § 28).

54. The act of expropriation, which is set out in Article 46 of the Constitution and main purpose of which is considered as “public interest”, is the termination of the private ownership of an immovable by the State, beyond the consent of its owner, in the public interest and in return for a payment. In Article 46 § 1 of the Constitution regulating the expropriation, it is set out “the State and public corporations shall be entitled, where the public interest requires, to expropriate, and impose administrative servitude on, privately owned real estate wholly or in part in accordance with the principles and procedures prescribed by law, provided that the actual compensation is paid in advance”. The constitutional elements of the expropriation are the existence of public interest, the observance of principles and procedures prescribed by law in performing an expropriation and advance payment, in cash, of the actual value of the expropriated property (see the Court’s judgment no. E.2004/25 K.2008/42, 17 January 2008).

55. Public interest is by its very nature a broad term. The legislative body may naturally have a wide discretionary power with respect to statutory arrangements on the implementation of social and economic policies such as the laws providing for the deprivation of property by way of paying the relevant price. Unless being manifestly devoid of a reasonable ground, the legislative body’s decision as to what would be in the public interest must be respected. Both the legislative and executive bodies have a wide discretionary power in determining what would be in the public interest by considering the needs of the society. If there has been an interference with the right to property by public authorities in order to implement an economic or social policy, it should be in principle assumed that the interference pursued a legitimate public interest. In case of a dispute as to the public interest, the first instance court and appeal courts specialized in expropriation-related matters are undoubtedly in a better position to resolve such disputes. Therefore, the burden to prove whether the interference has pursued a public interest rests on the claimant (see Mehmet Akdoğan and Others, no. 2013/817, 19 December 2013, § 35).

56. Public interest is a term which involves discretionary power afforded to the State organs. It is a criterion which is not susceptible to an objective definition and must be assessed individually in consideration of the particular circumstances of each concrete case. Any arrangement and practice devoid of a reasonable ground cannot be considered to fall into the scope of the discretionary power exercised in the public interest (see Yunis Ağlar, § 29).

ii. Application of Principles to the Present Case

57. The action for compensation brought by the applicant before the 1^st Chamber of the Gaziantep Civil Court of First Instance for the alleged misuse of his immovable which had been indeed expropriated in the public interest but was never used for that purpose was dismissed by the civil court on 31 May 2002, pursuant to Article 8 of Law no. 2942, on the ground that no action could be filed against the acts of expropriation performed upon the compromise reached with the property owner. The applicant appealed the first instance decision; however, it was upheld by the 5^th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation on 27 December 2012. The applicant’s request for rectification of the Court of Cassation’s judgment was also dismissed by the same Chamber on 30 May 2013.

58. In the present case, in dismissing the applicant’s action, the civil court relied on Article 8 § 7 of Law no. 2942 which sets forth that an immovable which has been purchased or traded for in accordance with the procurement procedure prescribed herein would be deemed to have been taken over from its owner by way of expropriation and that no action for annulment may be brought against such act of expropriation or the price thereof. In another action brought by the other co-owners of an impugned property, the General Assembly of Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation has stated in its judgment no. E.2013/5-381 K.2013/1597 and dated 27 November 2013 that Article 8 of the said Law is not applicable to the actions to be brought, pursuant to Articles 22 and 23 of the Law which regulate the behaviours and conducts of the administration following the expropriation, in cases where the immovable expropriated even by reaching a compromise has been sold for no longer involving a public interest.

59. As regards the individual applications, the duty incumbent on the Court is to examine whether the safeguards inherent in the rights which are under the joint protection of the Constitution and the Convention have been offered in each concrete case. Accordingly, unless there has been an interference with any right and freedom falling into the joint protection realm of the Constitution and Convention, the inferior courts’ assessment of material facts and evidence, interpretation and application of legal provisions and the fairness of the proceedings as to the merits cannot be brought before the Court through individual application mechanism (see Sebahat Tuncel (2), no. 2014/1440, 26 February 2015, §§ 53, 54).

60. As a matter of fact, the ECHR notes that it is not incumbent to examine the errors of fact or of law allegedly committed by the domestic courts, which are primarily responsible for interpreting and applying domestic law unless they are in breach of the fundamental rights and freedoms safeguarded by the Convention; that it is not considered necessary to address a statutory regulation in an abstract manner; and that the ECHR’s role is limited to the examination as to whether the manner in which the domestic law was applied is compatible with the Convention (see Karaman v. Turkey, § 30).

61. The main complaint raised by the applicant concerned the alleged non-existence of a ground justifying the expropriation as the immovable which was expropriated, by way of reaching a compromise, in the public interest in accordance with the prescribed procedure but was not used to that end; the acquirement by the relevant authority of an income through the immovable and his being deprived of the surplus income. In Article 8 of Law no. 2942 forming a basis for the dismissal of the action brought by the applicant, it is set forth that in cases where the expropriation has been performed upon a compromise, no action may be brought to challenge the act of expropriation itself or its price. In the present case, the applicant raised a challenge neither against the expropriation nor against the expropriation price.

62. Besides, even if it is accepted that such a restriction is laid down in Article 8 of Law no. 2942, it is explicit that this would not change the conclusion that an interference with the right to property enshrined in Article 35 of the Constitution on account of an expropriation devoid of an aim of public interest is incompatible with the relevant safeguards, but only makes a difference as to the source of the interference as resulting from a legislative act. As a matter of fact, Article 35 of Law no. 2942 sets forth “the former owner cannot claim ownership of, and demand payment in return for, the portions which have been allocated for road, green space and such public utility out of the parcels subject to adjustment pursuant to the zoning legislation as well as the portions which have been allocated with the owner’s consent for public service and facilities”.

 63. In the present case, the applicant’s share in the impugned immovable was expropriated by the Metropolitan Municipality on the ground that in the zoning plan it was within the boundaries of a sports field at the 100^th Year Atatürk Cultural Park.

 64. Zoning plans issued for ensuring the physical environment closely related to social life to become a healthy structure as well as for determining the balance for protection and utilization of land in the most rational manner are the documents which are to attain the aim of public interest. The questions as to whether these considerations have been fulfilled and whether the immovables at the planned locations have been compatible -in so far as it relates to the aim for which the immovables were assigned- with the urbanization principles, planning principles and public interest could be made subject to judicial review (see Yunis Ağlar, § 37). In the present case, it has been observed that no action for annulment was brought with a view to ensuring zoning plans to undergo a judicial review; and that the applicant’s share was expropriated by way of compromise. It has been therefore concluded that the zoning arrangement and the expropriation made on the basis of this arrangement were performed for public interest purposes pursuant to Article 10 of Law no. 3194 and the relevant provisions of Law no. 2942.

65. However, it is not in principle per se sufficient for an act depriving of property to merely pursue a public-interest aim in an abstract manner; but it must be further required that the reasons underlying the public-interest aim be applied concretely (see Motais de Norbonne v. France, § 20).

66. In the present case, it has been observed that on 20 July 1998 the Metropolitan Municipal Council amended the zoning plan with respect to the immovable where the applicant had a share and accordingly designated the zoning status of the immovable as a commercial area; and that on 2 November 1998 the immovable was sold by the Metropolitan municipality to third persons by auction.

67. In its judgments in similar cases, namely Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. Malta and Karaman v. Turkey, the ECHR has noted that the use of an immovable, which had been duly expropriated, -even in part- not for the aim of public interest contrary to the original intent of its expropriation by the administration was in breach of the requirements of the right to property set forth in Article 1 of the Additional Protocol no. 1 to the Convention (see Beneficio Cappella Paolini v. Maltai §§ 30,34; and Karaman v. Turkey, §§ 24-34). It has also indicated in its judgment of Motais de Norbonne v. France that in cases where the project in pursuance of the public interest underlying the expropriation is not put into practice for a long period upon the expropriation of the immovable and the applicant has been deprived of the surplus value having incurred within that period, it has been in breach of the right to property (see Motais de Norbonne v. France, §§ 16-23).

68. In the present case, the aim pursued for the public interest was to establish a sports field within a public park, and therefore, a zoning arrangement was performed and the immovable in question was expropriated. Upon the expropriation, the impugned immovable was not turned into a sports field in line with the pursued aim of public interest but converted to a commercial field and accordingly sold to third parties within a short period of approximately seven months following the expropriation. In other words, the administration neither attained the aim of public interest pursued nor used the immovable for any other aim of public utility. Besides, the metropolitan municipality changed the zoning status of the immovable –which had been expropriated for being designated as a sports field in the zoning plan– as a “commercial field” and thereby caused a surplus value with respect to the expropriated immovable. It however deprived the applicant of the surplus value and transferred certain portion of the immovable to private persons. It thus appears that the administration transferred the immovable, which it had taken over in the public interest relying on the zoning arrangements and the act of expropriation underpinned by the Constitution and relevant laws, to third persons without having concretely achieved the aim of public interest underlying the impugned act of expropriation whereby the applicant was deprived of his property. The administration thus only performed a transfer of property, intended for generating income, beyond the applicant’s legitimate consent. Therefore, the applicant was deprived of his property in breach of the safeguards enshrined in Article 35 of the Constitution as there was an interference with his right to property in the absence of any public interest justifying the expropriation.

69. It has been accordingly concluded that the interference with the applicant’s right to property did not fulfil the legitimate aim requirement set forth in Article 35 of the Constitution due to the failure to concretely materialize the aim of public interest pursued by the impugned interference. As it has been observed that the applicant’s right to property was interfered without the fulfilment of the legitimate aim requirement, the Court has not found it necessary to make an examination as to the proportionality.

70. For these reasons, the Court has found a violation of the right to property safeguarded by Article 35 of the Constitution.

3. Application of Article 50 of Code no. 6216

71. Article 50 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code no. 6216 on Establishment and Rules of Procedures of the Constitutional Court, dated 30 March 2011, reads as follows:

“(1) At the end of the examination of the merits it is decided either the right of the applicant has been violated or not. In cases where a decision of violation has been made what is required for the resolution of the violation and the consequences thereof shall be ruled...

(2) If the determined violation arises out of a court decision, the file shall be sent to the relevant court for holding the retrial in order for the violation and the consequences thereof to be removed. In cases where there is no legal interest in holding the retrial, the compensation may be adjudged in favour of the applicant or the remedy of filing a case before the general courts may be shown. The court which is responsible for holding the retrial shall deliver a decision over the file, if possible, in a way that will remove the violation and the consequences thereof that the Constitutional Court has explained in its decision of violation.”

72. The applicant claimed TRY 45,000,000 in compensation and requested the Court to order a retrial.

73. In the present case, it has been concluded that there was a violation of the right to property.

74. Since there is legal interest in holding a retrial to redress the consequences of the violation of the right to property, a copy of the judgment must be sent to the 1^st Chamber of the Gaziantep Civil Court for a retrial.

75. As it has been considered that ordering a retrial on account of the violation of the applicant’s right to property constituted a just satisfaction, the Court rejected the applicant’s claim for compensation.

76. The total court expense of TRY 1,998.35 including the court fee of TRY 198.35 and the counsel fee of TRY 1,800, which is calculated over the documents in the case file, must be reimbursed to the applicant.

JUDGMENT

For these reasons, the Constitutional Court UNANIMOUSLY held on 21 April 2016 that

A. The alleged violation of the applicant’s right to property be DECLARED ADMISSIBLE;

B. The right to property safeguarded by Article 35 of the Constitution was VIOLATED;

C. A copy of the judgment be SENT to the 1^st Chamber of the Gaziantep Civil Court for a retrial in order to redress the consequences of the violation;

D. The applicant’s claims for compensation be REJECTED;

E. The total court expense of TRY 1,998.35 including the court fee of TRY 198.35 and the counsel fee of TRY 1,800 be REIMBURSED to the applicant;

F. The payment be made within four months as from the date when the applicant applies to the Ministry of Finance following the notification of the judgment; In case of any default in payment, legal INTEREST ACCRUE for the period elapsing from the expiry of four-month time limit to the payment date; and

G. A copy of the judgment be SENT to the Ministry of Justice.