THE FACTS

 [5-45] After the coup attempt of 15 July 2016, the applicant was detained and placed in a prison for his alleged membership of the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization/Parallel State Structure (FETÖ/PDY).

 With the decision of the Administrative and Supervisory Board of the Prison, titled “Provision of Prisoners with Training and Rehabilitation Activities”, it was held that those who had been detained within the scope of the investigations conducted into the FETÖ/PDY would not be allowed to participate in the training and rehabilitation activities. It was underlined in the reasoning of the decision that the state of emergency was continuing and that the number of persons detained within the scope of the relevant investigations was high, and that therefore the measure in question was taken in order to prevent any security vulnerability.

 The applicant’s challenge to this decision was dismissed by the execution judge. Thereupon, the applicant appealed against the decision of the execution judge. The incumbent assize court dismissed the applicant’s appeal.

 Thereafter, the applicant lodged an individual application with the Court on 13 July 2017.

 V. EXAMINATION AND GROUNDS

46. The Constitutional Court, at its session of 18 July 2018, examined the application and decided as follows:

A. Request for Legal Aid

47. The applicant, indicating that he could not afford to pay the application fee and relevant expenses for being detained on remand, requested legal aid.

48. In consideration of the principles laid down in the Court’s recent judgments, the Court accepted the applicant’s request for legal aid for not being manifestly ill-founded in order not to cause financial difficulties to him (see Mehmet Şerif Ay, no. 2012/1181, 19 September 2013, §§ 22-27).

B. Alleged Violation of the Prohibition of Ill-Treatment

1. The Applicant’s Allegations

49. The applicant maintained that

 i. His detention conditions attained the threshold of torture and increased his physical and mental sufferings as he had not been allowed to use sports halls, library, workshops and multi-purpose hall and could not participate in such kinds of trainings and rehabilitation activities.

 ii. He had suffered from backache, inguinal pain, loss of vision, constipation and sleep problems. His preclusion from using library also hindered him in making researches and occupying his mind.

 iii. He therefore complained of the alleged violations of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment, as well as of the right to a fair trial and accordingly requested the Court to find a violation and award him compensation.

2. The Court’s Assessment

50. Article 17 § 3 of the Constitution, titled “Personal inviolability, corporeal and spiritual existence of the individual”, provides for as follows:

 “No one shall be subjected to torture or mal-treatment; no one shall be subjected to penalties or treatment incompatible with human dignity.”

 51. The Constitutional Court is not bound by the legal qualification of the facts by the applicant, and it makes such assessment itself (see Tahir Canan, no. 2012/969, 18/9/2013, § 16). Given the nature of the complaints raised by the applicant, it appears that his allegations that he was deprived of the opportunity to participate in training and rehabilitation activities mainly fall into the scope of the prohibition of ill-treatment. Therefore, all allegations raised by the applicant were examined under the prohibition of ill-treatment safeguarded by Article 17 of the Constitution.

 52. The State’s obligation to respect for the individuals’ right to protect and improve their corporeal and spiritual existence primarily requires the public authorities to refrain from interfering with this right, in other words, from causing individuals physical and mental damage in cases specified in the third paragraph of the said provision. It is the State’s negative duty emanating from its obligation to respect for individuals’ corporeal and spiritual integrity (see Cezmi Demir and Others, no. 2013/293, 17 July 2014, § 81).

 53. Article 17 § 3 of the Constitution and Article 3 of the Convention do not contain any limitation and point to the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatments or penalties. The absolute nature of the prohibition of ill-treatment does not embody an exception even in times of war or any other general threat to the nation within the meaning of Article 15 of the Constitution. In the same vein, nor does Article 15 of the Convention provide any exception to the prohibition of ill-treatment (see Turan Günana, no. 2013/3550, 19 November 2014, § 33).

 54. Detention conditions, treatments inflicted on prisoners, discriminatory behaviours and conducts, defamatory expressions used by state agents, or degrading treatments such as forcing a person to eat or drink something unusual may constitute treatment incompatible with human dignity (see Cezmi Demir and Others, § 90). The convicts and detainees may be lawfully deprived of the right to personal liberty and security under Article 19 of the Constitution (see İbrahim Uysal, no. 2014/1711, 23 July 2014, §§ 29-33), whereas they generally have the other fundamental rights and freedoms falling under the joint protection realm of the Constitution and the Convention. However, the rights enjoyed by prisoners may be restricted in case of any acceptable and reasonable requirements for preventing the commission of offences and maintaining order, namely for maintaining security in the prison, as an inevitable consequence of detention in a prison.

 55. The provision “No one shall be subjected to torture or mal-treatment; no one shall be subjected to penalties or treatment incompatible with human dignity”, laid down in Article 17 § 3 of the Constitution, is also applicable to the practices as to convicts and detainees. This is explicitly emphasised in Article 2 § 2 of the Law no. 5275 on the Execution of Penalties and Security Measures, which is titled “The basic principle of execution” and provides for “In the execution of penalties and security measures, there shall be no cruel, inhuman, degrading or humiliating treatment” as well as in Article 6 § 1 (b) of the same Law which provides for “A person shall deprived of his liberty necessitated by the imprisonment sentence under the physical and mental conditions that ensure respect for human dignity”. Therefore, in the enforcement of conviction decisions or detention orders, the conditions under which convicts and detainees will be held must ensure respect for human dignity (see Turan Günana, § 36).

 56. The issues to be regarded as ill-treatment in prisons may appear in different circumstances, which may result either from the intentional conducts of the prison administration and officers or from mismanagement or inadequate resources. Therefore, the life sustained by convicts in the prisons must be assessed in all aspects. The life in prisons must be taken into consideration widely ranging from the activities performed by prisoners to the general conditions of the relations between prisoners and prison officers (see Turan Günana, § 37). Article 17 of the Constitution also secures that the conditions under which a convict or detainee is held in a prison be compatible with human dignity. The method of execution and the conducts during the execution process must not cause hardship exceeding the inevitable level of suffering associated with the deprivation of liberty (see Turan Günana, § 39).

 57. In addition to the foregoing issues, for a treatment to fall into Article 17 § 3 of the Constitution, it must have attained the minimum threshold of severity. This minimum threshold may vary by, and must therefore depend on, the particular circumstances of each case. In this sense, in determining the level of severity, factors such as the duration of the impugned treatment; its physical and mental effects, as well as sex, age and mental health of the victim are of importance (see Tahir Canan, § 23).

 58. In the present case, the applicant was detained for his alleged membership of a terrorist organisation and placed in the Menemen T-type Prison. He complained of having been precluded from participating in training and rehabilitation activities.

 59. It should be primarily noted that the restrictions imposed on prisoners, who have been detained within the scope of a criminal investigation or prosecution or whose imprisonment sentence has been finalised, as to their participation in training and rehabilitation activities do not per se constitute a breach of Article 17 of the Constitution. The imposition of such restrictions for maintaining discipline and security may derive from the very nature of the detention measure and execution of sentence. However, it must not be disregarded that preclusion from training and rehabilitation activities to the extent that would go beyond the intended purpose of detention or execution, amount to arbitrariness and excessiveness and thereby impair the prisoners’ physical and mental health may constitute ill-treatment under Article 17 § 3 of the Constitution, provided that it has attained a minimum threshold of severity.

 60. The Court has noted that in assessing the detention conditions in prisons within the meaning of Article 17 § 3 of the Constitution, these conditions must be taken into consideration, along with the applicant’s allegations in a given application, and accordingly, the severity and aim of the applied measures as well as their consequences for individuals must be considered as a whole (see Turan Günana, § 38). Therefore, the particular circumstances of the present case, the nature, duration and aim of the restriction whereby the applicant was devoid of rehabilitation activities as well as its effects on the applicant must be taken into account.

 61. In the present case, the applicant detained on 20 March 2017 was placed in a cell measuring 60 square meters, with a yard for fresh air measuring 35 square meters. Pursuant to the relevant legislation and as set forth in Additional Article 27 of the Recommendation Rec (2006) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Prison Rules, the applicant was provided with the opportunity of at least one hour of walking and personally exercise in the yard for fresh air. Besides, the applicant had access to periodicals and non-periodicals as well as to newspapers, books and printed publications issued by state institutions, universities, public professional organisations, and -on condition of not being banned by courts- by foundations exempted from tax by the Council of Ministers and the associations serving for public interest.

 62. Besides, it is clearly set forth in the relevant legislation that the applicant, like the other prisoners, had the right to access to medical examination and treatment opportunities as well as medical devices for the protection of his physical and mental health and diagnosis of disorders. The medical institutions operating under the Ministry of Health, under the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and under the universities have been assigned to render this service. It is further laid down that the physician serving at the relevant prison shall inspect the prison at least once a month and issue a report including suggestions to be put into practice with respect to medical conditions.

 63. In the present case, the applicant was not allowed to participate in training and rehabilitation activities such as to use indoor and outdoor sports halls and library. The relevant prison administration noted that the impugned restrictions had been imposed to ensure the prisoners’ safety, to prevent organisational activities, as well as to preclude terrorist organisations from guiding the prisoners in line with the organisational purposes and giving them orders and instructions. In the assessments made in consideration of the aims pursued by the prison administration, it has been revealed that the impugned interference had acceptable and reasonable grounds such as the prevention of commission of offence and maintaining discipline at the prison, as an inevitable consequence of detention. It has been further observed that the applicant had the opportunity to go outside for fresh air for at least one hour on daily basis during which he could do outdoor exercises; that he was not subject to any restriction in having access to any periodicals or non-periodicals including books and journals, which are not found inconvenient, as well as to information; and that the impugned restriction, which had been indeed temporary, was lifted by the decision of the Prison’s Management and Supervisory Board on 8 June 2018. Nor did the applicant raise any allegations to the effect that he had been deprived of medical support for the treatment of his diseases and for the protection of his mental and physical health, or that he could not communicate with the outside world to a reasonable extent.

 64. Given the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court has concluded that the suffering caused by the very nature of the temporary measure, which had a reasonable basis, and incurred as an inevitable consequence of detention did not attain a minimum threshold of severity from the standpoint of Article 17 § 3 of the Constitution.

 65. As it has been observed that there was no violation of the prohibition of ill-treatment for the above-mentioned reasons, this part of the application must be declared inadmissible for being manifestly ill-founded.

 C. Alleged Violation of the Principle of Equality in conjunction with the Prohibition of Ill-Treatment

 1. The Applicant’s Allegations

 66. The applicant maintained that the principle of equality was breached as such a restriction had been imposed merely on those detained within the scope of the investigations conducted against the FETÖ/PDY, and the other detainees and convicts had not been subjected to a discriminatory treatment.

 2. The Court’s Assessment

 67. Article 10 §§ 1, 4 and 5 of the Constitution, titled “Equality before the law”, reads as follows:

“Everyone is equal before the law without distinction as to language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such grounds.

…

 No privilege shall be granted to any individual, family, group or class.

 …

 State organs and administrative authorities are obliged to act in compliance with the principle of equality before the law in all their proceedings.”

68. The Constitutional Court is not bound by the legal qualification of the facts by the applicant and it makes such assessment itself (see Tahir Canan, no. 2012/969, 18 September 2013, § 16). The applicant’s allegation essentially concerns that the impugned restriction whereby the prisoners were precluded from participating in training and rehabilitation activities has been applied merely to those detained on remand within the scope of the FETÖ/PDY investigations. It has been accordingly considered that this allegation raised by the applicant be examined under the principle of equality in conjunction with the prohibition of ill-treatment, which is safeguarded by Article 17 of the Constitution.

69. Even if Article 10 of the Constitution is not formulated as including the prohibition of discrimination in its wording, this prohibition must be effectively put into practice as the principle of equality involves, in constitutional context, a normative value to be based on in any case (see the Court’s judgment no. E.1996/15, K.1996/34, 29 September 1996). In other words, the principle of equality also embodies the prohibition of discrimination as a concrete standard norm (see Tuğba Arslan [Plenary], no. 2014/256, 25 June 2014, § 108; and Nurcan Yolcu [Plenary], no. 2013/9880, 11 November 2015, § 34).

70. The notion of “everyone” specified in Article 10 § 1 of the Constitution does not delimit the potential scopes of the principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination. Besides, as it is set forth in the same paragraph that no distinction shall be allowed on “such grounds”, it is clearly indicated that the grounds of discrimination is not limited to those listed in the relevant provision, and thereby the scope of the issues where no discrimination is allowed is extended (see Tuğba Arslan, 109).

71. No limitation is set in Article 10 of the Constitution as to the individual to enjoy the principle of equality as well as to the scope of the principle. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Constitution, which provides for “The provisions of the Constitution are fundamental legal rules binding upon legislative, executive and judicial organs, and administrative authorities and other institutions and individuals”, it is clear that the principle of equality enshrined in the Constitution under the heading “General Principles” is also applicable to the bodies, institutions and individuals specified in the said provision. Moreover, pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 10, which provides for “State organs and administrative authorities are obliged to act in compliance with the principle of equality before the law in all their proceedings”, the legislative, executive and judicial organs and administrative authorities are to act in line with the principle of equality (see Tuğba Arslan, § 110; and Nurcan Yolcu, § 35).

72. In Article 10 § 1 of the Constitution, it is set forth that there shall be no discrimination “as to language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect”, which also stresses that no distinction shall be allowed “on any such grounds”. In this sense, it is clear that the Constitution attaches more importance to the types of discriminatory treatment that are explicitly mentioned, and that such treatments may be justified only on “particularly important grounds”. The more the discriminatory treatment is considered severe, the more important would be the grounds to be relied on by the State to justify such treatment. In other words, in case of any potentially serious discrimination, the margin of appreciation accorded to the State would be generally narrower (see Tuğba Arslan, §§ 145, 146; and Nurcan Yolcu, § 36).

73. The Court defines the principle of equality as follows:

 “The principle of equality enshrined in Article 10 of the Constitution applies to those who are in the same legal status. This principle stipulates equality not in action but in legal terms. The purpose of this principle is to ensure that those who are in the same status be subject to the same process before laws and to prevent any distinction and privilege. This principle prohibits the breach of equality before laws due to applying different rules to certain individuals and communities of the same status. Equality before the law does not mean that everyone would be bound by the same rules in every aspect. The circumstances specific to these individuals and communities may require the application of different rules and practices in respect of them. If the same legal situations are subject to the same rules whereas the different legal situations are subject to different rules, the principle of equality enshrined in the Constitution is not impaired.” (see the Court’s judgment no. E.2009/47, K.2011/51, 17 March 2011).

74. As noted above, the principle of equality, which pursues the aim of ensuring those of the same legal status be subject to the same process, prohibits the application of different rules to the individuals in the same status. However, in a democratic society, in cases where a difference in treatment has an objective and reasonable basis and the method applied in this difference is proportionate, the principle of equality cannot be said to be impaired. Therefore, this principle would not be breached if the difference in treatment inflicted on those who are of the same legal status has an objective and reasonable basis, is proportionate to the prescribed legitimate aim, in other words, if it does not place an excessive and extraordinary burden on the relevant person.

75. In this sense, the following factors must be taken into consideration in determining whether the principle of equality has been breached:

 i. Whether there is a difference in treatment, towards the individuals or groups of the same legal status, as to language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such grounds;

 ii. Whether this difference in treatment has an objective and reasonable basis;

 iii. Whether it is proportionate.

76. The applicant, detained for his alleged membership of a terrorist organisation, was placed in the Menemen T-type Prison. He complained that those detained in the same prison within the scope of the FETÖ-PDY investigations, like himself, were deprived of the training and rehabilitation activities, whereas the other detainees and convicts were not. In this sense, the questions to be ascertained in the present case are whether there was a difference in treatment inflicted on the applicant; if there was, whether such a treatment had an objective and reasonable basis; and whether the method used and leading to difference in treatment was proportionate.

77. In the present case, the prison administration provided the prisoners with the opportunity to participate in some training and rehabilitation activities -such as using indoor and outdoor sports halls and library- with a view to maintaining their health and welfare. However, it appears that by virtue of the decision of 19 October 2016, it was ordered that those detained in the prison within the scope of the FETÖ/PDY investigations would not participate in these training and rehabilitation activities. Given the impugned practice whereby the other prisoners including those detained or convicted of terrorist offences were not subject to such a restriction and only those detained within the scope of the FETÖ/PDY investigations were deprived of such activities, it has been observed that this practice constituted a different treatment in respect of the applicant.

78. In consideration of the reasoning of the decision issued by the Prison’s Management and Supervisory Board, it has been observed that the impugned practice was intended for the prevention of organisational activities to be performed by those detained within the scope of the FETÖ/PDY investigations, their guidance by, and receiving orders and instructions from, the said terrorist organisation, as well as for ensuring the safety of the prisoners. It was further emphasised in the reasoning that as the state of emergency was still in force and there were so many individuals detained within the scope of the FETÖ/PDY investigations, the said measure had been put into practice so as to avoid any security vulnerability.

79. Given the complex nature of the FETÖ/PDY structure, clandestine nature of the organisational relationship and the reasons underlying the state of emergency in force at the relevant time, it is clearly possible for many individuals detained within the scope of the said investigations and placed at the same prisons to continue engaging in organisational activities. Therefore, the impugned difference in treatment in pursuit of prevention of such a possibility was based on objective and reasonable grounds.

80. The question whether the method applied and leading to difference in treatment was proportionate is a paramount criterion in ascertaining whether a fair balance has been struck between the aim pursued by the difference in treatment and the fundamental rights and freedoms. In the present case, it must be discussed whether such a balance was struck by the public authorities in respect of the prohibition of ill-treatment. As mentioned above, it has been observed that despite under limited terms and conditions, the applicant had the opportunity to do physical exercise and to have access to books; and that the impugned practice was indeed a temporary measure. Therefore, the Court has concluded that the method applied was proportionate.

81. As a result, even if the applicant was clearly subjected to a difference in treatment, it has been considered that the impugned treatment was based on objective and reasonable grounds; and the method applied was proportionate.

82. For these reasons, as it is explicit that the principle of equality, taken in conjunction with the prohibition of ill-treatment, was not breached, this part of the application must be declared inadmissible for being manifestly ill-founded.

VI. JUDGMENT

 For these reasons, the Constitutional Court UNANIMOUSLY held on 18 July 2018 that

 A. The applicant’s request for legal aid be ACCEPTED;

 B. 1. The alleged violation of the prohibition of ill-treatment be DECLARED INADMISSIBLE for being manifestly ill-founded;

 2. The alleged violation of the principle of equality in conjunction with the prohibition of ill-treatment be DECLARED INADMISSIBLE for being manifestly ill-founded;

 C. As the payment of the court expenses by the applicant would be unjust pursuant to Article 339 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure no. 6100 and dated 12 January 2011, he would BE COMPLETELY EXEMPTED from the court expenses.