FIRST SECTION
DECISION
President
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:
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Serruh
KALELİ
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Members
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:
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Nuri
NECİPOĞLU
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Hicabi
DURSUN
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Erdal
TERCAN
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Zühtü
ARSLAN
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Rapporteur
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:
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Recep
ÜNAL
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Applicant
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:
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Mehmet
Ali İNCESU
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Counsel
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:
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Att.
İnan AKMEŞE
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I. SUBJECT OF APPLICATON
1. The applicant asserted that the right to trial
in a reasonable time was violated due to the fact that the trial conducted on him
lasted for seven years and seven months, filed a request for compensation.
II. APPLICATION PROCESS
2. The
application was directly lodged to the Constitutional Court on 26/3/2013. As a
result of the preliminary administrative examination of the petition and its
annexes, it has been determined that there is no deficiency to prevent the
submission thereof to the Commission.
3. It was
decided by the Second Commission of the First Section on 30/5/2013 that the
examination of admissibility of the application be conducted by the Section and
the file be sent to the Section.
4. In the
session held by the First Section on 24/7/2013, it was decided that the
examination of admissibility and merits be carried out together.
5. The facts
and cases which are the subject matter of the application were notified to the
Ministry on 30/7/2013. The Ministry presented its written opinion to the
Constitutional Court on 23/8/2013.
6. The opinion
letter of the Ministry was notified to the applicant on 13/9/2013. The
applicant submitted his petition including his answers to the opinion of the
Ministry on 23/9/2013.
III. FACTS AND CASES
A. Facts
7. As
expressed in the application form and the annexes thereof, the facts are
summarized as follows:
8. The
applicant was taken into custody on 22/3/2005 with the suspicion that he sold
books without banderoles and his statement was taken.
9. A public
case was filed on the applicant, through the indictment of the Chief Public
Prosecutor's Office of Istanbul dated 23/3/2005 and numbered H.2005/13340,
M.2005/5572, with the claim that he committed the crime of contravening the
Code on Intellectual and Artistic Works numbered 5846 by selling books
reproduced in contrary to the provisions of the Code numbered 5846 and with the
request that he be sentenced due to this crime. In accordance with the
provisions of the abolished Code of Procedure on Flagrant Crimes dated 8/6/1936
and numbered 3005, the applicant was taken before the 3rd Criminal Court of
Intellectual and Industrial Rights of Istanbul (the Court numbered 3) on the
same date. The defense statement of the applicant was taken and he was released
at the hearing held on 23/3/2005 according to the provisions of the abolished
Code numbered 3005.
10. By
concluding that the applicant committed the crime of contravening the Code
numbered 5846 through the decision of the Court numbered 3 dated 25/5/2010 and
numbered M.2005/367, D.2010/249, it was decided that he be sentenced to a
judicial fine of 5.000,00 TL in accordance with article 81 of the same Code.
The applicant appealed the decision through a petition dated 24/6/2010.
11. Through
the decision of the 7th Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Appeals which
conducted the appeal examination dated 30/10/2012 and numbered M.2012/24087,
D.2012/26176, it was decided that the continuing criminal case on the applicant
"be removed" due to the fact that extraordinary statute of
limitations expired.
12. The
applicant declared that he was informed of the decision of the Supreme Court of
Appeals upon receiving a copy of the file through a petition dated 28/2/2013
and no finding could be determined as to the effect that the applicant had been
previously informed of the decision.
B. Relevant Law
13. Paragraph nine of article 81 of the Code
numbered 5846 is as follows:
"A person who produces, puts up for sale, sells,
distributes, purchases, accepts or uses fake banderoles shall be punished with
an imprisonment of three years to seven years and a judicial fine of up to five
thousand days."
IV. EXAMINATION AND JUSTIFICATION
14. The individual application of the applicant
dated 26/3/2013 and numbered 2013/2253 was examined during the session held by
the court on 15/4/2014 and the following were ordered and adjudged:
A. Claims of the applicant
15. The applicant asserted that the trial process
on him started on 22/3/2005 and came to an end with the writ of the Supreme
Court of Appeals dated 30/10/2012, that in this way the trial process lasted
for seven years and seven months, that it was necessary to evaluate whether the
trial process was reasonable or not within the framework of the specific
conditions of the case and to evaluate in particular the complexity of the case
and the attitude of the applicant and other relevant persons and authorities,
that the case through which he was tried was not complex, that for this reason
the right to personal liberty and security regulated in article 19 of the
Constitution and the right to trial in a reasonable time regulated in article
36 were violated, filed a request for moral compensation.
B. Evaluation 1. In Terms of Admissibility
16. The
applicant claimed that the right to personal liberty and security regulated in
article 19 of the Constitution was violated. The Constitutional Court is not
bound by the legal qualification of the facts made by the applicant, it
appraises the legal definition of the facts and cases itself. In this respect,
as the facts and cases that the applicant touched upon in his application
petition are in essence related to the field of protection of the right to
trial in a reasonable time which is an element of the right to a fair trial
regulated in article 36 of the Constitution, it has not been considered
necessary to conduct a separate examination in terms of article 19 of the
Constitution.
17. The
complaint of the applicant is not clearly devoid of basis. It should be decided
that the application, where no other reason is deemed to exist to require a
decision on its inadmissibility, is admissible.
2. In Terms of Merits
18. In the
opinion letter of the Ministry, it was stated that the Constitutional Court
examined not only the period following the date of 23/9/2012 which was the
beginning of lodging individual applications, but also the period that elapsed
until this date while examining the complaints of long trial, that the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Constitutional Court decided on whether
the trial period was reasonable or not by considering the specific conditions
of each incident and especially criteria such as whether the case was complex
or not, the attitude and behaviors that the applicant showed during the trial,
the attitudes of public authorities and in particular trial bodies, the
importance that the case had in terms of the applicant and if the trial in
question is a criminal trial, whether the applicant was under detention or not,
that the trial which was the subject of the concrete application started on
22/3/2005, came to an end on 30/10/2012, that the trial lasted for seven and a
half years, that the Constitutional Court had discretion over the determination
of whether the trial period in question was reasonable or not and the amount of
the compensation to be ruled upon.
19. The
applicant, in his declaratory petition dated 23/9/2013, stated that it was
necessary that the Constitutional Court decide in accordance with its decision
dated 2/7/2013 and numbered App. No: 2012/13 by repeating his claims and
requests in his application petition.
20. Paragraph
one of article 36 of the Constitution is as follows:
"Everyone has the right to make claims and defend
themselves either as plaintiff or defendant and the right to a fair trial
before judicial bodies through the use of legitimate ways and means."
21. Paragraph
(1) of article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention) with
the side heading "Right to a fair trial" is as follows:
"In the determination of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law."
22. In
paragraph one of article 36 of the Constitution, it is stated that everyone has
the right to make claims and defend themselves either as plaintiff or defendant
and the right to a fair trial before judicial bodies through the use of
legitimate ways and means. As the scope of the right to a fair trial is not
regulated in the Constitution, the scope and content of this right should be
determined within the framework of article 6 of the Convention with the side
heading "Right to a fair trial" (App. No: 2012/1049,
26/3/2013, § 22; App. No: 2012/13, 2/7/2013, § 38; App. No: 2013/695, 9/1/2014,
§ 27).
23. Article
141 of the Constitution which stipulates that the right to trial in a
reasonable time which constitutes the basis for the concrete application is
covered by the right to a fair trial and also states that the conclusion of
cases with minimum expense and as soon as possible is the duty of the judiciary
should also be taken into account in the evaluation of the right to trial in a
reasonable time as per the principle of holism of the Constitution (App. No: 2012/1198,
7/11/2013, § 39; App. No: 2013/695, 9/1/2014, § 28).
24. As the aim
of the right to trial in a reasonable time is the protection of the parties
against material and moral pressures and distresses to which they will be
exposed due to the long-lasting trial and the provision of justice as necessary
and the maintenance of confidence in law and as the requirement of showing due
diligence in the settlement of a legal dispute cannot be ignored in the trial
activity, it is necessary to evaluate whether the trial period is reasonable or
not individually for each application (App. No: 2012/673, 19/12/2013, § 27;
App. No: 2013/695, 9/1/2014, § 29).
25. Matters
such as the complexity of a case, how many levels the trial has, the attitude
of the parties and the relevant authorities during the trial and the quality of
the interest of the applicant in the speedy conclusion of the case are the
criteria to be taken into account for the determination of whether the period
of a case is reasonable or not (App. No: 2012/13, 2/7/2013, §§ 41-45; App. No:
2013/695, 9/1/2014, § 30).
26. However,
none of the specified criteria is conclusive by itself in the evaluation of
reasonable period. By evaluating the total impact of these criteria through the
determination of all delay periods in the trial process individually, which
element is more effective in the delay of trial should be determined (App. No:
2012/13, 2/7/2013, § 46; App. No: 2013/695, 9/1/2014, § 31).
27. In order
to determine whether the trial activity is conducted within a reasonable time
or not, it is primarily necessary to determine the dates of beginning and
completion which may vary depending on the type of dispute.
28. While
evaluating whether the trial period in criminal procedure is reasonable or not,
the beginning of the period is the moment of notification of a person by
competent authorities that s/he has committed a crime or application of a
series of measures such as search and custody during which s/he has been
initially affected by the allegation. The date on which the period comes to an
end in criminal procedure is the date on which the basis of incrimination is
finally concluded or, in terms of cases pending trial, the date on which the
Constitutional Court delivers its decision relevant to the complaint of
reasonable time (App. No: 2013/695, 9/1/2014, § 35).
29. Nevertheless,
the date of the basis of incrimination and the date on which the jurisdiction
ratione temporis of the Constitutional Court for the examination of individual
applications started can be different. As for criminal cases whose date of
incrimination is prior to the date of 23/9/2012 on which the jurisdiction
ratione temporis of the Constitutional Court started, but whose trial is
pending or whose final decision has not been finalized yet, the period to be taken
into account in terms of the complaints as to the effect that the right to
trial in a reasonable time has been violated is not the period that has elapsed
after the date of 23/9/2012, but the period that has elapsed as of the date on
which the crime is alleged. Therefore, in the complaints as to the effect that
the trial period in criminal procedure is not reasonable, on the condition that
they were pending on the date of 23/9/2012, the date on which the basis of
incrimination occurs and the period which elapses until the date on which the
final decision as regards the basis of incrimination is learned by the
concerned or, as for the pending cases, until the date on which the
Constitutional Court concludes the application will be taken into account (App.
No: 2013/695, 9/1/2014, § 36).
30. In the
incident which is the subject of the application, the applicant was taken into
custody on 22/3/2005 and the public case filed on him was finalized with the
writ of the Supreme Court of Appeals dated 30/10/2012. In this context, the
period that needs to be taken into account as regards the complaint of the
applicant as to the effect that the right to trial in a reasonable time was
violated is the total trial period of seven years, seven months and eight days
which elapsed between 22/3/2005 and 30/10/2012.
31. As the
delays which can be attributed to competent authorities in the prolongation of
the trial process can result from the failure to show due diligence for the
speedy conclusion of trial, so can they also arise out of structural problems
and lack of organization. Because, article 36 of the Constitution and article 6
of the Convention imposes the responsibility of regulating the legal system in
a way which can fulfill the conditions of fair trial including the liability of
courts to conclude cases in a reasonable time (App. No: 2012/13, 2/7/2013, §
44; App. No: 2013/695, 9/1/2014, § 39).
32. Within
this scope, in the event that reasonable period is exceeded in trial due to
reasons such as the structure of judicial system, disruptions during routine
duties at the clerk's office of the court, delays in the writing of a judgment,
in the sending of a file or document from one court to another and in the
appointment of a rapporteur, insufficiency in the number of judges and personnel
and the severity of workload, the responsibility of competent authorities comes
to the fore (App. No: 2012/1198, 7/11/2013, § 55; App. No: 2013/695, 9/1/2014,
§ 40).
33. The
applicant was taken into custody on 22/3/2005 and a public case was filed on him
on 23/3/2005 after his statement was taken. In accordance with the provisions
of the abolished Code numbered 3005, he was taken before the Court numbered 3
on the same date and his interrogation was conducted and he was released. At
the same hearing, it was decided that an expert review be carried out on the
criminal evidence. During the interval in between hearings, the criminal record
of the applicant reached to the Court, his census record and the letters of
response written to the law enforcement unit did not reach. At the hearing
dated 27/12/2005, it was decided that the previous letter be renewed and that
an expert review be made to be carried out on the criminal evidence. The expert
report was submitted prior to the hearing dated 9/10/2007. The expert report
was notified to the applicant prior to the hearing dated 3/4/2008. It was
decided that the applicant be brought by force for additional defense at the
same hearing and an arrest warrant was issued on the applicant at the hearing
dated 27/10/2008. The applicant was arrested in Arguvan district of Malatya
province on 19/11/2009 and he was taken before the Criminal Court of First
Instance of Arguvan and his defense statement was taken, no question was
separately directed for additional defense. At the hearing dated 16/2/2010, it
was decided that the indictments and last hearing minutes of the applicant in
his files as regards similar cases be requested, that the hearing be postponed
to the date of 25/5/2010. It was decided that the applicant be sentenced to a
judicial fine of 5.000,00 TL through the decision of the Court dated 25/5/2010
and upon the appeal of the applicant, it was decided that the criminal case
"be removed" through the writ of the 7th Criminal Chamber of
the Supreme Court of Appeals dated 30/10/2012.
34. In this
way, when the fact that the part of the trial with a period of five years, two
months and three days between the dates of 22/3/2005 and 25/5/2010 passed in
the Public prosecutor's office and the courts of first instance; the part thereof
with a period of two years, five months and five days between the dates of
25/5/2010 and 30/10/2012 passed in the examination of legal remedy is taken
into account, delays which are caused by structural problems and lack of
organization that need to be evaluated especially in terms of the concrete
application have also been subjected to examination by the ECtHR numerous
times. In this context, in the event that reasonable period is exceeded in
trials as a result of the existence of a structural problem and the increase
and accumulation of the disputes which await solution in the trial system, it
is concluded that article 6 of the Convention has been violated. Because, the
state is responsible for taking all measures required for the performance of its
trial activity in a reasonable time although the disputes which await solution
in the trial system increases in terms of quantity. This liability is a
manifestation of the responsibility of regulating the legal system in a way
which can fulfill the conditions of fair trial (App. No: 2012/1198, 7/11/2013,
§ 55; App. No: 2013/695, 9/1/2014, § 40).
35. When,
within the scope of the first instance trial, replacements of judges in the
periods where hearing is adjourned, delays in responses to warrants, the fact
that the hearing intervals were long, the fact that the evidence and documents
which formed the basis for trial could not be collected at once in a speedy
way, especially the exhaustion of the period of approximately three years and
four months of the trial between the hearings dated 16/10/2006 and 16/2/2010 by
waiting for the conclusion of the procedures of bringing by force and arrest
for taking additional defense statement, which did not have any effect on the
outcome as understood from the judgment ruled, the fact that the expert whose
assignment was decided at the hearing dated 27/12/2005 could submit his/her
report only prior to the hearing dated 9/10/2007 and no essential procedure
could be performed as regards the trial within these period and consequently
the fact that the first instance trial lasted for five years, two months and
three days are taken into account together, it is understood that the workload
and lack of organization caused by the structure of the judicial system has a
dominant effect on the prolongation of the trial period as regards the concrete
application especially in terms of the trial process that passed before the
court of first instance. In accordance with article 36 of the Constitution and
article 6 of the Convention, when the obligation of regulating the trial system
in a way which can fulfill the conditions of fair trial including the liability
of courts to conclude cases in a reasonable time is taken into account, it is
clear that the structural and organizational deficiencies which are present in
the legal system will not be able to justify the trial activity not be carried
out in a reasonable time.
36. It could
not be determined that the attitude of the applicant had a special effect on
the prolongation of the trial.
37. None of
the elements such as the number of the accused in a case, the complexity of a
case, the quality and nature of the alleged crime, the amount of the penalty
prescribed for the crime in question which are required to be taken into
account in the evaluation of whether the trial period is reasonable or not
allows for the evaluation of the trial period of the concrete criminal case as
reasonable. It is concluded that, in terms of the trial where a single accused
was tried and which did not have a complex quality, there was an unreasonable
delay in the trial process in question which exceeded nine years.
38. Due to the
reasons explained, it should be decided that the applicant's "right to
trial in a reasonable time" which is enshrined in article 36 of the
Constitution was violated.
C. In Terms of Article 50 of the Code Numbered 6216
39. The
applicant requested that a moral compensation of 20,000.00 TL be adjudged due
to the long-lasting trial.
40. Paragraph
(2) of article 50 of the Code on the Establishment and Trial Procedures of the
Constitutional Court dated 30/3/2011 and numbered 6216 with the side heading of
''Decisions'' is as follows:
41. "If the determined violation arises out of a
court decision, the file shall be sent to the relevant court for holding the
retrial in order for the violation and the consequences thereof to be removed.
In cases where there is no legal interest in holding the retrial, the
compensation may be adjudged in favor of the applicant or the remedy of filing
a case before the general courts may be shown. The court, which is liable to
hold the retrial, shall deliver a decision over the file, if possible, in a way
that will remove the violation and the consequences thereof that the
Constitutional Court has explained in its decision of violation."
41. At the end
of the examination of the application, although it has been determined that
article 36 of the Constitution was violated, as it is understood that there is
no causal relation between the violation determined and the material damage
claimed, it should be decided that the request of the applicant for material
compensation be dismissed.
42. When the
trial process which was conducted on the applicant and lasted for approximately
seven years and seven months is taken into account, it should be decided by
discretion that a moral compensation of 5.850,00 TL be paid to the applicant in
return for his moral damage which cannot be compensated only by the
determination of the violation due to the lengthiness of the trial activity.
43. It should
be decided that the trial expenses of 1,698.35 TL in total composed of the fee
of 198.35 and the counsel's fee of 1,500.00 TL which were made by the applicant
and determined in accordance with the documents in the file be paid to the
applicant.
V. JUDGMENT
In the light
of the reasons explained; it is UNANIMOUSLY decided on 15/4/2014
A. That
the application is ADMISSIBLE,
B. That
the right to trial in a reasonable time enshrined in Article 36 of the
Constitution WAS VIOLATED,
C. That
a MORAL COMPENSATION OF 5,850.00 TL BE PAID to the applicant,
D. That
the other requests of the applicant for compensation BE DISMISSED,
E. That
the trial expenses of 1,698.35 TL in total composed of the fee of 198.35 and
the counsel's fee of 1,500.00 TL, which were made by the applicant be PAID TO
THE APPLICANT,
F. That
the payments be made within four months as of the date of application by the
applicant to the State Treasury following the notification of the decision;
that in the event that a delay occurs as regards the payment, the legal
interest be charged for the period that elapses from the date, on which this
period comes to an end, to the date of payment.