THE FACTS

 [6-34] After the coup attempt of 15 July 2016, the applicant was detained and placed in a prison for his alleged membership of the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization/Parallel State Structure (FETÖ/PDY).

 In line with the Decree Law no. 667 on the Measures under the State of Emergency, the Administrative and Supervisory Board of the Prison decided that those who were already detained for the offences specified in the Decree Law and those who were detained for the first time and placed in the prison would exercise their right to contact by phone once every 15 days during the state of emergency.

 The applicant’s challenge against this decision was dismissed by the execution judge. Besides, his appeal against the decision of the execution judge was dismissed by the relevant assize court.

 V. EXAMINATION AND GROUNDS

35. The Constitutional Court, at its session of 3 July 2018, examined the application and decided as follows:

A. Request for Legal Aid

36. The applicant requested to be granted legal aid, maintaining that he could not afford to pay the litigation costs for being detained on remand.

37. In accordance with the principles set out in Mehmet Şerif Ay judgment of the Constitutional Court (no. 2012/1181, 17 September 2013), the request for legal aid made by the applicant, who could not apparently pay the court expenses without incurring financial difficulties, should be accepted for not being manifestly ill-founded (see Mehmet Şerif Ay, §§ 22-27).

B. Alleged Violations of the Right to Respect for Family Life and the Freedom of Communication

1. The Applicant’s Allegations and the Ministry’s Observations

38. The applicant maintained that his right to contact by phone had been disproportionately restricted without any justification; and that such restriction had been applied only to a certain group of prisoners. He further alleged that although the other prisoners enjoyed the right to contact with a larger circle of family and relatives by phone once a week, he had been restrained from communicating with his family, which was the most important factor that would raise the morale and motivation. He accordingly maintained that there had been violations of the principle of equality, the right to respect for family life, as well as the freedom of communication.

39. In its observations, the Ministry noted that given the nature of the offence underlying the applicant’s detention, the impugned restriction was considered reasonable for the prevention of offence and maintenance of prison discipline, as an inevitable result of being placed in a prison; and that the application was to be found manifestly ill-founded as the impugned restriction was in compliance with the established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (“the ECHR”) and the Constitutional Court.

2. The Court’s Assessment

40. Article 20 § 1 of the Constitution titled “Privacy and protection of private life”, which would be taken into consideration in the examination of the present case, reads as follows:

 “Everyone has the right to demand respect for his/her private and family life. Privacy of private or family life shall not be violated.”

41. Article 22 of the Constitution, titled “Freedom of communication”, reads as follows:

 “Everyone has the freedom of communication. Privacy of communication is fundamental.

 Unless there exists a decision duly given by a judge on one or several of the grounds of national security, public order, prevention of crime, protection of public health and public morals, or protection of the rights and freedoms of others, or unless there exists a written order of an agency authorized by law in cases where delay is prejudicial, again on the abovementioned grounds, communication shall not be impeded nor its privacy be violated. The decision of the competent authority shall be submitted for the approval of the judge having jurisdiction within twenty-four hours. The judge shall announce his decision within forty-eight hours from the time of seizure; otherwise, seizure shall be automatically lifted.

 Public institutions and agencies where exceptions may be applied are prescribed in law.”

42. The Constitutional Court is not bound by the legal qualification of the facts by the applicant, and it makes such assessment itself (see Tahir Canan, no. 2012/969, 18 September 2013, § 16). The application was examined from the standpoint of the right to respect for family life and the freedom of communication.

43. For an examination as to the alleged violation of the principle of equality, it must be primarily revealed that there had been a difference in treatment between the applicant and the persons in similar situations with him. It has been observed that in the present case, the impugned restriction imposed on the right to contact by phone was not applied to all detainees but applied to those who were detained for the certain offences specified in Article 6 §1 of the Law no. 6749 on the Adoption of the Decree Law on the Measures Taken under the State of Emergency with Certain Amendment (“Law no. 6749”); that it resulted from the conditions prevailing during the state of emergency; and that the restriction was applied to those detained on remand for the offences specified in Law no. 6749 without any distinction.

44. It is clear that the security risks associated with the conditions of detention in prison, which are incurred by those who are detained on remand due to the offences set out in Law no. 6749, are not of the same degree with those of the prisoners who are not within this scope. Besides, in Turkish law, those who are detained or convicted due to the said offences are subject to different processes not only in terms of the conditions of placement in prison but also in terms of the sentence execution regime. Therefore, those detained on account of terrorist offences, including the applicant, are considered to fall into a category different than that of the individuals detained due to the other types of offences and cannot be said to have the same status. Regard being had to the fact that the applicant did not complain of any difference in treatment between him and the other detainees of the same offence, the Court did not find it necessary to make an assessment under the principle of equality.

45. Article 15 of the Constitution, titled “Suspension of the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms”, reads as follows:

 “In times of war, mobilization, martial law or a state of emergency, the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms may be partially or entirely suspended, or measures which are contrary to the guarantees embodied in the Constitution may be taken to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation, as long as obligations under international law are not violated.

 Even under the circumstances indicated in the first paragraph, the individual’s right to life, the integrity of his/her corporeal and spiritual existence shall be inviolable except where death occurs through acts in conformity with law of war; no one shall be compelled to reveal his/her religion, conscience, thought or opinion, nor be accused on account of them; offences and penalties shall not be made retroactive; nor shall anyone be held guilty until so proven by a court ruling.”

46. The Court has noted that in examining the individual applications regarding the measures taken during the periods when emergency administration procedures are in force, it would take into account the protection regime set out in Article 15 of the Constitution with respect to fundamental rights and freedoms (see Aydın Yavuz and Others, §§ 187-191). In this sense, it has been considered that the impugned practice as to the applicant’s right to contact by phone was related to the incidents necessitating the declaration of the state of emergency.

47. In this regard, the restriction imposed on the applicant’s right to contact by phone would be examined from the standpoint of Article 15 of the Constitution. In the course of this examination, it would be primarily ascertained whether the impugned restriction was contrary to the safeguards set out in Articles 13, 20 and 22 of the Constitution. In case of any contradiction, it would be then assessed whether it was justified by the criteria set forth in Article 15 of the Constitution (in the context of the right to personal liberty and security, see Aydın Yavuz and Others, §§ 193-195 and 242; and in the context of the right to education, see Mehmet Ali Eneze, no. 2017/35352, 23 May 2018, § 31).

a. Scope of the Right and Existence of the Interference

48. Article 22 of the Constitution sets forth that everyone has the freedom of communication and that privacy of communication is essential. In Article 8 of the Convention, it is enshrined that everyone has the right to respect for his correspondence. The joint protection realm of the Constitution and the Convention affords safeguards not only for the freedom of communication but also for its privacy, regardless of its content and form. In this context, expressions used in the oral, written and visual communications, either mutual or collective, of individuals must be kept confidential. Communications via post, e-mail, telephone, fax and internet must be considered to fall under the scope of the freedom of communication as well as confidentiality of communication (see Mehmet Koray Eryaşa, no. 2013/6693, 16 April 2015, § 49).

49. The right to respect for family life is safeguarded by Article 20 § 1 of the Constitution which points to, when taken together with its legislative intention, the public authorities’ inability to interfere with private and family life, as well as the necessity that a person organises and steers his personal and family life in the way he chooses. It is the constitutional arrangement that corresponds to the right to respect for family life safeguarded by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) (see Murat Atılgan, no. 2013/9047, 7 May 2015, § 22; and Marcus Frank Cerny [Plenary], no. 2013/5126, 2 July 2015, § 36).

50. Pursuant to Article 19 of the Constitution, the restriction of the prisoners’ freedom of communication and right to respect for family life is an inevitable and natural consequence of being held in a prison, which is lawful. On the other hand, the right to respect for family life requires the prison administration to take the measures that would ensure the prisoners to maintain contacts with their families and relatives (see Mehmet Zahit Şahin, no. 2013/4708, 20 April 2016, § 36).

51. However, in fulfilling this obligation, the inevitable and natural consequences of being held in prison are to be taken into consideration. In this context, a fair balance is to be struck between the public order and the prevention of offences, and the right to respect for family life and the freedom of communication. It must be nevertheless borne in mind that as a natural consequence of placement in prison, the administration has a broader discretionary power in involving in an interference (see Mehmet Koray Eryaşa, § 89).

52. It should be primarily indicated that in the present case, the applicant did not raise any allegation to the effect that he had been completely precluded from communicating with his family members and relatives. His complaint was based on the alleged inability to contact with his family and relatives more frequently as he had been afforded the right to contact by phone only once within 15 days and for 10 minutes. Therefore, his individual application was examined under this scope.

53. The restriction imposed on the right, of those convicted or detained on account of certain offences, to contact by phone by virtue of the decision of the Administrative and Monitoring Board of the prisons does not constitute a breach of the freedom of communication and the right to respect for family life.

b. Whether the Interference Constituted a Violation

54. Article 13 of the Constitution, titled “Restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms”, insofar as relevant provides as follows:

 “Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law and in conformity with the reasons mentioned in the relevant articles of the Constitution ... These restrictions shall not be contrary to … the requirements of the democratic order of the society and … the principle of proportionality.”

 55. Unless the impugned restriction complies with Article 13 of the Constitution, it would be in breach of Articles 20 and 22 of the Constitution. Therefore, it must be ascertained at the outset whether the restriction complied with the requirements set out in Article 13 of the Constitution and applicable to the present case, namely being prescribed by law, pursuing a legitimate aim, being compatible with the requirements of a democratic society, as well as not being contrary to the principle of proportionality.

 i. Lawfulness

 56. The interference with the applicant’s right to contact by phone was based on the State of Emergency Decree Law no. 667 and Article 6 § 1 (e) of Law no. 6749 on the adoption of this Decree Law.

 57. It is set forth in Article 6 § 1 (e) of Law no. 6749 that those who are detained on account of certain offences defined in the Turkish Criminal Code no. 5237, dated 26 September 2004, and falling under the scope of the Anti-Terror Law no. 3713, dated 12 April 1991, shall be allowed to contact by phone, during the period when the state of emergency remains in force, merely with the individuals specified in Article 6 § 1 (e) of the same Law for only once within 15 days and up to 10 minutes.

 58. In this sense, it has been concluded that the applicant detained on account of an offence falling within the scope of Law no. 3713 was made subject to the statutory arrangement in Article 6 of Law no. 6749, which satisfied the condition of being restricted by law.

 ii. Legitimate Aim

 59. It is natural that certain rights and opportunities afforded to detainees and convicts may vary by the gravity of the criminal charges raised against them. Regard being had to the gravity of the offences covered by Law no. 3713 and particular circumstances of the state of emergency, it has been accordingly considered that the restriction of the right to contact by phone of those who were detained on account of certain offences so as to maintain the public order and the prison security and discipline satisfied the condition of pursuing a legitimate aim.

 iii. Compatibility with the Requirements of a Democratic Society and Proportionality

 60. The reasonable grounds that are likely to be relied on as a justification for the interferences with the fundamental rights of the convicts and detainees must be substantiated with the relevant facts and information within the framework of all circumstances of a given case. Besides, during such an examination, the offence imputed to the relevant person and the reasons of his detention must be also taken into consideration (see Mehmet Zahit Şahin, § 63).

 61. In this sense, the principal point of the assessments to be made with respect to the impugned incident in the present case is the question whether the grounds relied on by the administrative authorities causing the interference and the relevant inferior courts in their decisions provided a plausible explanation to the effect that the restriction imposed on the right to communication satisfied the requirement of being compatible with the requirements of a democratic society and the principle of proportionality (see Mehmet Zahit Şahin, § 64; and Ahmet Temiz, no. 2013/1822, 20 May 2015, § 68).

 62. The applicant being detained for his alleged membership of a terrorist organisation was allowed to contact with his family members under the conditions which are specified in Article 6 of Law no. 6749. In the application, there is no allegation or findings to the contrary. The applicant could make these contacts in the periods that were predetermined.

 63. Within the framework of the legal regime applied prior to the adoption of Law no. 6749, the detainees and convicts held in prisons were afforded the right to contact by phone once a week and being limited to 10 minutes.

 64. It is set forth in the above-mentioned statutory arrangement enacted subsequently that those who are held in prisons on account of membership of a terrorist organisation or any offence committed within the scope of the activities of terrorist organisations shall be allowed to contact by phone, during the state of emergency, only once within 15 days and being limited to 10 minutes. The applicant’s right to contact by phone was restricted, within the framework of the said provision, by the decision of the Administrative and Monitoring Board dated 24 August 2016.

 65. In this context, so as to have a better understanding of the impugned interference with to right to contact by phone, it is necessary to recall certain information on the military coup attempt of 15 July 2016 and the subsequent developments.

 66. There is a long-standing terror problem in Turkey. During the significant period of the republic, the State has made every effort to quell the organised and armed acts of violence. Along with its main struggle against the PKK for the last 35 years, Turkey has also undergone several attacks of, and struggled against, the other terrorist organisations (namely DHKP/C, TKP/ML, Al-Qaida, Daesh and Hezbollah). On 15 July 2016, a military coup attempt was staged by a structure namely the FETÖ/PDY (see Aydın Yavuz and Others, §§ 12-25).

 67. An investigation was conducted against many persons considered to have involved in the coup attempt of 15 July, or to have a relation with the FETÖ/PDY even if having no direct involvement with the coup attempt, all across the country upon the instruction of the chief public prosecutor’s offices during and after the coup attempt. Within the scope of these investigations, many public officers, notably those taking office at the Turkish Armed Forces, security directorates and in the judiciary, and civilians were arrested and taken into custody, and a significant number of these persons were detained on remand by virtue of a court decision (see Aydın Yavuz and Others, § 51). Besides, a certain part of the guardians and gendarmerie personnel in charge for ensuring safety and protection of the detainees and a significant part of the security officers who may be assigned, when necessary, to ensure safety of detainees were dismissed or suspended from public office for having a link with the terrorist organisations (see Aydın Yavuz and Others, § 357).

 68. The ECHR has also considered the military coup attempt of 15 July 2016 as a public threat to the nation (see Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, no. 16538/17, 20 March 2018, § 77).

 69. In the present case, the applicant was made subject, on account of the offence imputed to him, to a restriction on the frequency of the exercise of his right to contact by phone. It appears that the reason underlying the impugned restriction was the aim to maintain discipline and security in the prison. Given the nature of the coup attempt of 15 July 2016 that posed a threat to the existence of the nation, the fact that many persons were detained and/or convicted in the aftermath of the coup attempt on account of terrorist offences, as well as the significant decrease in the number of public officers engaged in ensuring the safety of the detainees and convicts, it has been concluded that the impugned interference was necessary in a democratic society.

 70. In the assessment as to the proportionality of the restriction of the applicant’s right to contact by phone, it must be borne in mind that it was limited to the period when the state of emergency would be in force and that the length of communication was not shortened. Nor did the applicant allege that he could not exercise his right to contact by phone.

 71. In the light of all these considerations, it has been concluded that with respect to the impugned interference whereby the applicant’s right to contact by phone was restricted -which did not preclude him from maintaining his relations with the family members-, a fair balance was struck between the legitimate aim pursued by the public authorities causing the interference and the applicant’s personal interest; and that the interference that was necessary in a democratic society was also proportionate to the aim sought to be attained, regard being had to the need to maintain the public order as required by the state of emergency conditions, the aim to maintain the security and discipline in the prison, as well as to the gravity of the offence imputed to the applicant.

 72. For these reasons, the application -which clearly involves no violation- must be declared inadmissible for being manifestly ill-founded without any further examination as to the other admissibility criteria.

 73. As the interference with the applicant’s right to contact by phone was not in contradiction with the safeguards set out in the Constitution (Articles 13, 20 and 22), there is no need to make any separate examination as to the criteria laid down in Article 15 of the Constitution.

 VI. JUDGMENT

 For these reasons, the Constitutional Court UNANIMOUSLY held on 3 July 2018 that

 A. The request for legal aid be ACCEPTED;

 B. The alleged violations of the right to respect for family life and the freedom of communication be DECLARED INADMISSIBLE for being manifestly ill-founded;

 C. The applicant be COMPLETELY EXEMPTED from the court expenses payment of which would cause the applicant to incur a financial difficulty pursuant to Article 399 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure dated 12 January 2011 and no. 6100.