On 15 March 2018, the Plenary of the
Constitutional Court found a violation of the right to personal liberty and
security safeguarded by Article 19 of the Constitution in the second
individual application lodged by Şahin Alpay (no. 2018/3007).
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THE FACTS
[9-30] After the coup attempt of 15 July 2016,
within the scope of an investigation conducted against the media structure of
the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization/ Parallel State Structure (FETÖ/PDY)
stated to be the organization behind the coup attempt, the applicant was
detained on remand for alleged membership of an armed terrorist organization.
In the first individual application
lodged by the applicant, the Plenary of the Constitutional Court found on 11
January 2018 a violation of the applicant’s right to personal liberty and
security, as well as, his freedoms of expression and press.
Regarding the alleged unlawfulness of
the applicant’s detention on remand, the Court concluded that the investigation
authorities could not sufficiently demonstrate a strong indication that the
applicant committed an offence, which was a prerequisite for detention as set
forth in Article 19 of the Constitution. In the judgment finding also
violations of the applicant’s freedoms of expression and press, the Court
mainly relied on its determinations as to the alleged unlawfulness of the
applicant’s detention on remand.
The applicant’s requests for release and
his appeals to this end were dismissed by the inferior courts. In their
decisions, the courts mainly relied on the assessments “that the Constitutional
Court cannot assess the evidence or the merits of the case or the issues to be considered
in appellate review, nor can it make a substantive review, that making an
examination as to the merits of the case results in “usurpation of power”, that
the violation judgment delivered by overstepping legal mandate cannot be
considered to be final nor binding, and consequently, it would not result in
the applicant’s release, if otherwise, it would contradict the legal principles
concerning the courts’ independence and mandating that no order or instruction
could be given to the courts”.
The applicant submitted a request for
release following the Constitutional Court’s judgment. However, his request was
rejected. Therefore, he lodged another individual application on 1 February
2018.
V. EXAMINATION AND GROUNDS
31. The Constitutional Court, at its session
of 15 March 2018, examined the application and decided as follows.
A. The Applicant’s Allegations
32. The applicant maintained that the
inferior courts failed to implement the
Constitutional Court’s judgment finding
a violation and that his appeals against the decisions ordering the
continuation of his detention on remand that were rendered after the violation
judgment were dismissed on insufficient grounds in the absence of a strong
indication of guilt and without relying on new evidence, which were in breach
of his rights safeguarded by Articles 13, 14, 17, 19, 26, 28, 36, 40 and 153 of
the Constitution.
B.
The Court’s Assessment
33. Article 19
§ 1 and the first sentence of Article 19 § 3 of the Constitution, titled “Personal
liberty and security”, reads as follows:
“Everyone has the right to personal
liberty and security.
...
Individuals against whom there is strong
evidence of having committed an offence may be arrested by decision of a judge
solely for the purposes of preventing escape, or preventing the destruction or
alteration of evidence, as well as in other circumstances prescribed by law and
necessitating detention."
34. The
applicant’s allegations that his right to personal liberty and security was
violated due to the failure to implement the violation judgment of the
Constitutional Court must be examined under Article 19 § 3 of the Constitution.
1.
Admissibility
35. The application is not manifestly
ill-founded and there exists no ground to declare it inadmissible, therefore it
is found admissible.
2.
Merits
a. General Principles
36. The
relevant part of Article 2 of the Constitution, titled “Characteristics of
the Republic”, is as follows:
“The Republic of Turkey is a … state
governed by rule of law.”
37. The second
sentence of Article 6 § 3 of the Constitution, titled “Sovereignty”, is
as follows:
“No person or organ shall exercise any
state authority that does not emanate from the Constitution.”
38. Article 36
§ 1 of the Constitution, titled “Freedom to claim rights”, reads as
follows:
“(As amended on October 3, 2001; Article
14 of Act No. 4709) Everyone has the right of litigation either as plaintiff or
defendant and the right to a fair trial before the courts through legitimate
means and procedures”
39. The
relevant part of the last paragraph of Article 138 of the Constitution, titled
“Independence of the courts”, provides as follows:
“Legislative and executive organs and
the administration shall comply with court decisions…”
40. The
relevant part of Article 148 of the Constitution, which regulates the “duties
and powers” of the Constitutional Court, reads as follows:
“(As amended on September 12, 2010;
Article 18 of Act No. 5982) The Constitutional Court shall … decide on
individual applications …
…
(Paragraph added on September 12, 2010;
Article 18 of Act No. 5982) Everyone may apply to the Constitutional Court on
the grounds that one of the fundamental rights and freedoms within the scope of
the European Convention on Human Rights which are guaranteed by the
Constitution has been violated by public authorities. In order to make an
application, ordinary legal remedies must be exhausted.
(Paragraph added on September 12, 2010;
Article 18 of Act No. 5982) In the individual application, judicial review
shall not be made on matters required to be taken into account during the
process of legal remedies.
(Paragraph added on September 12, 2010;
Article 18 of Act No. 5982) Procedures and principles concerning the individual
application shall be regulated by law.
…”
41. Article 153
§§ 1 and 6 of the Constitution, titled “Judgments of the Constitutional
Court” is as follows:
“The decisions of the Constitutional
Court are final. Decisions of annulment shall not be made public without a
written justification.
…
Decisions of the Constitutional Court shall
be published immediately in the Official Gazette, and shall be binding on the
legislative, executive, and judicial organs, on the administrative authorities,
and on persons and corporate bodies.”
42. The
relevant part of Article 3 of Law no. 6216, titled “Duties and powers of the
Court”, reads as follows:
“(1) Duties and powers of the Court:
…
c) To conclude individual applications
filed pursuant to Article 148 of the Constitution.
…”
43. Article 45
§ 1 of Law no. 6216, titled “Right of individual application”, provides
as follows:
“Every person may apply to the
Constitutional Court alleging that the public power has violated any one of
his/her fundamental rights and freedoms secured under the Constitution which
falls into the scope of the European Convention on Human Rights and
supplementary protocols thereto, which Turkey is a party to.”
44. The
relevant part of Article 49 § 6 of Law no. 6216, titled “Examination on the
merits”, reads as follows:
“Examination … on the applications
lodged against a decision of a court shall be limited with determination of
existence of a violation against a fundamental right and in what way such a
violation can be removed. The chambers may not examine issues that should be
dealt with through legal remedies.”
45. Article 50
§§ 1, 2 and 3 of Law no. 6216, titled “Judgments”, reads as follows:
“(1) After examination on the merits, a
decision on violation or non-violation of the applicant’s right is rendered. In
case of a decision on violation, a judgment may be rendered on the actions to
be taken in order to abolish the violation and its consequences. However,
expediency controls may not be carried out and decisions may not be given in a
manner of administrative act and transaction.
(2) In
case the violation has been caused by a court decision the file is forwarded to
the concerned court in order to renew the judicial procedure so that the
violation and its results will be cleared up. In cases where any legal interest
is not seen with renewal of judicial proceedings, it can be decided payment of
compensation in favour of the applicant or the applicant might be directed to
general courts to bring lawsuits. The court which is responsible for rendering
the retrial procedure renders its decision on file to a possible extent as to remove
the violation and its results which have been explained in the Constitutional
Court’s decision determining the violation.
(3) The
judgments of the Chambers on the merits together with their reasons are
notified to the concerned parties and the Ministry of Justice and published on
the website of the Court. The matters concerning the selection of judgments to
be promulgated in the Official Gazette are regulated in the Internal Regulation
of the Court.”
46. Article 66
§ 1 of Law no. 6216, titled “Court decisions”, reads as follows:
“Decisions of the Court are final.
Decisions of the Court are binding on the legislative, executive and judicial
bodies and administrative authorities of the State as well as real and legal
persons.”
47. Article 81
§§ 4 and 5 of the Internal Regulation of the Constitutional Court, titled “Signing,
notification and publication of the decision” is as follows:
“(4) All of the decisions of the
Sections and those which bear principal significance from an admissibility
point of view from amongst the decisions of the Commissions shall be published
on the website of the Court.
(5) The decisions which are determined
by the President of Section, which bear the quality of being pilot decisions
made by the Section or bear principal significance in terms of displaying case
law shall be published in the Official Gazette.”
48. By an
amendment to Article 148 of the Constitution in 2010, the Constitutional Court
has been vested with the authority to adjudicate the individual applications.
The justification of this amendment was provided as follows:
“Individual application or
constitutional complaint is defined as an extraordinary legal remedy resorted
to by the individuals whose fundamental rights and freedoms are violated by the
public force. Today, the remedy of individual application for the protection of
fundamental rights is accepted as an integral part of the constitutional
jurisdiction in many civilized countries …
…
While examining whether the domestic
legal remedies have been exhausted or not, the European Court of Human Rights
takes into consideration whether there exists any institution for individual
application in the country concerned and considers this as an effective remedy
to redress the violations. Therefore, by forming an institution to facilitate
individual applications, a significant part of those alleging to have been
suffering from violations can be redressed at the individual application stage,
namely before lodging an application with the European Court of Human Rights.
Thus, the applications to be lodged against Turkey, as well as, violation
judgments may also diminish. Therefore, establishing a well-functioning
individual application system in Turkey will enhance the standards based on
rights and the rule of law.
…
Adopting the remedy of individual
application in Turkey will on the one hand ensure a better protection for the
individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms and on the other hand it will
force the public authorities to comply with the Constitution and the laws. By such
an amendment, with a view to protecting and safeguarding individual rights and
freedoms, the citizens are provided with the right to individual application,
and the Constitutional Court is granted a duty to review and adjudicate these
applications.
… By this amendment, the Constitutional
Court has also undertaken a mission to protect and develop the freedoms by
virtue of the duty imposed on it to review individual applications.”
49. According
to Article 148 § 3 of the Constitution and Article 45 § 1 of Law no. 6216,
every person may apply to the Constitutional Court alleging that the public
authorities have violated any one of her/his fundamental rights and freedoms
secured under the Constitution which falls into the scope of the European
Convention on Human Rights and supplementary protocols thereto, which Turkey is
a party to. Pursuant to Article 148 § 1 of the Constitution, the Constitutional
Court has been given authority adjudicate these applications.
50. Pursuant to
Article 49 § 6 of Law no. 6216, the Constitutional Court’s examination of the
individual applications is limited to “whether a fundamental right is violated
or not” and to “the determination of how to remedy such a violation”.
51. According
to Article 148 § 4 of the Constitution and Article 49 § 6 of Law no. 6216, the
issues to be considered in appellate review cannot be examined in individual
applications. According to Article 50 § 1 of the latter, where a violation
judgment is rendered, a substantive review cannot be made while deciding on the
actions to be taken in order to redress the violation and its consequences.
52. These
provisions must be assessed together with the Constitutional Court’s power and
duty to adjudicate individual applications, which is regulated in Article 148
§§ 1 and 3 of the Constitution. Within the scope of this duty, the
Constitutional Court is obliged to examine and adjudicate the individual
applications lodged with the alleged violation of fundamental rights and
freedoms falling into the common protection area of the Constitution and the
Convention. The Constitutional Court makes this examination in accordance with
the safeguards provided by the Constitution regarding fundamental rights and
freedoms.
53. Accordingly,
the area the examination of which is prohibited in terms of individual
application, as set forth in the Constitution and the Law, cannot be considered
to be related to the safeguards provided in the Constitution concerning
fundamental rights and freedoms. This area relates to the allegations of unlawfulness
falling outside the scope of individual applications. In this respect, as also
stated in many judgments of the Constitutional Court, unless there is an
interference with fundamental rights and freedoms, it falls upon the inferior
courts to implement and interpret the legal rules and assess the evidence (see
for example, Ahmet Sağlam, no. 2013/3351, 18 September 2013, § 42; Sabahat
Beğik and Others [Plenary], no. 2014/3738, 21 December 2017, § 23). However,
in cases where there is an interference with the fundamental rights and
freedoms, it is the Constitutional Court that will give the final judgment on
the effect of the inferior courts’ decisions and assessments on the safeguards
provided in the Constitution. In this respect, any examination to be made, by
taking into account the safeguards provided in the Constitution, as to whether
the fundamental rights and freedoms falling into the scope of individual
application have been violated or not cannot be regarded as “an assessment of
an issue to be considered in appellate review” or “a substantive review”.
54. Otherwise,
the Constitutional Court’s power and duty to adjudicate individual applications
would not be functional, and this would not comply with the consideration that
the individual application is an effective remedy (see above §§ 40, 48).
Considering an examination to be carried out within the scope of the guarantees
pertaining to fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution as
an appellate review will result in the Constitutional Court’s failure to
examine and adjudicate the individual applications.
55. In this
context, as the existence of “a strong indication of guilt” is considered as a
prerequisite for detention in Article 19 § 3 of the Constitution, it is a
constitutional requirement for the Constitutional Court to examine whether
there is a strong indication of guilt in the individual applications in which
the right to personal liberty and security is allegedly violated due to
detention, and such an examination cannot be considered as substantive or
appellate review.
56. In
addition, it is provided in Article 50 § 1 of Law no. 6216 that in conclusion
of an examination to be made on the merits of an individual application, it
will be decided whether the applicant’s right has been violated or not; and if
a violation is found, the actions to be taken in order to redress the violation
and its consequences will be decided.
Accordingly, the Constitutional Court’s
powers and duties within the scope of individual applications are not limited
to the determination of whether the right has been violated or not but also
include the determination of the actions to be taken in order to redress the
violation and its consequences. As a matter of fact, the Constitutional Court
made the following assessment in an action for annulment pertaining to Article
50 of Law no. 6216 (see the Constitutional Court, no. E.2011/59, K.2012/34, 1
March 2012).
“…
The remedy of individual application
provided in Article 148 of the Constitution … is not only an action for
determination of whether a right has been violated or not, it is also an action
that will have legal effects such as preventing the violation of the
individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms by the public force, and where a
violation is found, redressing the consequences of the violation or redressing
the damage occurred. Therefore, it is clear that by including in the Law the
necessary procedural provisions applicable to the individual applications, the
legislator has enabled the Constitutional Court not only to determine the
violations but also to give judgments that might redress these violations.
Furthermore … there is no rule in
Article 148 of the Constitution which provides that the Constitutional Court’s power in terms of individual applications
is limited to finding a violation …”
57. The Law
vests the Constitutional Court with a broad discretion in determining the way
to redress the violation and its consequences. The only limitation in respect
thereof is the provision set out in the first paragraph of Article 50 of Law
no. 6216 stating that the Constitutional Court cannot render decisions or
judgments in the nature of an administrative act and action. Accordingly, such
limitation implies that in determining the way to redress the violation and its
consequences, the Constitutional Court cannot perform an act by substituting
itself for the administration. Given the nature of the individual application
mechanism, this limitation applies not only to the administration but also to
the legislative and judicial bodies. The Constitutional Court adjudicates the
way by which the violation and its consequences would be redressed and remits
its judgment to the relevant authorities for necessary actions.
58. In this
regard, the Constitutional Court, in principle, leaves a margin of appreciation
to the relevant authorities in respect of the questions as to how and by which
means the violation and its consequences would be redressed (see Savaş
Çetinkaya, no. 2012/1303, 21 November 2013, § 67). Having regard to the
nature of the judgment finding a violation, the relevant authority takes
necessary actions with a view to redressing the violation and its consequences.
In certain circumstances, the Constitutional Court taking into account the
nature of the concrete case may point out the principles as to how and by which
means the violation and its consequences would be redressed (see Bizim FM
Radyo Yayıncılığı ve Reklamcılık A.Ş. [Plenary], no. 2014/11028, 18
October 2017, §§ 71 and 72). In such case, the relevant authorities must act in
line with these explicated principles. However, in exceptional cases, the
relevant authorities may be left, by the very nature of the violation found,
with a single choice for the redress of the consequences thereof. In such
cases, the Constitutional Court clearly points out the measure required to be
taken for redress of the violation and its consequences, and the relevant
authority accordingly takes this measure (see Kenan Yıldırım and Turan
Yıldırım, no. 2013/711, 3 April 2014, § 82).
59. As stated
in Article 2 of the Constitution, the Republic of Turkey is a state governed by
rule of law. In such state, court decisions concerning the settlement of
disputes cannot be considered to be non-binding. Indeed, the last paragraph of
Article 138 of the Constitution provides that the legislative and judicial
bodies, as well as the administration, are to comply with the court decisions.
60. Moreover,
the right to a fair trial is safeguarded by Article 36 of the Constitution. One
of the elements inherent in this right is the right to access to a court which
also encompasses the right to bring a dispute before a court as well as the
right to request implementation of a court decision. Although implementation of
court decisions does not fall into the scope of trial, it is a complementing
element which ensures materialization of the outcome of the trial. In case of
non-implementation of the decision, the trial would make no sense (see the
Constitutional Court’s judgment no. E.2014/149 K. 2014/151, 2 October 2014; and
Ahmet Yıldırım, no. 2012/144, 2 October 2013, § 28).
61. Indeed,
Article 138 of the Constitution recognizes no exception in favour of neither
the legislative and judicial bodies nor the administrative authorities in
complying with the court decisions and implementing these decisions without any
alteration. In a state where the judicial decisions are not timely [and duly]
implemented by the relevant public authorities, individuals cannot be ensured
to fully enjoy rights and freedoms [shielded] through judicial decisions.
Therefore, the State carries the responsibility to prevent any loss of rights
likely to arise to the detriment of individuals by ensuring timely
implementation of judicial decisions and to protect individuals’ trust and
respect for legal system. Therefore, in a state governed by rule of law,
failure to timely implement decisions of judicial authorities, which perform an
essential duty for the protection of individuals’ trust and respect for legal
system, and thereby rendering these decisions inconclusive cannot be accepted (see
Ferda Yeşiltepe [Plenary], no. 2014/7621, 25 July 2017, § 36). The rule
of law principle cannot be realized by mere determination of unlawfulness, it
also requires elimination of all consequences thereof, as well as
implementation of court decisions in a timely manner (see the above-cited
judgment no. E.2014/149 K. 2014/151, 2 October 2014).
62. It is
explicit that non-implementation of the judgments where the Constitutional
Court finds a violation of fundamental rights and freedoms within the scope of
the individual application mechanism would further deepen the inconsistency
with the rule of law principle within the meaning of the right to access to a
court. As a matter of fact, the individual application mechanism is a means of
last resort through which those alleging that their fundamental rights and
freedoms have been violated seek a remedy after exhausting all available
remedies. Non-implementation of judgments which are rendered through this
mechanism impairs the trust of individuals and society in state of law.
63. The
constitution-maker specifically sets forth the binding nature of the
Constitutional Court’s judgments. In Article 153 § 6 of the Constitution, it is
prescribed that the Constitutional Court’s judgments shall have a binding
effect on the legislative, executive and judicial bodies, administrative
authorities, as well as on natural and legal persons. The same provision is
also set out in Article 66 § 1 of Law no. 6216. As distinct from Article 138 of
the Constitution, it is indicated in that provision that the Constitutional
Court’s judgments shall have a binding effect also on the judicial authorities.
In this respect, there is no hesitation in respect of the binding nature of the
Constitutional Court’s decisions including those rendered through individual
application mechanism. Indeed, regard being had to the judgments rendered by
the Court of Cassation and the Council of State that emphasize the binding
nature of the individual application judgments of the Constitutional Court, it
also appears that, in this respect, there is no practical problem in the
Turkish legal system (see above §§ 22-24).
64. In
addition, the Constitutional Court is empowered, by virtue of Article 148 of
the Constitution, to examine the constitutionality of laws, decree laws and the
Rules of Procedure of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (“the GNAT”) and,
through individual application mechanism, to examine and adjudicate the alleged
violation of fundamental rights and freedoms safeguarded by the Constitution
only after the exhaustion of all available ordinary legal remedies.
65. In Article
153 § 1 of the Constitution, it is set forth that the Constitutional Court’s
judgments are final. The same provision is included also in Article 66 § 1 of
Law no. 6216. Neither the Constitution nor the above-mentioned Law points out
an authority to which an application may be lodged against the Constitutional
Court’s judgments. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court is exclusively vested
with the authority to examine and to adjudicate, in a final and binding manner,
the constitutionality of laws, decree laws and the Rules of Procedure of the
GNAT as well as acts, actions and omissions of the public authorities.
66. In this
regard, no other authority is entitled to review and monitor whether the Constitutional
Court’s judgment, where it finds a violation of a fundamental right and freedom
through individual application mechanism, is constitutional or not. Otherwise,
it would be contrary to the second sentence of Article 6 § 3 of the Constitution
which reads as follows: “No person or agency shall exercise any state
authority which does not emanate from the Constitution”.
67. Implementation
of a judgment in which the Constitutional Court finds violation of a
fundamental right and freedom is a necessity resulting from the Constitutional
Court’s authority and duty to adjudicate the individual applications. Given the
rationale of the relevant constitutional amendment (see above § 48), one of the
objectives sought to be achieved by introducing individual application
mechanism before the Constitutional Court is to establish an effective domestic
remedy for the alleged violation of fundamental rights and freedoms and,
thereby, to decrease the number of applications before the ECtHR against Turkey.
A judicial remedy incapable of being final and binding cannot be regarded as
effective. Indeed, the ECtHR, which concludes in its Hasan Uzun v. Turkey judgment
that the individual application mechanism introduced by the Constitutional
Court is a domestic remedy required to be exhausted before lodging an
application with itself, makes a reference to Article 153 § 6 of the
Constitution therein and accordingly takes into account the binding effect of
the Constitutional Court’s judgments over all natural and legal persons, as
well as the state organs (see above § 30).
68. Besides,
Article 153 § 6 of the Constitution sets forth that “Constitutional Court’s
judgments shall be immediately published in the Official Gazette”. Taken in
conjunction with the other constitutional provisions, this provision cannot be
interpreted that all judgments of the Constitutional Court are to be published
in the Official Gazette and those which are not published in the Official
Gazette would not bear any legal consequence. As a matter of fact, the
Constitution explicitly indicates which judgments of the Constitutional Court
would have legal effect only after being published in the Official Gazette.
69. In this
respect, in Article 153 § 3 of the Constitution, it is prescribed that laws,
decree laws, or the Rules of Procedure of the GNAT or provisions thereof, shall
cease to have effect from the date when the annulment decisions are published
in the Official Gazette. Besides, Article 69 § 9 of the Constitution sets forth
that the members, including the founders of a political party whose acts or
statements have caused the party to be dissolved permanently shall not be
founders, members, directors or supervisors in any other party for a period of
five years from the date of publication of the Constitutional Court’s final
judgment with its justification. Lastly, it is prescribed in Article 152 of the
Constitution that no claim of unconstitutionality shall be made with regard to
the same legal provision until ten years elapse after publication, in the
Official Gazette, of the judgment of the Constitutional Court dismissing the
application on its merits.
70. The
constitutional amendment of 2010 -vesting the Constitutional with power and
duty to adjudicate the individual applications- includes no provision that
these judgments would bear a legal consequence only after being published in
the Official Gazette. Indeed, in paragraph 5 added by this amendment to Article
153 of the Constitution, it is set forth that procedures and principles with respect
to individual application shall be regulated by law. In Article 50 § 3 of Law
no. 6216 enacted after the constitutional amendment and setting out the working
principles and procedures of the Constitutional Court, it is primarily set out
that the individual application judgments on the merits, along with the
justifications thereof, shall be remitted to those concerned and the Ministry
of Justice and published on the webpage of the Constitutional Court. It is
subsequently set forth that “Issues pertaining to which of such judgments
are to be published in the Official Gazette shall be indicated in the Internal
Regulation”. Accordingly, Article 81 § 5 of the Internal Regulation points
out the judgments to be published in the Official Gazette at the Constitutional
Court’s discretion. In this respect, for the individual application judgments
to bear a legal consequence, the lawmaker takes as a basis, by virtue of its
power vested by the Constitution, not the publishing of the judgments in the
Official Gazette but their notification to those concerned.
b. Application of Principles to the
Present Case
71. In its
previous judgment on the present case, the Constitutional Court found a
violation of the right to personal liberty and security safeguarded by Article
19 of the Constitution, as well as the freedoms of expression and of the press
respectively safeguarded by Articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution. It also
held that the judgment be sent to the incumbent court in order to redress the
violation and its consequences.
72. In his
previous individual application, the applicant had maintained that he had been
detained on remand without a strong indication of guilt on the part of him,
which had been in breach of Article 19 of the Constitution (see Şahin Alpay,
§ 66).
73. The right
to personal liberty and security falls into the common protection area of Article
19 of the Constitution and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. One of the issues encompassed by Article 19 of the Constitution is
detention measure (see Bekir Akkaya, no. 2014/20387, 14 September 2017,
§ 32). As a matter of fact, this measure is explicitly prescribed in paragraph
3 of this Article. Therefore, there is no doubt that every person can lodge an
individual application with the Constitutional Court for the alleged violation
of her/his personal liberty and security due to detention and that the Court
must examine and adjudicate on such complaints.
74. In its
previous judgment, the Constitutional Court examined the applicant’s abovementioned
allegation under Article 19 § 3 of the Constitution, which sets forth the
safeguards concerning detention measure within the scope of the right to
personal liberty and security. It is clearly provided therein, by the phrase “Individuals
against whom there is strong evidence of having committed an offence may be
arrested…”, that one of the constitutional safeguards against detention is
the existence of “a strong indication of guilt”.
75. Therefore,
it is a constitutional obligation for the Constitutional Court to examine
whether there exists “a strong indication of guilt” concerning detentions
subject to individual applications alleging violation of the right to personal
liberty and security. The Constitutional Court cannot be expected to make an
examination with respect to fundamental rights and freedoms by ignoring a
safeguard explicitly enshrined in the Constitution. Otherwise, it would be
impossible to examine individual applications complaining of violation of
fundamental rights and freedoms within the framework of the criteria prescribed
in the Constitution.
76. Essentially,
in every concrete case, it falls in the first place upon the incumbent courts
deciding detention cases to determine whether the prerequisite for detention,
i.e. the strong indication of guilt, exists. This is because those authorities
which have direct access to the parties and evidence are in a better position
than the Constitutional Court in making such determinations (see Gülser
Yıldırım (2) [Plenary], no. 2016/40170, 16 November 2017, § 123). However,
determinations of these authorities are subject to review of the Constitutional
Court. This review must be conducted especially over the detention process and
the grounds of detention order by having regard to the circumstances of the
concrete case (see Erdem Gül and Can Dündar [Plenary], no. 2015/18567,
25 February 2016, § 79; and Selçuk Özdemir [Plenary], no. 2016/49158, 26
July 2017, § 76; and Gülser Yıldırım (2), cited-above, § 124).
77. Besides,
within the meaning of Article 19 § 3 of the Constitution, it is a
constitutional obligation for the inferior courts deciding detention cases to
demonstrate existence of strong indication of guilt −the prerequisite for
detention− on the basis of concrete facts. This cannot be regarded as
premature statement of the opinion by a judge concerning the merits of the case
(ihsas-ı rey). In this respect, it is out of question not to fulfil a
constitutional obligation due to the prohibition of such premature statements.
Moreover, Article 101 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure no. 5271 and dated
4 December 2004 also sets forth that in detention orders, evidence which
demonstrates strong indication of guilt must be explicitly demonstrated, along
with the concrete facts supporting such evidence.
78. In its
previous judgment, the Constitutional Court reviewed the case with the
abovementioned scope and method and concluded that the investigation
authorities failed to sufficiently demonstrate “the strong indication of
guilt”, a prerequisite for detention pursuant to Article 19 of the
Constitution. Accordingly, in this judgment, the Constitutional Court made an
examination as to the right to personal liberty and security, −one of the
fundamental rights and freedoms falling into the scope of the individual
application−, under a safeguard explicitly enshrined in Article 19 of the
Constitution. Therefore, the Court’s review cannot be regarded as “the assessment
of the issues to be considered in appellate review” or “a substantive review”
(see above §§ 53 and 55). Furthermore, as also expressed in the previous
judgment, the Constitutional Court’s review in this respect is limited to the
assessment of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention on remand,
independently of the investigation and prosecution conducted against the
applicant as well as the possible results of the proceedings (see Şahin
Alpay, § 71). Therefore, the judgment in question cannot be considered to
have included an assessment as to the merits of the criminal proceedings
against the applicant.
79. In
addition, in its previous judgment, the Constitutional Court held that the
judgment be remitted to the incumbent court in order to redress the previously
found violation and its consequences. There is no doubt that the Constitutional
Court’s judgment finding a violation with respect to the applicant is final and
binding. The Constitutional Court’s judgments finding a violation cannot be
subject to constitutional or legal review by another authority. The contrary
assessments of the inferior courts adjudicating on the applicant’s requests for
release (see above § 18) lack any constitutional or legal basis. Besides, in
order for the judgment finding a violation in respect of the applicant to bear
a legal consequence, its publishing in the Official Gazette is not a requisite.
In this respect, its notification to the relevant authority would suffice (see
above § 70).
80. In
circumstances where the Constitutional Court finds a violation and orders
redress of this violation and consequences thereof, the relevant authorities
must act in a manner that would redress the violation and its consequences by
paying due regard to the nature of the judgment finding violation (see above §§
57 and 58). Accordingly, in the present case, the inferior courts’ duty is not
to assess the scope of duties and powers of the Constitutional Court but to
redress the violation and its consequences. This cannot be construed as an
order or instruction directed to courts within the meaning of Article 138 of
the Constitution, but rather the materialization of the right of access to a
court in a state of law. Indeed, as stated above, Article 153 § 6 of the
Constitution, distinctively from Article 138 thereof, explicitly states that
the judgments of the Constitutional Courts are binding on judicial authorities
as well (see above § 63).
81. In its
judgment finding a violation in respect of the applicant, the Court concluded
that the investigation authorities could not sufficiently demonstrate a “strong
indication” that the applicant committed an offence, which is a prerequisite
for detention as set forth in Article 19 of the Constitution.
82. Following
the Constitutional Court’s such judgments finding a violation, the inferior
courts must release the applicant against whom the prerequisite of detention
could not be demonstrated. There is no other way to redress the violation and
its consequences, save very exceptional cases where “a strong indication of
guilt” can be demonstrated on the basis of new facts other than those that had
been relied for detention and, therefore, that had not been assessed in the
Constitutional Court’s judgment finding a violation. It must be also stressed,
however, the margin of appreciation afforded to the inferior courts in this
respect is very limited compared to the initial detention order. In such cases,
final assessment as to whether “a strong indication of guilt” has been
demonstrated or not on the basis of new facts and evidence falls upon the
Constitutional Court.
83. In the
present case, the inferior courts have not released the applicant following the
Constitutional Court’s judgment finding a violation, nor have they demonstrated
the existence of the abovementioned exceptional case.
84. Therefore,
it is understood that the inferior courts have failed to redress the violation
found by the Constitutional Court with respect to the applicant, as well as its
consequences.
85. In this
respect, in the absence of a strong indication of guilt on the part of the
applicant, continuation of his detention on remand violates the safeguards
provided in Article 19 of the Constitution.
86. It is
concluded that the applicant’s right to personal liberty and security has been
violated due to non-implementation of the Constitutional Court’s judgment on
the applicant’s detention on remand, in a manner also contradicting the
safeguards inherent in the right to access to a court.
87. Besides,
regard being had to the fact that the application in essence concerns the
continuation of the applicant’s detention on remand in spite of the Court’s judgment
finding a violation for non-existence of a strong indication of guilt, the
Constitutional Court made no further examination on the applicant’s allegations
that his some other fundamental rights and freedoms were also violated due to
continuation of his detention on remand.
3. Application of Article 50 of Code
no. 6216
88. The
applicant requested discontinuation of his detention on remand and to be
awarded 100,000 Turkish Liras (“TRY”) as non-pecuniary damage.
89. The
applicant is still detained on remand (see above § 21). Considering the nature
of the violation found, there is no other way than releasing the applicant in
order to redress the violation and its consequences. Therefore, the judgment
must be remanded to the trial court for release of the applicant in order to
redress the violation and its consequences.
90. A net
amount of TRY 20,000 must be awarded to the applicant for non-pecuniary damages
that he suffered due to the interference with his right to personal liberty and
security and that cannot be redressed by only finding a violation.
91. The court
expense of TRY 2,274.70, including the court fee of TRY 294.70 and counsel fee
of TRY 1,980, which is calculated over the documents in the case file, must be
reimbursed to the applicant.
VI. JUDGMENT
The Constitutional Court unanimously
held on 15 March 2018 that
A. The
applicant’s alleged violation of his right to personal liberty and security be
DECLARED ADMISSIBLE.
B. The right
to personal liberty and security safeguarded by Article 19 of the Constitution
was VIOLATED.
C. A copy of
the judgment be REMITTED to the 13th Chamber
of the Istanbul Assize Court (E.2017/112) for redress of the violation and its
consequences by means of ordering discontinuation of the applicant’s detention
on remand.
D. A net
amount of TRY 20,000 be PAID to the applicant in respect of non-pecuniary
damage, and his other compensation claims be REJECTED.
E. The total
court expense of TRY 2,274.70 including the court fee of TRY 294.70 and counsel
fee of TRY 1,980 be REIMBURSED TO THE APPLICANT.
F. The payment
be made within four months as from the date when the applicant applies to the
Ministry of Finance following the notification of the judgment. In case of any
default in payment, legal INTEREST ACCRUE for the period elapsing from the
expiry of four-month time limit to the payment date.
G. A copy of
the judgment be SENT to the Ministry of Justice.