THE FACTS

 [8-47] On 11 August 2011, the applicant started to serve as a military attaché in the Tbilisi Embassy while working in the Turkish Armed Forces (“the TAF”) as a staff colonel. Thereupon, the applicant’s wife who was working as a civilian officer in the TAF took unpaid leave.

 In September and December 2011, four tape records of sexually explicit content alleged to belong to the applicant’s wife were broadcasted on the Internet. The applicant was ordered to return to the country upon a written order of 16 December 2011 in which the ground thereof was not specified and was subsequently assigned under the command of the Presidency of the Turkish General Staff. On 19 December 2011, the applicant’s statement was taken by the administrative investigation board. The applicant’s wife, who returned from abroad three days later, rejected the allegations during the interview made with the board and did not find it necessary to submit a sample voice record at this stage.

 In the report of 26 December 2011 drawn up by the Presidency of the Criminal Department of the Gendarmerie General Command upon the request of the administrative investigation board, it was stated that voice of the woman in the tape records broadcasted via Internet “most probably” belong to the same person; and that there was no manipulation in the records. Within the same period, the administrative investigation board heard eight workmates working in the same workplace with the applicant’s wife on 23 and 26 December 2011 with a view to establishing whether the tape records broadcasted on the Internet belonged to the applicant’s wife or not. Moreover, out of these personnel whose statements were taken, those who did not have any knowledge concerning the impugned tape records were enabled to listen to a certain part of the records, and subsequently, their statements were taken. Given the information available in the tape records, it has been concluded that the voice in these records might belong to the applicant’s wife. On 30 December 2011, the applicant’s permanent appointment to abroad was cancelled upon the approval of the Chief of the General Staff on 30 December 2011 due to these tape records broadcasted via Internet, and the applicant was then charged in the 3^rd Corps Command of the Land Forces Command (İstanbul).

 Thereupon, on 9 January 2012, the applicant brought an action before the 1^st Chamber of the Supreme Military Administrative Court (“the SMAC”) for the stay of execution and revocation of the act of “cancellation of the appointment for a permanent task abroad”. The applicant’s request for the stay of execution was rejected on 6 March 2012.

 In the meanwhile, the applicant filed a criminal complaint against the relevant military officers who made the tape records alleged to belong to the applicant’s wife listened to the other personnel serving in the TAF; however, an authorization for investigation was not granted. This decision was served on the applicant on 7 May 2012.

 During the stage of exchanging of petitions, the applicant requested from the court to be provided with a copy of the confidential documents. The court decided not to render a decision concerning the applicant’s request on the ground that it was the Secretariat General’s task to allow for the examination of the confidential documents in an action which was at the notification stage and noted that upon the decision of the Secretariat General, an appeal may be lodged with the Chamber.

 In the meantime, an administrative investigation was initiated against the applicant’s wife due to these tape records broadcasted on the internet, and the High Disciplinary Board of the Ministry of National Defence imposed a penalty of dismissal from profession on the applicant’s wife. An action was brought against this decision before the 2^nd Chamber of the SMAC within the prescribed period.

 Thereupon, the decision on dismissal of the applicant’s wife from profession and a warning letter within the scope of Article 153 of the Military Criminal Code were served on the applicant. On 13 August 2012, the applicant requested to be retired by reserving his legal rights and was retired on 27 September 2012 upon the approval of the Minister of the National Defence.

 The Secretariat General of the SMAC did not find the request for the examination of the confidential documents in the action brought by the applicant appropriate. Upon the objection to the decision, the 1^st Chamber of the SMAC accepted the request partially.

The applicant maintained that his representative had become aware, upon examining the confidential information, of the fact that the administrative investigation board had been established due to the tape records; and that the administrative investigation board had acted in an unduly manner, by illegal methods and on the basis of a tape record actor of which was not identified.

 In the meantime, a total of eleven persons including the applicant and his wife filed criminal complaints on various dates on the ground that unsubstantial posts including aspersions and defamations against them were made available on the social networking site. It was concluded that three suspects identified within the scope of the investigation had no relation with the offences committed, and accordingly the chief public prosecutor’s office rendered a decision of non-prosecution.

 While the action brought by the applicant’s wife was pending, she accepted to give a sample voice record. Thereupon, the Presidency of the Criminal Department of the Gendarmerie General Command specified in its report that the woman in the tape records broadcasted via Internet was “most probably the same person” with the applicant’s wife.

 At the end of the hearing held on 19 March 2013, an interlocutory decision was taken, and accordingly information was requested from the Presidency of the 2^nd Chamber of the SMAC, which subsequently provided information in a letter concerning the action and submitted the criminal reports concerning the tape records to the court.

 The 1^st Chamber of the SMAC dismissed the action brought by the applicant on 18 June 2013.

 The action brought by the applicant’s wife due to the penalty of dismissal from profession and her request for rectification of the judgment were dismissed by the SMAC.

 IV. EXAMINATION AND GROUND

48. The Constitutional Court, at its session of 1 June 2016, examined the application and decided as follows:

A. The Applicant’s Allegations

49. The applicant maintained in his application form that while he was serving as a staff officer, he had to retire at the age of 47; that the tape records broadcasted via internet could not be accepted as evidence; that the sole basis underlying the impugned administrative act was the issues that must fall within the scope of private life; that the tape records of which authenticity had not been demonstrated with any legal evidence were relied on in the administrative act only on the basis of discretion; and that these tapes did not have evidential value and were obtained unlawfully, which were also raised before the SMAC. He also alleged that the evidence underlying the impugned administrative act was not genuine; that there was an unlawful interference with his private and family life; that the requests made had not been taken into account; that these tape records had been also listened to the workmates of his wife, which was an unfavourable and incorrect procedure; that the SMAC had not found the acts performed by the administration sufficient to award non-pecuniary compensation but rather dismissed the applicant’s action as the impugned administrative act was based on material facts; that the dismissal decision did not include any grounds as to why his claims and defence submissions had not been taken into consideration; that the trial was concluded on the basis of an incomplete examination; that their requests for obtaining a report from the Forensic Medicine Institute had not been accepted; that he suffered morally as he had to retire pending the judicial process, which amounted to torture and mobbing; that he had been exposed to degrading treatments; and that there had been violations of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, the right to private and family life as well as the right to a fair trial. He therefore claimed 200,000 Turkish Liras (“TRY”) and TRY 150,000 in compensation for his pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.

B. The Court’s Assessment

50. The applicant mainly complained of the alleged violation of his constitutional rights as the action brought by him due to cancellation of his appointment for a permanent task abroad on account of the tapes made available via internet had been dismissed, as well as of his being forced to retire due to these tapes. The Constitutional Court is not bound by the legal qualification of the facts by the applicant and it makes such assessment itself (see Tahir Canan, no. 2012/969, 18 September 2013, § 16).

51. The events taking place in the relevant period were initially related to the applicant’s professional life, and he brought an action on this account. The administrative act, which allegedly led to a violation, was based not on the decision rendered at the end of the action brought by him at the outset but on the administrative act ordering cancellation of his appointment for a permanent task abroad. In examining the present application, the Court must therefore consider the events taking place during the cancellation of the appointment for a permanent task abroad within the scope of Article 20 of the Constitution. The applicant’s allegations as to his being compelled to retire were also discussed under a separate heading within the scope of Article 17 of the Constitution.

1. Alleged Violation of the Right to Respect for Private Life due to the Administrative Act Ordering Cancellation of the Appointment for a Permanent Task Abroad and Dismissal of the Action Brought

a. Admissibility

52. The applicant’s allegations that his constitutional rights were violated -as he had been appointed to a position within his country of origin upon the termination of his post in Georgia because he no longer had the capacity to represent his country abroad due to the impugned tapes which had been made available via internet, the administration subsequently decided to cancel his appointment for a permanent task abroad, and the action brought by him for revocation of the administrative act as well as being awarded non-pecuniary compensation was dismissed- are not manifestly ill-founded. As there being no other grounds for its inadmissibility, the application was declared admissible.

b. Merits

i. General Principles

53. Article 20 of the Constitution reads as follows:

 “Everyone has the right to demand respect for his/her private and family life. Privacy of private or family life shall not be violated.

 Unless there exists a decision duly given by a judge on one or several of the grounds of national security, public order, prevention of crime, protection of public health and public morals, or protection of the rights and freedoms of others, or unless there exists a written order of an agency authorized by law, in cases where delay is prejudicial, again on the above-mentioned grounds, neither the person, nor the private papers, nor belongings of an individual shall be searched nor shall they be seized. The decision of the competent authority shall be submitted for the approval of the judge having jurisdiction within twenty-four hours. The judge shall announce his decision within forty-eight hours from the time of seizure; otherwise, seizure shall automatically be lifted.

 Everyone has the right to request the protection of his/her personal data. This right includes being informed of, having access to and requesting the correction and deletion of his/her personal data, and to be informed whether these are used in consistency with envisaged objectives. Personal data can be processed only in cases envisaged by law or by the person’s explicit consent. The principles and procedures regarding the protection of personal data shall be laid down in law.”

54. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) reads as follows:

 “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

55. The right to respect for private life is set forth under Article 20 of the Constitution. Private life is a broad concept which does not lend itself to an exhaustive definition. However, this concept covers such elements as the corporeal and spiritual integrity, physical and social identity, name, sexual orientation and sex life, as well as personal information and data, personal development, family life, and etc. (see Ata Türkeri, no. 2013/6057, 16 December 2015, § 30).

56. The notion of private life guarantees that individuals lead a private social life, namely a “private life” within the meaning of their right to develop their social identities. In this sense, respect for private life must also comprise the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings. According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (“the ECHR”), there is no reason to consider that the notion of "private life" excludes professional activities. Restrictions on working life may fall under Article 8 when they affect the way in which the individual forges his social identity through the development of relationships with his peers. At this point, it should be noted that in the course of their working lives, the majority of people have a significant opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world (see Özpınar v. Turkey, no. 20999/04, 19 October 2010, § 45; and Niemietz v. Germany, no. 13710/88, 16 December 1992, § 29).

57. One of the legal interests safeguarded within the scope of the right to respect for private life is the right of privacy. However, the right of privacy does not only represent the right to be left alone, but it also covers the individual’s legal interest of controlling the information about him. An individual has an interest in the fact that any information concerning himself is not disclosed or disseminated without his consent, that such information is not accessed by the others and is not used without his consent, in other words, that such information remains confidential. This points out the individual’s right to determine the future of the information about him (see the Court’s judgments no. E.2009/1 K.2011/82, 18 May 2011; no. E.1986/24 K.1987/7, 31 March 1987; and Işıl Yaykır, no. 2013/2284, 15 April 2014, § 37).

58. Besides, the notion of private life covers several varying circumstances such as name, image, reputation, family information, sexual identity, health, confidentiality of communication. The more the private life is interfered with by way of technological improvements, the higher the need for its protection is. It is therefore necessary, in a democratic state of law liable to protect and reinforce freedoms, to protect and safeguard individuals against interferences and to keep to a minimum the interference, as required by the right to respect for private life. In this sense, there is an obligation incumbent on both individuals and the State to avoid displaying conducts which would preclude effective exercise of this right.

59. Professional life is often intricately linked to private life, especially if factors relating to private life, in the strict sense of the term, are regarded as qualifying criteria for a given profession. Professional life is therefore part of the zone of interaction between a person and the others which, even in a public context, may fall within the scope of private life (see, for the ECHR’s judgment in the same vein, Fernandez Martinez v. Spain [GC], no. 56030/07, 12 June 2014, § 110).

60. It is undoubted that the shift in the applicant’s place of duty from abroad to his country of origin adversely affected his professional life. However, existence of such unfavourable outcomes does not per se lead to an unconstitutionality. Nevertheless, the issue at stake in the present case is to ascertain the reasons underlying this shift and to examine the constitutionality of these reasons (see, for the ECHR’s judgment in the same vein, Sodan v. Turkey, no. 18650/052, 2 February 2016, § 43).

61. The essential object of Article 20 of the Constitution is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities. Besides, the State also has a positive obligation to afford an effective protection, and to respect, for private and family life. This obligation may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private and family life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves (see, for the ECHR’s judgment in the same vein, X and Y v. the Netherlands, no. 8978/80, 26 March 1985, § 23).

ii. Application of Principles to the Present Case

(1) Existence of an Interference

62. The ECHR underlines that the investigation carried out by the inspector into the individuals’ private lives as well as the resulting administrative dismissal essentially motivated by the conclusions drawn from their behaviours and conducts could be considered as an interference with the right to respect for his private life (see Özpınar v. Turkey, § 47).

63. In the present case, the public authorities decided to cancel the applicant’s appointment for a permanent task abroad due to reasons falling into the scope of his private and family life, which was an administrative act constituting an interference with his private life. However, in the context of the complaint raised by the applicant, the impugned administrative act was examined as an interference not having an effect on his wife’s professional life but merely on his own professional life.

(2) Whether the Interference Constituted a Violation

64. Article 20 of the Constitution embodies certain grounds of restriction concerning the privacy of private life, which appear not to cover all aspects of the right. However, even the rights in respect of which any specific ground of restriction is prescribed have boundaries deriving from their very nature. Besides, a restriction may be imposed on these rights by also relying on the other provisions of the Constitution. At this point, the safeguards laid down in Article 13 of the Constitution come into play (see Sevim Akat Eşki, no. 2013/2187, 19 December 2013, § 33).

65. Article 13 of the Constitution reads as follows:

 “Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law and in conformity with the reasons mentioned in the relevant articles of the Constitution without infringing upon their essence. These restrictions shall not be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the requirements of the democratic order of the society and the secular republic and the principle of proportionality.”

 66. This constitutional provision is of vital importance in respect of the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms as well as of the safeguards against such restrictions. It lays down the circumstances under which all fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution may be restricted by the legislator. As required by the principle of the constitutional holism, the constitutional provisions are to be implemented collectively and in consideration of the general rules of law. It is therefore clear that all criteria concerning the safeguards specified in Article 13 of the Constitution, notably the requirement of restricting only by law, must be taken into consideration also in determination of the scope of the right enshrined in Article 20 of the Constitution (see Sevim Akat Eşki, § 35).

 (a) Lawfulness

 67. The requirement that fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law is of great importance in the constitutional jurisdiction. In case of an interference with any fundamental right or freedom, the primary question to be clarified is whether there is a provision of law which justifies the interference; in other words whether the interference has a legal basis (see Sevim Akat Eşki, § 36).

 68. The requirement “prescribed by law”, which is also mentioned in the ECHR’s case-law, embodies three basic three principles. The first principle is that the interference in question must have a basis in the domestic law. The second principle requires that the law underlying the interference be adequately accessible for those concerned. The third principle is that this statutory arrangement be formulated with sufficient precision to enable those concerned to regulate their conduct and to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 5947/72 …, 25 March 1983, §§ 86-88).

 69. The administrative act complained of in the present case was performed by virtue of Additional Article 10 and Article 163 of Law no. 926, Article 28 of the Regulation as well as Articles 5 and 18 of the Directive.

 70. The provision of law forming the basis of the interference and the Regulation and the Directive issued pursuant to this Law are accessible and foreseeable arrangements capable of clearly indicating the limits of any interference with fundamental rights and freedoms. It has been accordingly concluded that the impugned interference has satisfied the “lawfulness” requirement.

 (b) Legitimate Aim

 71. An interference with an individual’s private life may be deemed justified only when it relies on one or several grounds of maintaining national security and public order, prevention of crime, protection of public health and public morals, or protection of the rights and freedoms of others, which are laid down in Article 20 § 2 of the Constitution.

 72. Regard being had to the scope of the said Directive, it appears that the statutory arrangements included therein are designated to indicate the measures that may be taken by the administrative bodies in cases where an official no longer has the capacity to represent. It is inferred therefrom that an appointment for a permanent task abroad may be cancelled for the purposes of maintaining public order, securing military discipline and ensuring dignity and prestige inherent in the military profession. It has been accordingly concluded that this amounts to a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 20 § 2 of the Constitution.

 (c) Necessity in a Democratic Society and Proportionality

 73. The phrase "necessary in a democratic society", which is indicated in the ECHR’s case-law, means that the interference must, inter alia, correspond to a pressing social need and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, § 97).

 74. Contemporary democracies are the regimes whereby the fundamental rights and freedoms are ensured and safeguarded to the widest extent possible. The restrictions which infringe the very essence of fundamental rights and freedoms and which limit them to a great extent or render them completely dysfunctional cannot be considered to comply with the requirements of a democratic society. As the aim pursued by the State governed by rule of law is to ensure the exercise by individuals of fundamental rights and freedoms to the widest extent possible, the statutory arrangements are to be formulated with an approach where human being is ascribed with greatest importance. Therefore, not only the extent of the restrictions imposed but also of the conditions, reasons, method of such restrictions as well as available legal remedies prescribed against such restrictions must be assessed as a whole within the scope of the notion of “democratic society” (see Serap Tortuk, no. 2013/9660, 21 January 2015, § 46).

 75. The public authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation at two different stages in restricting a fundamental right. First, they may enjoy this margin of appreciation in choosing the aim of restriction, and second, in determining the necessity of the restriction, which has been imposed in order to attain the legitimate aim pursued. However, the margin of appreciation given to the public authorities is not unlimited, and arguments raised to justify the alleged interference must be suitable, necessary and proportionate (see Serap Tortuk, § 49).

 76. Such margin of appreciation has an extent specific to each case. The extent is reduced or expanded depending on factors such as the nature of the right which is under protection or of the legal interest and its significance in respect of the person concerned (see Serap Tortuk, § 50).

 77. In cases where paramount rights or legal interests concerning the most intimate aspect of private life or concerning the existence or identity of an individual are at stake, the margin of appreciation is narrower. In this context, if the particular aspects of the right to respect for private life, namely sexuality and intimacy, are at stake, the margin of appreciation must be much narrower. Accordingly, there must exist particularly serious reasons for the legitimacy of interferences with these aspects (see, for the ECHR’s judgment in the same vein, Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, no. 7525/76, 22 October 1981, § 52).

 78. That is because, the most intimate of the individual’s private life and the right to respect for this sphere are clearly one of the key rights which are necessary for the individual’s personal safety, existence and identity (see Serap Tortuk, § 51).

 79. Besides, in an area which is subject to strict rules and conditions such as personnel regime, the public authorities are naturally afforded a wide margin of appreciation varying by the nature of the activity and the aim of restriction. In this sense, regard being had to the fact that the notion of private life is not confined only to a most intimate aspect of one’s private life but also guarantees the right to lead a “private social life”, it is clear that notably public officers may be subject to restrictions in respect of certain aspects of their private life which are also interrelated with their professional life. However, as in cases of restrictions imposed on other persons, these public officers must avail themselves of the minimum safeguards. It is notably requisite to consider whether a fair balance was struck between the individual’s right to respect for private life and the legitimate interest in ensuring the performance of public service in accordance with the abovementioned principles (see Serap Tortuk, § 57).

 80. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned administrative act was justified on the abovementioned legitimate grounds; however, the restriction apparently constituting an interference with the applicant’s private life must avoid infringing the very essence of the said right to the extent that would render it dysfunctional. It must be accordingly assessed, in the particular circumstances of the present case, whether a fair balance was struck between the applicant’s personal interest within the meaning of Article 20 of the Constitution and the public interest or any other person’s interest.

 81. In the present case, it is apparent that the applicant was assigned to a domestic task four months after his appointment as an attaché to the Tbilisi Embassy; and that he was subsequently subject to an administrative act whereby his permanent appointment abroad was cancelled. The applicant maintained that he could not at the outset become aware of the legal ground underlying the impugned interference with his professional life but learned it only after he had submitted his defence submission during the proceedings. The applicant, who was informed of the outcome of the administrative act only through an instruction, could fully understand the reason underlying the administrative act from the classified information which was examined during the action brought by him against the annulment of the impugned administrative act and after he had submitted a petition for retirement. In this sense, the ground underlying the impugned administrative act whereby the applicant was assigned with a domestic task during his foreign mission and his appointment abroad would be probably no longer possible during his professional life is the tapes containing sexually explicit conversations, which were made available through internet. According to the defendant administration, these tapes belonged to the applicant’s wife.

 82. During the impugned process, several decisions were taken on the basis not of the applicant’s own conversations but of those between his wife and other persons. In appointing those who would serve as a military attaché, their capacity to represent is naturally taken into consideration, which also requires an insight into their family life. It accordingly falls within the administration’s margin of appreciation to make the tapes allegedly related not to the applicant himself but to his wife subject to an investigation.

 83. It is also necessary to determine whether there is any responsibility on the part of the applicant and his wife in the disclosure of the tapes via internet. Several persons, along with the applicant and his wife, also filed a criminal complaint before the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office due to the tapes made available via their social media accounts and sought for the identification and punishment of those responsible. Besides, the applicant disputed the authenticity of the impugned tapes both before the military investigation board and the civil prosecutor’s office. Therefore, regard being had to the fact that several persons including the applicant raised a complaint on different grounds, the administration could not attribute any concrete responsibility to the applicant.

 84. In the course of the investigation conducted, the right to privacy, which is one of the most significant elements of the private life, inevitably became an issue. The conversations in the impugned tapes were made known to the former workmates of the applicant’s wife, and the workmates were asked whether the person in the tapes was his wife. The applicant was also working in the same workplace at that time.

 85. On the other hand, in reappointing the applicant to a position within his country of origin four months after his appointment to the Tbilisi Embassy as a military attaché and in subsequently cancelling his permanent appointment abroad, the administration relied on the tapes allegedly belonging to the applicant’s wife, which were proven to exist by virtue of the gendarmerie criminal reports indicating that the tapes had not been manipulated. The sole ground relied on by the TAF in deciding that the applicant had sustained a loss of dignity was these tapes, and accordingly his permanent appointment was cancelled as a measure required by the military service. The defendant administration reiterated during the proceedings that the sole and actual ground for it to take such a measure was the tapes made available via internet and further asserted that these tapes could not be considered to fall into scope of private life.

 86. The High Disciplinary Board of the Ministry of National Defence decided to dismiss the applicant’s wife from office due to the tapes pending the proceedings before the SMAC, and within the scope of the action brought in this respect, the same tapes were subject to an examination. As a result of the examination conducted by the Gendarmerie Criminal Department, a report was issued to the effect that the voice of the applicant’s wife and the voice in the impugned tapes “most probably belonged to the same person”. In its decision, the incumbent court only referred to the process during which the report was issued. The court merely found established that the act performed in respect of the applicant was based on material facts.

 87. Accordingly, it has been observed that at the outset, an incomprehensive examination was conducted to ascertain whether the tapes on internet, which could not be certainly identified, belonged to the applicant’s wife; that these tapes were listened to other persons working in the same workplace with the applicant and his wife on suspicion of belonging to the latter. In consideration of the Gendarmerie Criminal Department’s report of 26 December 2011, the applicant’s appointment to a permanent task abroad was cancelled.

 88. At the outset, the applicant certainly denied the authenticity of the tapes in question. The applicant further noted during the proceedings that even if these tapes were considered to be authentic, they could not be said to be obtained lawfully given the fact that they were obtained through internet.

 89. As a result, it has been concluded that regard being had to the procedure applied during the administrative process in the present case, the administration led to the disclosure, to a more extent, of the most intimate part of private life, which resulted in the infringement of a much greater personal interest in comparison to the public interest pursued. As a matter of fact, the applicant and his wife filed a criminal complaint before the military prosecutor’s office against the military officers acting on behalf of the administration for official misconduct, defamation and insult before the applicant was retired and after he had become aware of the impugned acts. However, their criminal complaint remained fruitless as no instruction for an investigation had been given.

 90. It should be also noted that the authority afforded to the courts to review the lawfulness of an administrative act is not confined to the question whether the impugned act was based on concrete facts. In the present case, the SMAC did not address the applicant’s arguments that the impugned tapes had been obtained through internet; that the content of the gendarmerie criminal reports was not definite; that disclosure of these tapes to the applicant’s workmates had infringed his personal rights; and that there was no available evidence other than the tapes. In consideration of the justifications given by the SMAC, it has been observed that the dismissal of the applicant’s action did not only have a bearing on the applicant’s professional life but also directly give an impression that the tapes were authentic as the reports issued by the Gendarmerie Criminal Department had been relied on, which caused the applicant himself and his family to be in a difficult situation.

 91. For these reasons, the Court found a violation of the right to respect for private life safeguarded by Article 20 of the Constitution.

 2. The Applicant’s Allegation that He was Compelled to Retire

 92. In its observations, the Ministry noted that the applicant’s allegation that he was compelled to retire against the risk of being subject to mobbing and punishment be declared inadmissible for the failure to duly exhaust the available legal remedies.

 93. In his counter statements against the Ministry’s observations, the applicant asserted in brief that the action he had brought and the criminal complaints they had filed remained inconclusive; that he could not obtain any result through the legal remedies prescribed in the Turkish law; and that he had been destitute of appointment abroad and ultimately of his profession due to this unjust and groundless cyber-attack.

 94. In the application form, the applicant noted that he had been given warning that an act would be taken against him pursuant to Article 153 of Law no. 1632; that if he refused to divorce his wife, he would face the risk of being deprived of his military rank due to these tapes; that he had to retire pending the judicial proceedings; that the non-pecuniary damage he had suffered amounted to torture and mobbing; that he had been subject to degrading treatments; and that therefore the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment had been violated.

 95. As noted above, the applicant submitted his defence submissions to the relevant Command ten days after he had been given a letter of warning. It is understood from his defence submissions that the applicant requested to be retired on account of the impugned process. Thereafter, he was retired on 27 September 2012 upon the approval of the Ministry of National Defence.

 96. Individual application to the Constitutional Court is a legal remedy of subsidiary nature. It is essential that the alleged violations of the fundamental rights and freedoms be dealt with and concluded primarily through ordinary legal remedies before ordinary judicial courts. An individual may resort to the individual application remedy only when the alleged violations could not be redressed through the ordinary review mechanism (see Bayram Gök, no. 2012/946, 26 March 2013, § 18).

 97. As required by the subsidiary nature of the individual application mechanism, the allegations which have not been raised through the ordinary legal remedies before general courts cannot be brought before the Constitutional Court. In the same vein, new information and documents which have not been previously submitted to general courts cannot be submitted to the Constitutional Court (see Bayram Gök, § 20).

 98. The subject of the impugned administrative act performed in respect of the applicant is not identical with the subject-matter which is complained of. The subject-matter of the action brought by the applicant is the “cancellation of his appointment to a permanent task abroad”, while his complaint is being compelled to retire under the threat of a punishment. It therefore appears that the applicant has brought before the Court new allegations which he has not been previously raised before the inferior court.

 99. Regard being had to the applicant’s retirement and his complaints and claims raised within the scope of the dismissal of the action brought by him, one of the legal remedies to which he may have recourse in respect of the complaint of his being compelled to retire is the action for compensation.

 100. Therefore, in the present case, the administrative and judicial bodies should have primarily dealt with the questions as to whether there was a causal link between the applicant’s retirement and the tapes allegedly belonging to his wife, which were made available via internet, and whether the State has fulfilled its negative and positive obligations within the meaning of the applicant’s right to improve his corporeal and spiritual existence.

 101. For these reasons, the Court declared this part of the application inadmissible for non-exhaustion of legal remedies.

 3. Application of Article 50 of Code no. 6216

 102. Article 50 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code no. 6216 on Establishment and Rules of Procedures of the Constitutional Court, dated 30 March 2011, reads as follows:

 “(1) At the end of the examination of the merits it is decided either the right of the applicant has been violated or not. In cases where a decision of violation has been made what is required for the resolution of the violation and the consequences thereof shall be ruled...

 (2) If the determined violation arises out of a court decision, the file shall be sent to the relevant court for holding the retrial in order for the violation and the consequences thereof to be removed. In cases where there is no legal interest in holding the retrial, the compensation may be adjudged in favour of the applicant or the remedy of filing a case before the general courts may be shown. The court which is responsible for holding the retrial shall deliver a decision over the file, if possible, in a way that will remove the violation and the consequences thereof that the Constitutional Court has explained in its decision of violation.”

103. The applicant requested the Court to find a violation as well as to award TRY 150,000 and TRY 200,000 respectively for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages he sustained.

104. In the present case, it has been concluded that the right to respect for private life was violated. The Court has found no legal interest in ordering a retrial as the applicant was already retired.

105. The applicant must be awarded TRY 25,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage which could not be redressed by merely finding a violation.

106. The Court may award compensation also for pecuniary damage sustained only when there is a casual link between the alleged pecuniary damage and the violation found. The applicant’s claim for pecuniary compensation must be rejected given the nature of the action brought by him as well as the fact that he did not claim any pecuniary compensation through this action.

107. The total court expense of TRY 1,998.35 including the court fee of TRY 198.35 and the counsel fee of TRY 1,800, which is calculated over the documents in the case file, must be reimbursed to the applicant.

 V. JUDGMENT

 For these reasons, the Constitutional Court UNANIMOUSLY held on 1 June 2016 that

 A. 1. The alleged violation of the right to respect for private life due to the administrative act whereby the applicant’s appointment to permanent task abroad was cancelled as well as due to dismissal of the action brought by him be DECLARED ADMISSIBLE;

 2. The allegation that he was compelled to retire for being under the threat of a punishment be DECLARED INADMISSIBLE for non-exhaustion of legal remedies;

 B. The right to respect for private life safeguarded by Article 20 of the Constitution was VIOLATED;

 C. A net amount of TRY 25,000 be PAID to the applicant as non-pecuniary compensation, and other claims for compensation be DISMISSED;

 D. The total expense of TRY 1.998.35 including the court fee of TRY 198.35 and the counsel fee of TRY 1,800 be REIMBURSED TO THE APPLICANT;

 E. The payments be made within four months as from the date when the applicant applies to the Ministry of Finance following the notification of the judgment; In case of any default in payment, legal INTEREST ACCRUE for the period elapsing from the expiry of four-month time-limit to the payment date;

 F. A copy of the judgment be sent to the 1^st Chamber of the Supreme Military Administrative Court for information; and

 G. A copy of the judgment be SENT to the Ministry of Justice.