THE FACTS

 [8-73] On the date of incident, the hearing-impaired applicant, who resides in Diyarbakır, saw a crowd while he was going to his house. Then, he felt a pain on his back and fell to the ground.

 It was noted in the incident scene investigation report that a bullet had been removed from the applicant’s body and was secured by the university hospital.

 The Security Directorate noted that on the date of incident it had been informed that an armed terrorist organization had been preparing an attack; that some officers had fired warning shots to protect an old woman who had stayed between the officers and the terrorists; that having seen a person (the applicant) behind the group lying wounded on the ground, the officers called the ambulance; and that a police officer had also been wounded on his foot during the incident.

 The Security Directorate described the injury of the applicant as an unsolved incident and stated that the cause of the injury could not be determined.

 The applicant, who was paralyzed from the waist down due to spinal cord injury as a result of the incident, stated in his statement to the public prosecutor that a police officer had shot him.

 Upon the instruction of the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, criminal examinations were conducted into the guns of the police officers who had been at the scene, and it was determined that the bullet wounding the applicant and other bullets collected at the scene had been fired from the police officer R.Ç.’s gun.

 The Governor’s Office did not granted a permission for an investigation against R.Ç. on the ground that according to the examinations, the bullet had been deformed and the police officer in question had fired a warning shot, the applicant had been wounded by the by a ricochet bullet, and therefore there was no fault or negligence in the incident. This decision was revoked by the regional administrative court.

 The Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated a criminal case against the police officer for causing aggravated injury with probable intent. The court sentenced the accused police officer to 1 year and 8 months’ imprisonment.

 However, the incumbent court concluded that the accused did not have an intent or probable intent to injure the applicant; and that it was just a reckless injury. Thereupon, the court suspended the pronouncement of the imprisonment sentence. The applicant’s appeal against the court’s decision was dismissed by the assize court.

 V. EXAMINATION AND GROUNDS

74. The Constitutional Court, at its session of 18 April 2018, examined the application and decided as follows:

A. The Applicant’s Allegations and the Ministry’s Observations

75. The applicant maintained that during the investigation into the incident, the evidence capable of fully revealing the material truth had not been collected in a timely and sufficient manner, in order to protect the police officer who had injured the applicant; that the police officer had been given a punishment which was clearly disproportionate to the impugned act in the form of a severe attack and however, the punishment had not been executed as the court granted suspension of the pronouncement of the relevant decision; and that the investigation had not been concluded within a reasonable time.

76. The applicant alleged that the inadequate sentence imposed on the police officer, which was not even executed for being suspended, also caused him to suffer distress and sorrow, independent of the incident itself. According to the applicant, it amounted to an ill-treatment.

77. Maintaining that the relevant statutory arrangements had been all applied in favour of the accused person for being a police officer; and that he was in need of care by his family members due to the injuries he had sustained, which prevented him from undertaking his own care, the applicant further alleged that the principle of equality and the right to respect for private life had been violated.

78. He accordingly maintained that there had been violations of Article 10, 17, 37 of the Constitution and Articles 3, 6, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention. He requested the Court to find the violations under these provisions and to award him compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage suffered by him.

79. In its observations, the Ministry noted that the applicant’s allegations be examined from the standpoint of the right to life. It then listed the principles set by the European Court of Human Rights (“the ECHR”) for an effective investigation to be conducted within the scope of the said right.

80. Making a reference to the acts performed within the scope of the impugned investigation, the Ministry also noted that it was for the Court to assess the complaint in question.

81. In his counter-statements against the Ministry’s observations, the applicant reiterated his allegations and claims specified in the application form.

B. The Court’s Assessment

82. Article 17 § 1 of the Constitution titled “Personal inviolability, corporeal and spiritual existence of the individual” reads as follows:

 “Everyone has the right to life and the right to protect and improve his/her corporeal and spiritual existence.”

83. Article 5 of the Constitution titled “Fundamental aims and duties of the State” insofar as relevant reads as follows:

 “The fundamental aims and duties of the State are to safeguard … the Republic and democracy, to ensure the welfare, peace, and happiness of the individual and society; to strive for the removal of political, economic, and social obstacles which restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in a manner incompatible with the principles of justice and of the social state governed by rule of law; and to provide the conditions required for the development of the individual’s material and spiritual existence.”

 1. Applicability

 84. In the present case, the applicant is alive. Therefore, an examination must be conducted primarily as regards the applicability of Article 17 § 1 of the Constitution where the right to life is enshrined.

 85. In order for the principles concerning right to life to be applied in a given case, there must be an unnatural death. However, in certain cases, the incident may be examined within the scope of the right to life, even if there has occurred no death (see Mehmet Karadağ, no. 2013/2030, 26 June 2014, § 20).

 86. An application concerning an incident that has not resulted in death can also be examined within the scope of the right to life, given the circumstances of the case, such as the nature of the act against the victim and the intent of the perpetrator. In making this assessment, the question whether the act is potentially lethal or not, and the consequences of the act in respect of the physical integrity of the victim, are of importance (see Siyahmet Şiran and Mustafa Çelik, no. 2014/7227, 12 January 2007, § 69; and Yasin Ağca, no. 2014/13163, 11 May 2017, §§ 109 and 110).

 87. Regard being had to the fact that the impugned act was performed by a gun on account of which the applicant sustained life-threatening injury, there is no doubt that the act was likely to cause death. Considering this nature of the impugned act, its severe effects on the physical integrity and other relevant factors as a whole, the Court concluded that the application must be examined from the standpoint of the right to life.

 88. The Constitutional Court is not bound by the legal qualification of the facts by the applicant and it makes such assessment itself (see Tahir Canan, no. 2012/969, 18 September 2013, § 16). It has been considered that the applicant’s complaint in essence concerns his being subjected to lethal violence, the failure to conduct an effective investigation into the incident and the failure to ensure accountability for an effective deterrence. Therefore, it has been considered that the allegations raised by the applicant in connection with the other rights fall within the scope of the right to life, and these allegations were therefore examined within the scope of the mentioned right.

 2. Scope of Examination

 89. The applicant alleged, inter alia, that the principle of equality had been breached as the judicial authorities had applied the relevant statutory arrangements in favour of the accused person for being a police officer.

 90. It should be primarily noted that the alleged violations of the principle of equality safeguarded by Article 10 of the Constitution as well as of the prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 14 of the Convention cannot be examined abstractly, and it must be examined in conjunction with the other fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined both in the Constitution and the Convention (see Onurhan Solmaz, no. 2012/1049, 26 March 2013, § 33).

 91. Besides, in order for an examination as to an alleged discrimination, the applicant must demonstrate with reasonable ground that the difference in treatment between him and the persons in a similar situation with him was based on a discriminatory reason such as race, colour, sex, religion, language and etc. in the absence of any legitimate ground (see Adnan Oktar (3), no. 2013/1123, 2 October 2013, § 50).

 92. In the present case, the applicant however failed to provide a sufficient explanation as to the judicial practices that were complained of as allegedly amounting to a difference in treatment. Nor did he mention the discriminatory reason underlying the alleged difference. The applicant did not allege that there was a difference between the impugned practice and those performed regarding persons in a similar situation with him, which was based on language, religion, race, sex and etc. in the absence of any legitimate ground. The reason underlying the alleged discriminatory treatment is not related to the applicant himself but to the accused person for being a police officer.

 93. Besides, irrespective of the above-mentioned consideration, the applicant also failed to provide any concrete finding and evidence to justify his allegation. Accordingly, the Court did not find it necessary to make an examination from the standpoint of the principle of equality invoked by the applicant in conjunction with the right to life.

 94. On the other hand, it is undisputed that in the present case, the applicant was injured on account of the shot fired by a police officer. However, there are major differences between the applicant’s allegations and the judicial authorities’ acknowledgement as to the occurrence of the impugned incident.

 95. The applicant maintained that he had been attempted to be intentionally killed by the police officer who had evidently pointed his gun at him. However, in the decision issued at the end of the investigation, it was indicated that the applicant had been hit by a ricochet bullet fired by the police officer into the air.

 96. As required by the negative obligation incumbent on the State concerning the right to life, the officers who use force by exercising public authority bear the liability not to end the life of any individual in an intentional and unlawful way (see Serpil Kerimoğlu and Others, no. 2012/752, 17 September 2013, § 51). This obligation concerns the use of force that results or may result in both deliberate killing and death without premeditation (see Cemil Danışman, no. 2013/6319, 16 June 2014, § 44).

 97. The last paragraph of Article 17 of the Constitution provides for that an interference with the right to life shall be lawful in the following cases: (i) for self-defence; and, when permitted by law as a compelling measure to use a weapon, (ii) during the execution of warrants of capture and arrest, (iii) the prevention of the escape of lawfully arrested or convicted persons, (iv) the quelling of riot or insurrection, or (v) carrying out the orders of authorised bodies during state of emergency.

 98. Lethal force must be used as a last resort in cases specified in the Constitution and where there is no other way of intervention. Therefore, having also regard to the inviolable nature of the right to life, the necessity and proportionality of the use of force that might result in death must be subjected to a strict review.

 99. At this point, it should be especially emphasised that the criminal acts performed by public officers, which put the individuals’ lives at risk -including those committed by the use of armed force, or those resulting in death or fatal injury on account of the officers’ negligence-, should in no way be allowed to go unpunished.

 100. In addition, it should be noted that the relevant legislation empowers the inferior courts to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment in such cases; however, this is not obligatory, and the judge enjoys full discretion in this regard. The courts should exercise this power so as not to mitigate or eliminate the consequences of an act constituting a heavy offence but to demonstrate that the acts in question would never be tolerated.

 101. It is of critical importance to ensure the maintenance of public confidence, the rule of law and the prevention of the impression that unlawful acts are tolerated.

 102. In cases where the police officers have resorted to the use of armed force, the suspension of the penalty may lead not only to impunity but also to a clear disproportionality between the severity of the acts and the punishment imposed. In such cases, as the applicants’ victim status caused by the violation of the right to life could not be removed, the Constitutional Court might be obliged to intervene in the case although it usually respects the inferior courts’ decision whereby the sanction to be imposed is specified and does not directly have such a duty.

 103. At this point, it should again be noted that the Court is also entitled to deal with the cases where there is a clear disproportionality between the severity of the acts committed by the public officers within the scope of Article 17 of the Constitution and the punishment imposed, even if it is not directly for the Court to deal with the questions of criminal liability (see Cezmi Demir and Others, no. 2013/293, 17 July 2014, § 76).

 104. In the present case, it may be asserted that a further examination by the Court to ascertain whether the use of armed force was absolutely necessary and proportionate would be unnecessary as the inferior court indicated in its decision that the applicant had been injured in breach of the provisions concerning the use of armed force, thereby finding a violation of Article 17 of the Constitution. If this assertion is accepted, the Court’s examination would be limited to the determination as to whether the inferior court provided an appropriate and adequate redress (punishment) for the said violation.

 105. In the present case, the judicial authorities acknowledged that the applicant was not directly subject to the use of armed force. The incumbent inferior court concluded that the permissible limit of the use of armed force against the applicant had not been exceeded deliberately or by negligence; and that therefore, there was no contradiction with the requirements, in other words safeguards, as to the resort to armed force which are enshrined in the Constitution. It also considered that the applicant’s injury had not been caused by any negligence involved in the violence used against him. It acknowledged that the negligence in question was caused not on account of the contravention with the provisions on the permissible limits of the use of armed force but under the general provisions on gross negligence, which are laid down in the relevant law.

 106. On the other hand, the applicant asserted the contrary and even maintained that he had been clearly targeted by the police officer resorting to the armed force; and that therefore, the police officer should have been sentenced to severe punishments. In this sense, regard being had to the inferior court’s consideration and the applicant’s allegation that he had been clearly targeted, it appears that the Court should assess and elucidate whether the use of armed force was absolutely necessary and proportionate. Accordingly, the Court cannot confine itself to establishing whether the unfair treatment was redressed by the imposition of a sufficient punishment.

 107. However, the Court has no sufficient information or finding to assess the applicant’s allegations and the inferior court’s consideration because the conditions in which the impugned incident took place could not be established, as would be explained in detail below in the assessment as to the procedural aspect of the right to life.

 108. Therefore, the applicant’s complaints that the substantive aspect of his right to life insofar as it relates to the State’s obligation to prevent arbitrary killing by its agents had been violated and that the unjust treatment he sustained had not been compensated for as the police officer responsible went unpunished could not be addressed at this stage. Therefore, the Court’s examination was limited to the question whether the State’s obligation to conduct an effective investigation was fulfilled, save for as regards the complaint that the authorities failed to ensure effective deterrence as a requirement inherent in accountability.

 3. Admissibility

 109. In the present case, the applicant filed an administrative action and claimed compensation on account of the impugned incident. The administrative proceedings are still pending.

 110. It should be primarily noted that in all cases where the right to life has not been violated or the physical integrity has not been damaged intentionally, the positive obligation to conduct an effective investigation does not necessarily entail an effective criminal investigation. It may be sufficient to provide civil, administrative and even disciplinary remedies to the victims (see Serpil Kerimoğlu and Others, § 59).

 111. In the present case, although the inferior court considered that the impugned incident had been caused not intentionally but within the scope of general provisions on gross negligence laid down in the relevant law, it was concluded that the remedy of compensation could not ensure fulfilment of the State’s positive obligation to conduct an effective investigation due to the allegation that the police officer intentionally resorted to the armed force.

 112. Accordingly, the alleged violation was declared admissible for not being manifestly ill-founded and there being no other grounds for its inadmissibility.

 4. Merits

 a. General Principles

 113. The right to life enshrined in Article 17 of the Constitution, when read together with Article 5 thereof, imposes positive and negative obligations on the State (see Serpil Kerimoğlu and Others, § 50).

 114. The positive obligations incumbent on the State within the right to life also have a procedural aspect. Within the framework of this procedural obligation, the State is required to carry out an effective official investigation capable of ensuring identification, and if necessary, punishment, of those who are responsible for each incident of unnatural death. The main aim of this type of investigation is to guarantee the effective implementation of the law that protects the right to life and to ensure that those responsible, if any, account for the incident (see Serpil Kerimoğlu and Others, § 54).

 115. On the other hand, the aim of the criminal investigation is to ensure the effective enforcement of the statutory provisions protecting the right to life and to hold those responsible accountable. This is not an obligation of result but of appropriate means. In addition, Article 17 of the Constitution does not grant the applicants the right to have third parties prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal offence; nor does it place an obligation on the State to conclude all proceedings in a verdict of conviction (see Serpil Kerimoğlu and Others, § 56). However, provided that the circumstances of each given case are assessed separately, the acts that manifestly jeopardise the individuals’ lives as well as grave attacks towards material and spiritual existence must not be allowed to go unpunished (see Filiz Aka, no. 2013/8365, 10 June 2015, § 32).

 116. In order for a criminal investigation with respect to the right to life to be effective, the investigation authorities need to act ex officio and collect all evidence capable of elucidating the circumstances of a death as well as of identifying those who are responsible. A deficiency in the investigation that would reduce the likelihood of discovering the cause of death or identifying those who are responsible bears the risk of clashing with the obligation of conducting an effective investigation (see Serpil Kerimoğlu and Others, § 57).

 117. To ensure the effectiveness of investigations into the cases of deaths arising from the use of force by public officers, the investigation authorities must be independent from those who might have been involved in the case. This requirement not only defines hierarchical and institutional independence but also necessitates that the investigation be actually carried out independently (see Cemil Danışman, § 96).

 118. One of the matters which ensures the effectiveness of the criminal investigations to be conducted is to make the investigation process open to public scrutiny in order to ensure accountability in practice. In addition, in each incident, it should be ensured that the relatives of the deceased person participate in this process to the extent that would be necessary so as to protect their legitimate interests (see Serpil Kerimoğlu and Others, § 58).

 119. Besides, the investigations must be conducted with a reasonable speed and due diligence. There may be difficulties which hinder progress of the investigation in certain specific circumstances. However, speedy actions taken by the authorities even in those circumstances are of critical importance for the clarification of the events, maintenance of the individuals’ commitment to the rule of law and precluding the impression that the authorities tolerate and remain indifferent to unlawful acts (see Deniz Yazıcı, no. 2013/6359, 10 December 2014, § 96).

 b. Application of Principles to the Present Case

 120. In the present case, it was maintained that no effective investigation had been conducted into the incident. The applicant reached the conclusion that no effective investigation had been conducted, on the basis of two main complaints. The first one relates to the alleged failure to collect, in a sufficient and timely manner, the evidence concerning the incident in order to protect the police officer responsible. The second complaint is the alleged failure to conduct the investigation with a reasonable speed.

 121. The applicant did not complain that the investigation had not been initiated ex officio and immediately; that it had not been open to public scrutiny; that effective participation had not been ensured; and that the investigation authorities had not been independent from the persons who might have involved in the incident. Nor is there any information or finding to the effect that these principles were breached in the present case.

 122. Considering the applicant’s complaints in the light of the above-cited principles, the Court would assess whether the investigation authorities took the reasonable measures, which were reasonably expected from them as required by Article 17 of the Constitution, to collect all evidence capable of establishing the “type of responsibility”, which would ensure clarification of the cause of the incident as well as of the question whether the right to life had been breached intentionally.

 123. Although, during the investigation, the incident scene investigation was conducted without delay, the material evidence at the incident scene including the bullet leading to the applicant’s injury was secured for examination, and it was found established, as a result of the ballistic examination, that the shot which injured the applicant had been fired by the relevant police officer, it is evident that there are issues undermining the effectiveness of the investigation in determining the circumstances under which the incident took place.

 124. One of these issues is the fact that why the authorities waited for about six months to make a comparison between the police officers’ gun and the bullet in question as well as cartridge cases although it was revealed by the examination reports of the Security Directorate, dated 1 September and 15 September 2010, that some of the police officers present at the incident scene had fired their guns during the incident, and the bullet extracted from the applicant’s body had been received by the Incident Scene Investigation Team a few hours after the incident.

 125. The same ambiguity is also at stake for the request to obtain video footage of the incident scene. It has been observed that the video footage of the incident scene was requested also six months later. However, the video footage was preserved only for two months and then deleted. Therefore, it became impossible to collect this evidence which was so important as to eliminate the need to conduct any other inquiry into the incident.

 126. Another prominent issue coming into play for the collection of evidence is the failure, during the investigation, to revisit the incident scene to have the incident reconstructed although it was acknowledged that the police officer responsible for the incident had fired a shot in the air but hit the applicant by a ricochet. The incident scene investigation team determined the locations of the spent bullet cases fired by the police officer and the cartridge bullets as well as the signs of hits by certain bullets. It therefore appears that the discovery, if should have been conducted at the incident scene, would be capable of revealing the credibility of the police officers involved in the incident to which there was allegedly no other eyewitness. It has been observed that it could have been possible to easily elucidate the incident by eliminating the discrepancy between the claimant and the defence if it had been established, by the incident scene investigation, that there were discrepancies between the police officers’ statements and the location of material evidence at the incident scene, the way followed by the bullet, the position of the gun fired by the police officer as well as the place where the applicant fell to the ground. However, these steps were never taken during the investigation. As a matter of fact, in such kinds of incidents, incident scene investigation is of great importance for the judicial authorities to elucidate the circumstances of the incident and to establish the material fact.

 127. On the other hand, the determination in the expertise report that the bullet fired by the police officer and injuring the applicant was deformed, which was not explicitly specified in the bill of indictment issued by the chief public prosecutor’s office and in the reasoning of the decision rendered by the inferior court, led the judicial authorities to consider that the applicant had not been directly targeted but hit by a ricochet. This consideration was clearly specified in the preliminary survey conducted with respect to the police officer.

 128. The applicant, hit as a result of a ricochet bullet, sustained severe fractures in his backbone and other bones on account of which he became paralysed. Besides, the bullet caused severe damage not only to the applicant’s bones but also to his internal organs such as lung, diaphragm and spleen.

 129. Firstly, it should be noted that it is a frequent case where the bullets, upon entering through the body, may strike the bones, or may stay in the body for any other reasons. The situation is exactly the same in the present case. It is also highly likely that the bullet becomes deformed for striking the bones through the body directly or by changing its trajectory. However, despite this well-known fact, during the investigation in the present case, no inquiry including an expertise report was conducted as to the deformation of the bullet that had been shot in the incident, and it was accepted that the bullet had been deformed outside the body.

 130. Besides, it appears that a total of 16 judicial reports were issued in respect of the applicant. Nor did any of these reports address the question whether a bullet with a diameter of 9 mm, as used in the present case, would cause such a severe damage if it hit the body in a deformed way upon ricocheting off a place (wall). However, it is of utmost importance, for clarifying the impugned incident, to ascertain whether a deformed cartridge bullet could penetrate the body downwards, by entering inside from the lungs at the back, in a way that could cause severe fractures on the backbone and other bones and cause severe damage to the internal organs.

 131. The most important issue needed to be taken into consideration in the investigation is the fact that the police officer, the suspect of the present case, was asked, for the first time, to provide his defence submissions within about 3 years after the incident and within about 2 years after it was revealed through the expertise report that his gun had been used in the incident.

 132. In cases where death or a fatal injury occurs, such delays in taking statements of the perpetrators per se suffice to explicitly demonstrate the lack of due diligence in these investigations. This may also cause the impression, in cases where the law-enforcement officers have involved, before the eyes of both the victim and, in general, the society that these officers have acted in a vacuum of authority whereby they are not responsible towards anyone including the judicial authorities for their acts.

 133. The last failure to be mentioned in the collection of evidence is that it had not been researched whether there was any eyewitness other than the workmates of the police officer, who was the suspect of the incident. As indicated in the relevant reports and according to the judicial authorities, there were other individuals who did not attend the demonstration -like the applicant-, and the police officer acted with the intent of protecting these persons.

 134. There is no information in the application form or the investigation documents that an inquiry was conducted to identify these individuals who were at the incident scene but did not attend the demonstration. It has been observed that a separate investigation into the acts of violence was carried out, independently of this investigation, by the specially authorized unit of the chief public prosecutor’s office. In the investigation conducted by this unit, no inquiry was conducted, either by examining this investigation file or through any other means, to ascertain whether there was any eyewitness to the impugned incident as it was presumed that the eyewitnesses, if any, had been identified during this investigation. Although it may be asserted that the eyewitnesses could not testify every moment of the incident due to the tension of, and the clash taking place at, the incident scene, it should be noted that it was also the same for the police officers whose statements were taken within the scope of the investigation.

 135. As a result, it has been concluded that the competent authorities failed to take, or caused delay in taking, the measures reasonably expected from them in revealing the material facts, that is to say, in clarifying the incident.

 136. The last issue to be taken into consideration with regard to the effectiveness of the investigation is whether it was conducted with reasonable speed.

 137. The determination whether the investigation was conducted with due diligence and speed depends on the particular circumstances of every concrete case, number of the suspects and accused persons involved in the investigation, the nature of the charges, the complexity of the incident and the question whether there is any factor or difficulty to hinder the progress of the investigation (see Fahriye Erkek and Others, no. 2013/4668, 16 September 2015, § 91).

 138. The impugned investigation could be concluded within approximately 4 years and 2 months. The lack of due diligence in collecting the evidence in a timely manner not only hindered the full clarification of the incident in all its dimensions but also led to the procrastination of the investigation without any justification despite the existence of no obstacle or difficulty, as well as to the impression that such unlawful acts in which a law-enforcement officer has been involved are tolerated or confronted with indifference.

 139. For these reasons, the Court found a violation of the procedural aspect of the obligation to conduct an effective investigation that is inherent in the right to life.

 5. Application of Article 50 of Code no. 6216

 140. Article 50 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code no. 6216 on Establishment and Rules of Procedures of the Constitutional Court, dated 30 March 2011, reads as follows:

 “(1) At the end of the examination of the merits it is decided either the right of the applicant has been violated or not. In cases where a decision of violation has been made what is required for the resolution of the violation and the consequences thereof shall be ruled...

 (2) If the determined violation arises out of a court decision, the file shall be sent to the relevant court for holding the retrial in order for the violation and the consequences thereof to be removed. In cases where there is no legal interest in holding the retrial, the compensation may be adjudged in favour of the applicant or the remedy of filing a case before the general courts may be shown. The court which is responsible for holding the retrial shall deliver a decision over the file, if possible, in a way that will remove the violation and the consequences thereof that the Constitutional Court has explained in its decision of violation.”

 141. In his application form, the applicant requested the Court to award him an equitable amount of compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage he had sustained. By his letter in response to the Ministry’s observations, he requested a total of 150,000 Turkish liras (“TRY”) out of which is TRY 100,000 is for his pecuniary damage and TRY 50,000 is for his non-pecuniary damage.

 142. In the present case, it has been concluded that the procedural aspect of the obligation to conduct an affective investigation inherent in the right to life was violated.

 143. As there is a legal interest in conducting a retrial to redress the consequences of the violation of the procedural aspect of the right to life, a copy of the judgment must be sent to the 5^th Chamber of the Diyarbakır Criminal Court of First Instance to conduct a retrial.

 144. The applicant must be awarded a net amount of TRY 30,000 in compensation for the non-pecuniary damage he sustained due to the violation of the procedural aspect of the right to life, which could not be redressed by merely the finding of a violation.

 145. The Court may award compensation for the pecuniary damage sustained only when there is a casual link between the alleged pecuniary damage and the violation found. In the present case, the Court found a violation of the obligation to conduct an effective investigation. The applicant’s claim for pecuniary compensation must be rejected as he failed to submit any information or document to demonstrate the causal link between his claim in respect of the pecuniary damage sustained by him and the violation found.

 146. The total court expense of TRY 2,186.10 including the court fee of TRY 206.10 and the counsel fee of TRY 1,980, which is calculated over the documents in the case file, must be reimbursed to the applicant.

 VI. JUDGMENT

 For these reasons, the Constitutional Court UNANIMOUSLY held on 18 April 2018 that

 A. The alleged violation of the right to life be DECLARED ADMISSIBLE;

 B. The procedural aspect of the obligation to conduct an effective investigation, which is inherent in the right to life safeguarded by Article 17 of the Constitution, was VIOLATED;

 C. A copy of the judgment be SENT to the 5^th Chamber of the Diyarbakır Criminal Court of First Instance for a retrial in order to redress the consequences of the violation of the procedural aspect of the right to life;

 D. A net amount of TRY 30,000 be PAID to the applicant as non-pecuniary compensation, and other claims for compensation be DISMISSED;

 E. The total expense of TRY 2.186.10 including the court fee of TRY 206.10 and the counsel fee of TRY 1,980 be REIMBURSED TO THE APPLICANT;

 F. The payments be made within four months as from the date when the applicant applies to the Ministry of Finance following the notification of the judgment; In case of any default in payment, legal INTEREST ACCRUE for the period elapsing from the expiry of four-month time-limit to the payment date;

 G. A copy of the judgment be SENT to the Ministry of Justice.